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Financial markets are vital for capital allocation and as a consequence, for the wider economy. 
They perform two primary functions: liquidity and price discovery. Liquidity refers to the 
ability to trade large quantities of an instrument quickly, and with relatively little price impact. 
Therefore, it offers investors the flexibility to make investment decisions. Price discovery 
encompasses the price formation process in financial markets and is, therefore, critical for 
efficient capital allocation. Both these functions are linked to the functioning of the wider 
economy. Over the last decade, financial markets have been transformed with the help of 
technology and are now a completely different proposition. Specifically, technological 
advancements, such as high frequency trading (HFT), have altered the structure of financial 
markets, the strategies of traders, and the liquidity and price discovery processes. These 
changes and developments have ignited a heated debate among academics and regulators. 
While some researchers claim that HFTs increase the market efficiency by improving the 
liquidity and price discovery (see as an example, Brogaard et al., 2014b), others argue that they 
create adverse selection risks for slow traders and contribute to market instability by 
exacerbating illiquidity shocks, such as flash crashes (see as an example, Kirilenko et al., 2017). 
Motivated by these contrasting views, this thesis investigates these issues, and is therefore 
situated at the intersection of financial markets, technology and regulations. It specifically 
examines the topical issues around the transformative role of technology in financial markets 
by adopting novel and unique approaches. In the first study, I present a novel framework 
illustrating the links between order aggressiveness and flash crashes. My framework involves 
a trading sequence beginning with significant increases in aggressive sell orders relative to 
aggressive buy orders until instruments’ prices fall to their lowest levels. Thereafter, a rise in 
aggressive buy orders propels the prices back to their pre-crash levels. Using a sample of S&P 
500 stocks trading during the May 6 2010 flash crash, I show that the framework is correctly 
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specified and provides a basis for linking flash crashes to aggressive strategies, which are found 
to be more profitable during flash crashes. The second study is a methodological contribution 
to the financial econometrics literature, in which I propose a state space modelling approach 
for decomposing a high frequency trading volume into liquidity- and information-driven 
components. Using a set of high frequency S&P 500 stocks data, I show that the model is 
empirically relevant, and that informed trading is linked to a reduction in volatility, illiquidity 
and toxicity/adverse selection. Furthermore, I observe that my estimated informed trading 
component of volume is a statistically significant predictor of one-second stock returns; 
however, it is not a significant predictor of one-minute stock returns. I show that this disparity 
can be explained through the HFT activity, which eliminates pricing inefficiencies at high 
frequencies. The third study exploits the impact of the international transmission latency on 
liquidity and volatility by constructing a measure of the transmission latency between 
exchanges in Frankfurt and London and exploiting speed-inducing technological upgrades. I 
find that a decrease in the transmission latency increases the liquidity and volatility. In line 
with the existing theoretical models, I show that the amplification of liquidity and volatility is 
associated with the variations in adverse selection risk and aggressive trading. I then investigate 
the net economic effect of high latency, which lead to the finding that the liquidity deterioration 
effect of high latency dominates its volatility reducing effect. This implies that the liquidity 
enhancing benefit of increased trading speed in financial markets outweighs its volatility 
inducing effect.  
 
Keywords: trading volume, permanent component, transitory component, market quality, time 
series models, state space modelling, transmission latency, microwave connection, high-
frequency trading, liquidity, volatility, order aggressiveness, algorithmic trading, asymmetric 
information, extreme price movement, high-frequency data, logistic regression. 
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1. Introduction  
1.1 A summary of the thesis 
Technological advancements have significantly altered the nature of trading in financial 
markets; the structure of financial markets, the strategies of traders, and the mechanisms of 
liquidity and price discovery are completely different today. One of the most important 
implications of the evolution of technology in financial markets is HFT, which has grown 
tremendously over the past decade and now drives at least half of all the trading in major 
financial markets (see Brogaard et al., 2014b). In response to the changes in the structure of 
financial markets, and in order to ensure a stronger level of competition and a more efficient 
pricing system, new trading rules and regimes, such as the Regulation National Market System 
(Reg NMS) and the Markets in Financial Instrument Directives (MiFID), have been 
implemented. These new trading rules have further altered critical market processes and 
mechanisms, resulting in an even more complex market structure. Therefore, it is vital to 
examine the effects of these developments in financial markets. This thesis directly addresses 
the questions arising from these developments, and consequently fills a yawning gap in the 
existing literature.  
The evidence regarding the impact of technological advancements on financial markets 
has hitherto been inconsistent. While some studies show the positive impact of HFTs on 
liquidity and price discovery (see as examples Brogaard et al., 2014b; Hendershott et al., 2011; 
Hoffmann, 2014), others suggest that HFTs can increase the adverse selection (and hence, 
deteriorate liquidity) and contribute to flash crashes (see as examples, Biais et al., 2015; 
Foucault et al., 2016; Foucault et al., 2017; Hendershott and Moulton, 2011; Kirilenko et al., 
2017). Motivated by these contrasting predictions/findings, I conduct three studies examining 
the questions linked to the recent major developments and challenges in financial markets. 
Specifically, I investigate the role of aggressive traders in flash crashes in HFT-driven markets, 
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the effects of informed/liquidity trading on financial markets at high frequency, and the 
relationship between speed/latency and the market quality. I directly contribute to the literature 
through the investigations described below. The contributions and research questions of the 
thesis are briefly discussed in the following paragraphs.  
Chapter 2 contains an investigation of the contribution of aggressive orders to flash 
crashes by proposing a novel framework illustrating the links between order aggressiveness 
and flash crashes. The framework is a hypothetical three-stage trading strategy, which 
generates a similar price evolution process to flash crashes and provides more profit for 
aggressive traders under some conditions. The framework motivates three important 
predictions. First, excessive sell order aggressiveness creates a downward pulling effect on 
stock prices prior to and during the first half of flash crashes. Then, in the second stage of flash 
crashes, the balance of order aggressiveness shifts to the buy side which generates an increasing 
pressure on stock prices. Second, the framework predicts that order aggressiveness prior to 
flash crashes is linked to it. Third, aggressive orders are more profitable during extreme price 
movements; thus, traders tend to behave more aggressively during these periods. Thereafter, I 
test these predictions using ultra-high frequency trading data for the components of the S&P 
500 stock index impacted by the May 6 flash crash, i.e. the biggest flash crash in the financial 
market history. The empirical results are consistent with the framework’s predictions. First, I 
documented that, as predicted by the framework, during the first half of the flash crash stock 
prices going down as a result of excessive aggressive order imbalance favouring the sell side. 
Then, the aggressive order imbalance shifts to the buy side, which pushes the prices back to 
the pre-flash crash level. Second, the study shows that increased build-up order aggressiveness 
contributed to the May 6 2010 flash crash. Third, the findings suggest that aggressive trading 
is significantly more profitable during flash crashes than normal trading periods; the difference 
is both economically and statistically significant. Specifically, an informed/aggressive trader 
could earn up to a cumulative return in excess of 1,482 basis points (bps), based on my analysis 
12 
 
of a sample of flash crash-affected stocks. This chapter differs from previous studies (see as 
examples, Easley et al., 2011; Jacob Leal et al., 2016; Kirilenko et al., 2017) in at least two 
aspects. First, my framework makes no assumptions regarding the liquidity constraints in the 
market, and, therefore, is more consistent with the reality of the HFT-driven financial markets. 
Second, while some studies show the contribution of aggressive traders to the flash crash (see 
as an example Mcinish et al., 2014), to the best of my knowledge, the theoretical framework 
and empirical analysis I present in this study are the first to explain the economic motivation 
for aggressive trading. Explicitly, the results suggest that higher profitability of aggressive 
orders may be a driver of the traders’ aggressiveness during flash crashes.  
In Chapter 3, I propose the state space modelling approach for decomposing a high 
frequency trading volume into liquidity- and information-driven components. More explicitly, 
I demonstrate trading volume as a sum of two unobserved series: a non-stationary permanent 
series and a stationary transitory series. I argue that uninformed/liquidity traders and informed 
traders can be respectively modelled by using estimated permanent and transitory components 
from the state space approach. I then test this argument, i.e. the empirical relevance of the 
proposed state space approach, by developing a set of univariate analysis and multivariate 
regression models. Using a set of high frequency S&P 500 stocks data, I find that the model is 
empirically valid and that informed trading reduces volatility, illiquidity and toxicity/adverse 
selection. The validity of the empirical relevance of the model is further confirmed by the price 
efficiency test prescribed in Chordia et al. (2002; 2008).  Specifically, I demonstrate that one-
second stock returns can be predicted from the estimated transitory component of the volume, 
which implies that the transitory component of the state space approach can indeed provide a 
signal about informed trading. However, I observe that both Chordia et al.’s (2008) and my 
informed trading proxies are not able to predict one-minute stock returns. By using the 




This chapter makes the following contributions to the existing literature. First, the 
proposed state space modelling approach is fundamentally different from the existing 
decomposition methods and has significant economic worth. Second, I examine the role of 
informed trading activity in market quality by using a relevantly new proxy – market toxicity 
– which is not well-documented in the literature. Finally, I present new evidence on the speed 
of price adjustment in HFT-driven markets.  
The study reported in Chapter 4 involves estimating the information transmission 
latency (TL) between a home exchange in Frankfurt and a satellite exchange in London; 
subsequently, its effect on the liquidity and volatility of cross-listed stocks in the satellite 
market is examined. This study provides important empirical findings. First, I find that the TL 
between Frankfurt and London is 3–5ms. Second, and more importantly, my findings suggest 
that while higher transmission speed improves the market quality by increasing liquidity, it 
nevertheless raises volatility, and thus, harms the market quality. By adopting a quasi-
experimental setting, I show that the positive relationship between the transmission speed and 
liquidity/volatility is causal. Furthermore, I show that channels proposed by various theoretical 
models, i.e. adverse selection avoidance and aggressiveness, can explain the main findings – 
the positive relationship between speed and liquidity/volatility. Finally, I report that the net 
economic impact of high speed is positive for the economy.  
My contributions to the existing literature are as follows. First, the study is the first to 
empirically estimate the TL between the two biggest European financial centres, Frankfurt and 
London. The highly fragmented characteristic of the European trading venues makes it 
particularly important for this region. Second, I provide causal evidence on the direct impact 
of speed on volatility, which is unclear in the literature. Third, the latency metric I constructed, 
TL, is more relevant for fragmented financial markets, and it implies that it has further 
economic insight and is more consistent with the reality of trading in modern financial markets. 
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Finally, the study investigates the net economic effect of high speed, which is unclear in the 
HFT literature and thus, has many important implications for the wider economy. 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 individually focus on a single issue, as stand-alone studies. I use 
the US and European stocks as sample data for empirical tests across the three chapters. The 
next part of this section discusses the literature related to my studies. 
 
1.2 Financial markets: microstructure and technology 
Financial market microstructure is the branch of financial economics, dedicated to the 
study of pricing dynamics of financial securities and the mechanisms used for trading those 
securities. According to Madhavan (2000, p.205) “market microstructure studies the process 
by which investors’ latent demands are ultimately translated into prices and volumes”. 
Whereas O'Hara (1995) views market microstructure as involving an investigation of the way 
in which price discovery is affected by trading mechanisms. Furthermore, O'Hara (2003) 
argues that market microstructure mainly analyses two important functions of financial 
markets: liquidity and price discovery. Financial markets impact the wider economy through 
these two channels, and thus, well-functioning financial markets are essential for the stability 
of the financial system and long-term economic growth. Hence, examining the microstructure 
of financial markets is vital and has many important implications.  
 O'Hara (2015) suggests that technological advancements have altered the entire system 
of financial markets; therefore, investigating the implications of these changes for market 
microstructure is important. The author further argues that researchers must change their 
directions to reflect the fundamental differences in the new market microstructure, i.e. the high 
frequency market microstructure.  
While the intersection of financial markets and technology has several implications, in 
this section, I provide the literature review for two of them, namely HFT and market 
fragmentation, as they are directly linked to the studies investigated in this thesis; the most 
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important result of the intersection of financial markets and technology is HFT. The evidence 
of the impact of HFT on financial markets has so far been inconsistent. While some studies 
find that HFTs improve the liquidity and price discovery process (see as examples, Brogaard 
et al., 2014b; Hendershott et al., 2011), others suggest that they increase the adverse selection 
risks for slow market makers and exacerbate price crashes (Biais et al., 2015; SEC, 2010).  
For example, Jovanovic and Menkveld (2016) propose a model where HFTs interact 
with investors in a limit order book; the authors assume that HFTs are equipped with hard 
information about the common values of assets. The study shows that HFTs use their speed 
advantage to avoid being adversely selected and thereby, increase liquidity and reduce the 
adverse selection in financial markets. Furthermore, their findings suggest that well-designed 
double auctions maximise the welfare impact of HFTs. Similar to Jovanovic and Menkveld 
(2016), Hoffmann (2014) also shows that HFTs can reduce adverse selection by avoiding it 
and increasing the trade. However, the study finds that if the proportion of HFTs is not given 
exogenously, they can cause social welfare loss. The predictions of the abovementioned studies 
are empirically confirmed by Hendershott et al. (2011). Hendershott et al. (2011) conducts one 
of the first studies that examined the role of Algorithmic Trading (AT) in the market quality. 
By using the New York Stock Exchange’s automated quote dissemination in 2003 as an 
exogenous shock, the study finds that AT improves the liquidity and reduces (increase) the 
noise (efficient) price discovery. Similar to Hendershott et al. (2011), Brogaard et al. (2014b) 
also find that HFTs increase (reduce) the efficient (noise) price discovery. The study conducts 
an analysis using the NASDAQ-provided HFT data, and by employing the state space 
approach, described in Menkveld et al. (2007), to decompose the price discovery into efficient 
and noise parts. 
The negative impact of HFT on financial markets is modelled by Biais et al. (2015), 
Foucault et al. (2016), and Foucault et al. (2017). Biais et al. (2015) develop a simple model 
where financial institutions have heterogeneous private valuations and private information. 
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While heterogeneous private valuations create additional gains from trades, private information 
causes adverse selection for slow traders. More importantly, the authors show that as a result 
of the negative externality of fast trading, i.e. adverse selection impact, investments in fast 
trading exceed their utility and hence, fast trading reduces social welfare. The study proposes 
various approaches that allow all traders, slow and fast, to obtain social gains. Foucault et al. 
(2016) build on Kyle (1985) and allow one speculator (slow or fast) and one competitive dealer 
in the model. The study shows that when the speculator is fast, the dealer has a higher adverse 
selection risk and thus, the market is less liquid. Furthermore, in the model, the speed of price 
discovery is independent on the types of speculators (fast or slow), since the fast speculator’s 
trades have less (more) information content for long-run (short-run) price changes, and these 
two effects offset each other. Similar to Biais et al. (2015) and Foucault et al. (2016), Foucault 
et al. (2017) also show that HFT can raise adverse selection in financial markets. The study 
argues that there are two possible channels for arbitrage opportunities: (1) demand and supply 
shocks (price pressures) and (2) asynchronous adjustments in asset prices. The study models 
the latter channel and demonstrates that while HFTs improve price efficiency in financial 
markets, they increase the adverse selection for dealers. The prediction of the mentioned 
theories, i.e. positive relation between HFT and the adverse selection cost, is empirically 
confirmed by Hendershott and Moulton (2011). Hendershott and Moulton (2011) find that 
although automation trading systems make the prices more efficient, these systems increase 
adverse selection and thereby, raise the cost of immediacy. 
 Kirilenko et al. (2017) empirically show that HFTs behave differently than traditional 
market makers during the flash crash. More specifically, the study reveals that during the May 
6 flash crash, the trading strategies of HFTs are based more on quote sniping and latency 
arbitrage rather than traditional market making strategies. This implies that HFTs may 
adversely select/stale quotes of slower market makers during extreme price movements; 
therefore, while HFTs did not trigger the flash crash, they contributed towards it (see also SEC, 
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2010). By contrast, Brogaard et al. (2014a) show that although the profits of HFTs are high 
during extreme price movements, there is little evidence of HFTs causing extreme price 
movements. Furthermore, the study states that while HFTs provide liquidity when a single 
stock experiences extreme price movements, they demand liquidity in multi stocks case, i.e. 
when there are simultaneous extreme price movements in multiple stocks. In addition to these 
studies, Easley et al. (2011), Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016), Madhavan (2012), and Menkveld 
and Yueshen (2017) show other technology-linked factors that are susceptible to contribute to 
flash crashes. Further literature about the impact of HFTs on financial markets and wider 
economy can be found in Menkveld (2016). 
Another noteworthy outcome of the intersection of financial markets and technology is 
market fragmentation. Market fragmentation implies that stock trading is spread across 
multiple financial markets. Although the impact of this phenomenon on market quality has 
been extensively investigated in the market microstructure field, the studies do not have a 
consensus. On the one hand, O'Hara and Ye (2011) show that market fragmentation improve 
the market quality by lowering the transaction costs and increasing the execution speeds (see 
also Battalio, 2012). On the other, Bennett and Wei (2006) find that when stocks switch from 
a more fragmented market (NASDAQ) to a less fragmented one (NYSE), they experience the 
better market quality and more efficient price discovery.  
While market fragmentation is not directly studied in this thesis, one of the most 
important and HFT-related implications of it – the transmission latency between financial 
markets – is investigated. Shkilko and Sokolov (2016) examine liquidity when weather-related 
episodes disrupt the microwave transmission between the lead and lag markets; they find that 
adverse selection and trading costs decline and the liquidity improves during these periods, 
implying that a higher transmission speed between trading venues may harm the market 
quality. Menkveld and Zoican (2017) and Baron et al. (2018) also investigate the role of speed 
differentials in financial markets, however, by focussing more on a consolidated market 
18 
 
structure rather than a fragmented one. More explicitly, Menkveld and Zoican (2017) 
theoretically model the HFT arms race. The study extends Budish et al.’s (2015) model by 
adding the impact of exchange speed to it. Their model explains the impact of exchange speed 
on the market quality by using two contrasting channels. In the first channel, high frequency 
market makers (HFMs) obtain speed advantages as a result of the improvements in exchange 
latency; by doing so, they avoid being adversely selected and improve liquidity. In the second 
case, high frequency speculators (HFSs) obtain speed advantages as a result of improvements 
in the exchange latency; thereby, they adversely select the HFMs’ orders, leading them to 
widen the bid-ask spread to compensate for the increased adverse selection risk. The widening 
of the bid-ask spread implies a deterioration in liquidity. The authors further analyse the net 
effect of the exchange speed improvements and show that it depends on the news-to-liquidity 
ratio of the asset. Specifically, Menkveld and Zoican (2017) present that the former (latter) 
channel is strong when the news-to-liquidity ratio is high (low). Baron et al. (2018) study the 
relationship between speed differentials and the trading revenue in a single market and find 
that the fastest firms (HFTs) can generally earn the largest trading revenues. 
 
1.3 Background 
In this section, I provide detailed information on the structures of the markets 
investigated in the thesis. I further discuss a few of the key aspects and regulations that should 




1.3.1 U.S. Markets: The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Nasdaq Stock Market 
(NASDAQ) 
As of January 2007, the NYSE is a hybrid market, and in terms of liquidity, it is 
considered the best exchange in the US.1 The NYSE’s market model mainly consists of three 
players: (1) the designated market makers (DMMs), (2) the floor brokers, and (3) the 
supplemental liquidity providers (SLPs). The DMMs improve price discovery and liquidity by 
maintaining well-coordinated markets. Furthermore, the DMMs minimise the order latency by 
matching the incoming orders from traders. Previously, the NYSE used the specialists instead 
of the DMMs. In order to eliminate the issue of front running, the NYSE replaced specialists 
by the DMMs. Explicitly, while the specialists could see all incoming orders, the DMMs do 
not have an advanced view and they thus behave like a regular market participant. As of 2017, 
there are five DMMs in the NYSE. 
The floor brokers execute transactions, i.e. buying and selling stock, on behalf of their 
firm’s clients. Their firm should be the member firm of the NYSE. The SLPs are established 
by the NYSE to improve liquidity and they are electronic, high-volume members of the 
marketplace. One of the most important obligations of the SLPs is to keep a bid price at the 
National Best Bid or Offer (NBBO) level, at least 10% of the trading day. Six order types are 
commonly used in the NYSE. They are immediate or cancel, displayed limit, displayed limit 
reserve, non-displayed limit, auction, and other. Almost half of all orders are immediate or 
cancel and displayed limit orders.  
Similar to the NYSE, the NASDAQ is also considered a hybrid market. The NASDAQ 
is considered the largest trading venue by volume in the US.2 While both of them are hybrid 
markets, in contrast to auction market system of the NYSE (at market open and close), the 
NASDAQ is a purely dealer’s market. More explicitly, in the NASDAQ market, security 





transactions are executed through dealers. However, at market open and close periods, market 
participants can buy and sell securities from each other in the NYSE. Another important 
difference is in terms of their market models. As already noted, the NYSE relies on the DMMs 
and the SLPs for providing liquidity and efficient trading/price discovery processes. However, 
the NASDAQ is a purely electronic market and therefore, has different “traffic control” 
mechanism, i.e. the electronic market makers. In contrast to the NYSE, in the NASDAQ 
exchange, each stock has more than one market maker. The NASDAQ’s market maker buys 
and sells securities at the NASDAQ’s prices and can execute transactions for his/her own 
account as well as his/her client’s account. The NASDAQ uses the price-time priority rule to 
execute transactions and has various types of orders, such as intermarket sweep orders, post-
only orders, supplemental orders, and more. 
 
1.3.2 European Markets: Deutsche Börse Xetra (Xetra) and Cboe European Equities 
(CBOE) 
Xetra is a main German stock exchange where 90% of security trading at all German 
exchanges are executed. Furthermore, 30% of all exchange traded funds (ETFs) in Europe are 
transacted at this trading venue. Xetra uses “continuous trading with auctions” for securities; 
this model is a combination of continuous trading and auctions. Through the continuous trading 
mechanism, liquid securities are executed immediately at the current market price. In addition 
to this continuous trading system, three auctions are organised during the day. By adopting 
auctions, Xetra aims to determine the price level for the exchange which can be used by 
institutional investors for valuing their trading positions. In addition to this system, Xetra offers 
the designated sponsors (DSs). The primary aim of the DSs is to provide liquidity for less liquid 
securities. Xetra also has the regulated market makers (RMMs) who provide liquidity to the 
market and have similar obligations to the DSs. The major difference between the RMMs and 
the DSs is their requirements. More specifically, while the RMMs should include a presence 
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of at least 50% during continuous trading, this number is 90% in equities and 80% in ETFs for 
the DSs. The basic types of orders used by market participants in Xetra are market order, limit 
order, stop market order, stop limit order, and trailing stop order. 
CBOE is the largest European trading venue in terms of the value traded, and was 
formed through the merging of BATS Europe and Chi-X Europe in 2011. CBOE offers an 
excess to 18 major European financial markets, and more than 6,000 securities are traded 
through this venue. 
CBOE continuously accepts orders from 08:00 to 16:30 and further, has a periodic 
auctions book which aims to publish the prices and order quantity, prior to the order execution. 
CBOE uses the post trade model and offers the central counterparty (CCP) to provide liquidity 
to the venue. This market participant is used by trading participants to clear their trades. More 
specifically, the CCPs can be a buyer (seller) to each seller (buyer). This type of a trading 
model allows participants to trade and clear their trade with minimum cost and counterparty 
risk. 
CBOE operates two lit (BXE-lit and CXE-lit) and two dark order books (BXE-dark and 
CXE-dark). Between these four order books, CBOE holds nearly 25% of the daily equities 
trading in European markets. The lit order books have four categories of orders: (1) visible 
orders, (2) interbook orders, (3) hidden orders and (4) peg orders. Each order category has 
different order types. For example, visible orders have visible limit order, post only order, and 
reserve order types. There are two order categories in the dark order books: minimum 
acceptable quantity and midpoint peg orders. 
 
1.3.3 Regulations: The Regulation National Market Systems (Reg NMS) and the Markets 
in Financial Instrument Derivatives (MiFID) 
As previously noted, the new trading rules and regimes have been proposed in response 
to the changes in the structure of financial markets. In this section, I discuss two important 
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regimes, the Regulation National Market System (Reg NMS) and the Markets in Financial 
Instrument Directives (MiFID), which have been respectively implemented in the US and 
European financial markets.  
According to SEC (2005), Reg NMS has four key provisions: (1) the order protection 
rule (OPR), (2) the access rule (AR), (3) the sub-penny rule (SPR), and (4) the market data 
rules (MDR). The OPR has been designed to protect limit orders against trade-throughs – a 
trade-through is an order with a suboptimal price. More specifically, these orders are executed 
at non-optimal prices, even if there is a better price on the same or other exchanges. It is 
important to note that the OPR protects only the displayed and automatically accessible orders. 
The SEC offers the OPR to strengthen price discovery and market efficiency by protecting the 
limit orders. The AR has been proposed to set better standards for ruling access to quotations 
in securities. This rule is very vital for the OPR, as market participants and trading centres need 
to have effective access to prices to protect them against a trade-through. The AR rule provides 
more efficient access to quotations using various ways. For instance, the rule allows 
participants to use private linkages in addition to a collective linkage facility. More specifically, 
before the AR rule, traders could use only a collective linkage facility, such as inter-market 
trading systems (ITS), to gain access to the quotations of exchange-listed stocks. These 
collective linkages are generally offered by trading venues. However, following the success of 
private linkages in electronic markets (for example, NASDAQ), the SEC decided to use the 
same connection systems for traditional exchange-listed stocks. In contrast to ITS, private 
linkages are offered by various connection providers and aim to obtain better access to the 
quotations displayed by exchanges. 
The SPR was proposed to prevent market participants from “stepping ahead” of the 
displayed limit orders through trivial amounts. More specifically, the rule implies that 
exchanges cannot accept quotes that are prices in increments of less than $0.01, if the quote 
price is more than $1.00. The main aim of the rule is to improve liquidity by protecting liquidity 
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providers from losing their priority owing to trivial amount changes in order prices. The MDR 
is designed to fairly allocate the market data revenues of self-regulatory organisations (SROs)3 
and, by doing so, promote the wide availability of market data. Before the MDR, the market 
data revenue was allocated according to the number of trades reported by the SROs. However, 
the MDR allocates more revenue to SROs who provide greater contributions to the best 
displayed quotes. Furthermore, in addition to the required best quotes and trades data 
distributed by exchanges through the different plans, the MDR allows exchanges to distribute 
their own data independently. This further promotes the wide availability of market data.  
While the Reg NMS’s OPR mandates the best execution by enforcing trade-through 
provisions, the European equivalent of the all-encompassing financial regulation, the MiFID, 
does not enforce trade-throughs. However, the European regulation/MiFID requires that 
investment firms ensure the best execution on behalf of their firms. This somewhat differs from 
the US regulation/Reg NMS, requiring that platforms forward orders to other platforms 
offering the best execution.  
The MiFID has been designed to promote transparency, competition and integration in 
European financial markets. Two levels of this regulation have been implemented: MiFID and 
MiFID II. The MiFID has been effective from November 2007. The first important implication 
of the MiFID is pre- and post-trade transparency. Pre-trade transparency allows market 
participants to continuously monitor transactions and quotations; thereby, this transparency 
provides traders with the opportunity to immediately obtain new information about the 
fundamental value of assets. It is important to note that pre-trade transparency has been applied 
to lit order books only. Post-trade transparency requires that market participants report their 
post-trade information within three minutes of the relevant trade.  
                                                          
3SROs are multilateral trading platforms such as NYSE. 
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Another important implication of the MiFID has been proposed for market 
fragmentation. The MiFID has been designed to promote competition, and this competition 
leads to more fragmented financial markets in Europe. As pointed out, this implication raises 
an important difference between the MiFID and the Reg NMS. Specifically, while the Reg 
NMS requires orders to be executed at the best bid and ask prices – even if these best prices 
are available at different markets – the MiFID does not have this requirement. Rather, the 
MiFID requires investment firms to take all the necessary steps for the best execution, 
considering the costs, speed and likelihood of execution. Therefore, under the MiFID, orders 
might sometimes be executed at non-optimal prices. 
The MiFID II has been proposed to address the shortcomings of the MiFID, considering 
the consequences of the 2008 financial crisis and was implemented in January 2018. One of 
the important implications of the MiFID II covers the HFT/AT. According to the rule, HFTs 
should disclose their algorithms and test them in specific environments prior to trading in 
financial markets. Furthermore, all HFTs that trade in European markets should register as 
investment firms. To prevent market participants from leaving HFTs during stressed periods, 
MiFID II has set clear “exit” conditions. The MiFID II has also introduced cancellation fees 
for HFTs to mitigate the adverse impact of some HFT strategies, such as quote stuffing. In 
addition to the HFT-related regulations, the MiFID II sets two important limits for dark trading. 
First, in any trading venue, the dark trading volume for each stock should not be more than 4% 
of the total trading volume for that particular stock in that particular venue. Second, the dark 
volume of any stock in all trading venues cannot exceed 8% of the total trading volume of that 






2. Order aggressiveness and flash crashes 
2.1  Introduction 
Flash crashes are characterised by high price volatility, a significant negative return in 
instruments’ prices and are defined by a sharp price reversal (see Aldridge, 2010; Easley et al., 
2011). The most notable flash crash in recent history occurred on May 6, 2010 (see Kirilenko 
et al., 2017). On this day, market indices such as the S&P 500, the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average, the Russell 2000, and the Nasdaq 100, fell significantly before rebounding within an 
extremely short period.  
In the aftermath of the May 6 flash crash there has been a widespread concern that 
trading strategies commonly deployed by the fastest traders in financial markets – the so-called 
high frequency traders (HFTs) – induce or worsen price crashes.4 Kirilenko et al. (2017) argue 
that, although there may be no evidence of HFTs causing the May 6 flash crash, they 
nevertheless exacerbated it by demanding immediacy. The immediacy demanded at a 
heightened pace in a liquidity-constrained environment appeared to have led to an unbearably 
high level of order flow toxicity, thereby worsening the price crash.5 The aggressiveness of 
HFTs in demanding liquidity could therefore be argued to be a major contributing factor to the 
extent of the price crash recorded on May 6, 2010. However, to date, there has been no study 
directly linking order aggressiveness6 to flash crashes, with no constraints placed on market 
agents. This chapter addresses this gap in the literature.  
                                                          
4 About five months after the flash crash, on September 30 2010, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) released a study identifying an automated program 
executing the sale of 75,000 E-mini S&P 500 futures contracts as the main trigger for the flash crash (see SEC, 
2010). 
5 Easley et al. (2011) highlight the key role played by order flow toxicity in the occurrence of the flash crash; they 
also propose a measure of order flow toxicity, which they call the Volume-Synchronized Probability of Informed 
Trading (VPIN). 
6 I define aggressive orders in line with the classification approach of  Biais et al. (1995); specifically, aggressive 
orders are defined with respect to their sizes and tendency to cross the spread.  
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This chapter differs from previous studies (see as examples, Easley et al., 2011; Jacob 
Leal et al., 2016; Kirilenko et al., 2017) in at least two respects. Firstly, the links I draw between 
order aggressiveness and flash crashes make no assumptions regarding liquidity constraints in 
the market.7 Secondly, although there are a few studies examining the role of trader 
aggressiveness in flash crashes (see as an example Mcinish et al., 2014), to my knowledge, the 
theoretical framework and empirical analysis I present in this study is the first to explain the 
economic motivation for aggressive trading. Specifically, I show that higher profitability of 
aggressive orders during flash crashes may be a driver of traders’ aggressive trading behaviour 
during periods of extreme price movements.  
My approach involves extending the approach of Menkveld (2013), developed to 
decompose the trading profit in a normal market environment into its spread and positioning 
components. Menkveld (2013) illustrates the decomposition of traders’ profits by presenting 
two extreme cases – aggressive and passive market making trading strategies. The framework 
shows that traders adopting aggressive trading strategies incur losses during normal trading 
days and, therefore, the majority of traders – about 80% – tend to deploy passive market making 
trading strategies. The losses reported for aggressive traders on normal trading days is due to 
incoming market orders adversely selecting aggressive orders in the market (see also Glosten 
and Milgrom, 1985). My extension of this two-stage approach shows how aggressive trading 
strategies affect the price discovery process in financial markets.  
The framework involves a trading sequence beginning with significant increases in 
aggressive sell orders relative to aggressive buy orders until instruments’ prices fall to their 
lowest levels. Thereafter, a rise in aggressive buy orders propels prices back to their pre-crash 
levels. Using the predictions of the framework, I highlight the role of order aggressiveness in 
                                                          
7 Jacob Leal et al. (2016) also develop an agent-based model of a limit-order book to show the impact of HFT on 
financial markets; their HFTs are assumed to deploy only predatory high frequency trading strategies (aggressive 
trading strategies). They conclude that aggressive HFTs are culpable in flash crashes. Consistent with Jacob Leal 
et al. (2016), Mcinish et al. (2014) show that the aggressive behaviour of Intermarket Sweep Orders contributed 
to the May 6, 2010 flash crash. 
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extreme price movements, such as flash crashes, and argue that order aggressiveness can 
contribute to flash crashes.8 In this case, the framework shows that even in a liquid trading 
environment where there are no significant liquidity constraints, order aggressiveness can 
contribute to an environment of severe illiquidity such that prices become extremely volatile, 
as evident during the May 6, 2010 event.  
Furthermore, the framework shows that profits in aggressive trading strategies are 
positive and large during extreme price movements such as flash crashes, and therefore the 
fraction and the number of aggressive orders should be higher during these periods when 
compared with normal trading periods. I decompose the profits of aggressive traders into their 
spread and positioning components and similar to Menkveld (2013), I show that traders are 
confronted with a position profit and, inevitably, a spread loss when they trade aggressively. 
However, unlike during normal trading periods, when markets are volatile, the position profit 
eclipses the spread loss, thus making aggressive trading ultimately profitable during periods of 
high price volatility. Since my framework involving a three-stage aggressive trading strategy, 
which results in a price collapse and a subsequent sharp price reversal, mimics the form of a 
flash crash, I argue that aggressive trading strategies can contribute to flash crashes (see also 
Mcinish et al., 2014). I test the foregoing arguments and framework predictions using ultra-
high frequency trading data for the components of the S&P 500 stock index affected by the 
May 6 flash crash. The empirical results obtained are completely in line with the predictions 
of my framework.  
Firstly, I find that a significant imbalance in order aggressiveness favouring sell orders 
ensues in the run-up to and during the flash crash. I document a significant increase in the 
number of aggressive sell orders relative to aggressive buy orders in the run-up to and during 
the flash crash until instruments’ prices plummeted to their troughs. The increase in aggressive 
                                                          
8 This argument is also motivated by the results of Griffiths et al. (2000) and Wuyts (2011), who show that 
aggressive orders have price impacts larger than those of other trades. 
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sell orders with no corresponding rise in aggressive buy orders precipitated the crash in 
instruments’ prices. This finding is very important, since the total number of aggressive orders 
could be high; however, a significant price crash will only occur if aggressive sell orders 
significantly outstrip aggressive buy orders. This result is consistent with the official reporting 
following the flash crash (see SEC, 2010). 
Secondly, I link the evolution of order aggressiveness to the flash crash within an 
econometric framework, showing that increased order aggressiveness is related to the May 6 
2010 flash crash; hence, a build-up of aggressive orders ahead of the flash crash appears to be 
a contributory factor to the onset of the flash crash.  
Thirdly, I show that aggressive trading is significantly more profitable during periods 
of high price volatility such as flash crashes, than during normal trading periods. The increase 
in profitability is economically meaningful. I find that an informed trader could earn up to a 
cumulative return in excess of 1,482 basis points (bps) based on my analysis of a sample of 
flash crash-affected stocks, this is significantly higher than possible during the non-flash crash 
periods. Consistent with this finding, the fraction of aggressive buy and sell orders during the 
May 6, 2010 flash crash is higher than the fraction of these kinds of orders during other periods 
under investigation. The actual number of aggressive sell and buy limit orders during the flash 
crash is also remarkably higher than during the surrounding periods (before and after the flash 
crash). The results are robust to alternative estimation approaches and model specifications, 
including estimation frequencies. Overall, the empirical results show that the framework is 
correctly specified and the arguments I present valid in the case of the flash crash I examine. 
Thus, my theoretical framework not only predicts the aggressive behaviour of HFTs during the 
flash crash, more importantly, it explains the economic intuition behind this aggressive 





2.2  The approach 
2.2.1 Motivation 
Griffiths et al. (2000) and Wuyts (2011) find that aggressive orders generate larger price 
impacts. Given this finding, there is a case to be made for aggressive orders being culpable in 
inducing extreme price movements, such as flash crashes. However, this argument raises an 
interesting question about why aggressive orders do not always cause flash crashes, given that 
they are likely to be submitted repeatedly on any given day in financial markets. In order to 
examine this question and demonstrate the potential relationship between order aggressiveness 
and flash crashes, I extend the approach of Menkveld (2013). Following Sofianos (1995), 
Menkveld (2013) decomposes the profit of traders into two components: the spread component 
and the positioning component. Menkveld's (2013) framework focuses on two extreme cases 
involving aggressive trading on the one hand and passive market making on the other, by using 
a two-stage approach: 
Aggressive trading strategy 
          
Passive market making strategy                               
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1  are the ask price, the bid-
price and the mid-price at time t1 under passive (market-making) trading strategy, respectively. 
In the first extreme case, i.e. aggressive trading strategy, a trader consumes liquidity in 
order to pursue a fundamental value change, and then quickly follows this with a sell order. By 
submitting a buy limit order at the ask price and a sell limit order at the bid price, the trader 
will make a spread loss at t0 and t1, but will make a position profit at the end of the trading 
session. The trader will adopt this trading strategy if she expects a large position profit at the 
end of the trading session – this is necessary to compensate for the spread losses incurred from 
the first and second trading stages. However, adverse selection is a potential risk here, as the 
position profit could be negative if the trader’s orders are adversely selected by an informed 
market order (see Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). Consistent with this argument, Menkveld 
(2013) finds that position profit is negative in the Dutch stock market during normal trading 
periods – periods of no or very low price volatility. In the second extreme case, i.e. the passive 
market making strategy, a trader acting as a market maker makes a profit from the spread in 
the first and second trading session, and a loss from her position at the end of trading.  
In this chapter, I alter the strategies above and further extend the framework to 
decompose the profit of traders. Specifically, I employ a three-stage approach and alter the 
order of submitted orders to show the relationship between order aggressiveness and flash 
crashes; what this means is that while Menkveld's (2013) framework begins with a buy order, 
my approach begins with a sell limit order. 
 
2.2.2 My three-stage approach 
Trading at t0   
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Traders submit sell limit orders at t0 by following one of two trading strategies (passive 
and aggressive), while the subsisting bid and ask prices, with mid-price
mp
tP0 , are set before 
traders come to the market: 
      












=                                                      (2.1)                                                
I assume that a trader will submit a sell limit order at the prevailing best bid price if she wants 
to adopt an aggressive trading strategy, or a trader will submit a sell limit order at ask price is 
she wants to adopt a passive market making strategy. I focus on one of these extreme cases, an 
aggressive trading strategy, as I aim to illustrate the relationship between order aggressiveness 
and flash crashes. By submitting a sell limit order at the bid price, a trader will make a loss at 
t0. The trading sequence is illustrated below: 
                                  
The loss of my hypothetical aggressive trader is therefore given as: 






t PP 000 −=                                                   (2.2)       
Trading at t1   
Inevitably, different types of trading strategies in t0 will have different impacts on ask 
and bid prices. This implies that bid and ask prices at t1 will be different under either of the two 
extreme (passive and aggressive) strategies/cases. By submitting an aggressive sell limit order 
at t0, the trader consumes liquidity, which in turn induces a price change. An aggressive trading 
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strategy will therefore have a downward pulling effect on bid and ask prices, leading to bid and 
ask prices going down at t1. However, if an aggressive order is adversely selected by an 
incoming informed market order, the price will go up at t1 and the aggressive trader will incur 
a significant position loss. I therefore concentrate on the case where an aggressive order is not 
adversely selected (see Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). This assumption is in line with the recent 
literature, arguing that HFTs can predict adverse selection and therefore are able to avoid 
falling prey to it (see Hirschey, 2017; Hoffmann, 2014; Jovanovic and Menkveld, 2016). This 
assumption is critical for my framework to mimic the price evolution during a flash crash, i.e. 
price falling significantly from the level at t0 to t1.  
During the second trading stage, the aggressive trader submits an aggressive buy limit 
order at the ask price:  
             
The submission of a buy order at the ask price will again lead to the trader incurring losses at 
t1. The payout at this stage will be: 






t PP 111 −=                                                     (2.3) 
Trading at t2   
As earlier stated, the deployed trading strategies will have varying impacts on ask and 
bid prices. An aggressive trading strategy at t1 will generate an increasing pressure on bid and 
ask prices, thus bid and ask prices will appreciate subsequently at t2 and reach initial position 
(t0). If an aggressive order is adversely selected by an incoming informed market order, the 
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price will go down at t2 and the hypothetical trader will again incur significant position loss. 
Therefore, I again assume that an aggressive order is not adversely selected, to mimic the price 
evolution during a flash crash, i.e. price rebounds from t1 to t2 and attains the pre-flash crash 
level.  
I further assume that the asset price at time t2 will be equal to the asset price at time t0. 
This is necessary for the sequence of events/price evolution to be consistent with a flash crash; 
i.e. a sudden/sharp fall in the price of an asset and a full rebound in price shortly afterwards: 
 
By submitting a sell limit order at t2’s bid price, the aggressive trader makes a profit from her 
position and incurs losses from the bid-ask spread. Thus, her position profit and spread loss are 
as follows: 
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t PP 122 −=                                         (2.6) 
To sum up these trading strategies thus far, I can examine the profitability of an 
aggressive trading strategy. By combining the above equations, I generate the following 
equations for an aggressive trading strategy, assuming that the bid and ask prices at time t2 
equal the bid and ask prices at time t0 : 
34 
 








































                    (2.7) 
Typically, a trader should pay the clearing fee and the aggressive exchange fee (usually 
imposed by exchanges on traders consuming liquidity) when she adopts an aggressive trading 
strategy. For simplicity, I assume that these fees are zero. As seen from Equation 2.7, the 
position profit of an aggressive trading strategy is high if there is a sharp reduction in the asset 
price at t1 )( 1
a
tP . The interesting point is that this type of sharp reduction is consistent with the 
extreme price movements documented in the case of flash crashes. Therefore, I argue that 
although Menkveld (2013) shows that position profit is negative during normal trading days, it 
might be large and positive during extreme price movements. This implies that this kind of 
extreme price movement could be profitable for some traders. This argument is consistent with 
Brogaard et al. (2014a), who show that although HFTs do not cause extreme price movements 
such as flash crashes, these types of price movements is more profitable for HFTs. The 
argument raises an interesting question about why traders fail to always adopt an aggressive 
trading strategy and therefore obtain large and positive profitable positions or, more 
specifically, are there some other conditions that ensure that traders become aggressive? I argue 
that there should be other conditions, which are not necessarily directly linked with the traders 
themselves, which may lead to traders choosing an aggressive trading strategy. The important 
point to note is that the price decrease in t1 should be very sharp in order to compensate for the 
losses from the spread. As already stated, that there will be a position loss if the order submitted 
by an aggressive trader is adversely selected by an incoming informed market order (see also 
Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). Therefore, traders must be sure that they do not face adverse 
selection risk when attempting an aggressive trading strategy. Indeed, this argument explains 
Brogaard et al.'s (2014) view regarding the profitability of extreme price movements for HFTs. 
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The ability of HFTs to make hay of volatile trading conditions as described above is not far-
fetched.  Hirschey (2017) argues that HFTs can anticipate buying and selling pressure, which 
could help them avoid being adversely selected when deploying aggressive trading strategies 
(see also Hoffmann, 2014; Jovanovic and Menkveld, 2016). Indeed, Hirschey (2017) finds that 
HFTs’ aggressive sales and purchases consistently lead those of other investors. This implies 
that the framework I illustrate above is more likely to be successfully deployed when it is 
implemented at a high frequency. 
 
2.2.3 Order aggressiveness and flash crashes 
Thus far, I have demonstrated price evolution under an aggressive trading strategy. The 
sequence of aggressive trading strategy I describe is useful for understanding the contribution 
of order aggressiveness to flash crashes. Although, the sequence of orders is not based on the 
May 6 2010 flash crash, the aggressive trading strategy shares three notable characteristics with 
the May 6, 2010 flash crash. Firstly, the price movement under this strategy exactly mimics the 
price movements in the US financial markets during the flash crash, i.e. asset prices collapse 
and rebound very rapidly within a very short period of time.  Secondly, the SEC (2010) finds 
that a large amount of seller-initiated E-mini contracts executed by algorithmic traders 
triggered the flash crash. My approach also begins with a sell limit order. Thirdly, consistent 
with recent empirical findings, my framework also predicts the aggressiveness of  HFTs in 
demanding liquidity during flash crashes (see as an example Kirilenko et al., 2017). Inspired 
by these three commonalities, I argue that an aggressive trading strategy can contribute to flash 
crashes under certain conditions, mainly when there is excessive aggressiveness prior to flash 
crashes and aggressive traders can avoid adverse selection risk. In order to test my arguments, 
using relevant data, I examine the aggressiveness of the order flow during, and prior to, the 
May 6, 2010 flash crash. If, indeed, the predictions of the framework are consistent with the 
flash crash, then, firstly, there should be an excessive sell order aggressiveness in financial 
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markets, which will create a downward pulling effect on prices. Thereafter, the excessive 
aggressiveness should shift to the buy side and as a result, prices will rise. Secondly, the 
fraction and number of aggressive buy and sell orders during the May 6, 2010 flash crash 
should be higher than the fraction of aggressive buy and sell orders during the surrounding 
periods. This is simply because, as I have shown, aggressive orders are more profitable during 
these periods. It is very important to note that I do not argue that the three-stage aggressive 
trading strategy I illustrate in this chapter is the reason for the May 6 flash crash. Rather, I 
argue that order aggressiveness prior and during the May 6, 2010 flash crash contributes to 
flash crashes (see SEC, 2010). 
 
2.3  Data 
2.3.1 Sample selection 
In order to empirically test my hypotheses, as developed above, I focus on the biggest 
and most reported flash crash in the recent financial markets history, the May 6, 2010 flash 
crash experienced in the U.S. markets. The flash crash was one of the most turbulent periods 
in U.S. financial markets history and has been considered to be the most harmful flash crash to 
date, during which the biggest intraday point decline in the history of the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average was recorded. Instruments such as options, exchange-traded funds, and individual 
stocks, also suffered from the May 6, 2010 flash crash.9 I focus on the May 6, 2010 flash crash 
because it provides an ideal ground for testing the relationship between a flash crash and pre-
crash aggressiveness.  
The data employed consists of ultra-high frequency tick-by-tick data for a selection of 
53 S&P 500 stocks sourced from the Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) database. 
                                                          
9 According to SEC (2010), the May 6, 2010 flash crash lasted for approximately 36 minutes and could be viewed 
as consisting of two halves: (1) prices collapse and reach their lowest levels from 2:32 PM to 2:45 PM, (2) prices 
rebound and reach their pre-crash levels from 2:46 PM to 3:08 PM. 
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Appendix 4.B contains a detailed list of all stocks included in the sample.  I obtain data for all 
messages recorded for  May 6, 2010, but focus mainly on the period between 1:30 PM and 4 
PM, since the flash crash started around 2:32 PM and lasted for about 36 minutes (see SEC, 
2010). In the data, each message is recorded with a time stamp to the nearest 1/1000th of a 
second (millisecond). The following variables are included in the dataset: Reuters 
Identification Code (RIC), date, timestamp, price, volume, bid price, ask price, bid volume, 
and ask volume. 
Although the S&P 500 index consists of 500 large companies listed on the NYSE and 
NASDAQ, I select only the 53 stocks deemed to have been severely affected by the flash crash. 
I employ these stocks, because only stocks affected by a flash crash are appropriate for testing 
the predictions of a framework depicting a flash crash. In addition, I select S&P 500 stocks 
because SEC (2010) also examines the impact of the flash crash on individual stocks by using 
a sample selected from this index. SEC (2010) shows that a large trader executing a sell 
program for 75,000 E-mini S&P 500 index futures contracts triggered the flash crash of May 
6, 2010. As the performance of this index future is directly linked with the S&P 500 stocks, it 
is reasonable to select the components of S&P 500 for my analysis. 
Once the raw data is obtained, I determine the prevailing best bid and best ask quotes 
for each transaction by using the order flow as downloaded. I then follow Chordia et al. (2001) 
and Ibikunle (2015) in applying a standard set of exclusion criteria to the data, thus deleting all 
inexplicable observations which might arise due to errors in data entry. 
 
2.3.2  Sample Description 
In order to better observe the dynamics of stocks during the flash crash, I classify the 
sample into three periods: before the flash crash (from 1:30 PM to 2:32 PM), the flash crash 




Table 2. 1 Transactions’ summary statistics and statistical tests 
Panels A and B respectively present trading summary statistics and statistical tests of differences between the 
period of the flash crash and surrounding periods for 53 S&P 500 stocks affected by the May 6, 2010 flash crash. 
The statistical tests conducted are two-sample t-tests and pairwise Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U tests. The sample 
period covers 1:30 PM to 4 PM May 6, 2010. The time series on May 6, 2010 is divided into three: before the 
flash crash (from 1:30 PM to 2:32 PM), the flash crash period (from 2:32 PM to 3:08 PM), and after the flash 
crash (from 3.08 PM to 4 PM). 




Average per minute 
transactions (000s) 
Number of  1:30 PM – 2:32 PM  186.6 3.0 
Transactions 2:32 PM – 3:08 PM 329.9 8.9 
 3:08 PM – 4 PM 405.8 7.8 
 All 922.3 19.7 
 
  
Total trading volume 
(000s) 
Average per minute trading 
volume (000s) 
Trading  1:30 PM – 2:32 PM  62878.8 1014.2 
Volume 2:32 PM – 3:08 PM 98185.5 2653.7 
 3:08 PM – 4 PM 119209.9 2292.5 
 All 280274.2 5960.4 
 
  
Total dollar trading 
volume ($'000,000) 
Average per minute dollar 
trading volume ($'000,000) 
Dollar 1:30 PM – 2:32 PM  2541.6 41.0 
Trading 2:32 PM – 3:08 PM 4332.2 117.1 
Volume 3:08 PM – 4 PM 5239.7 100.8 
 All 12113.5 258.9 
 
Panel B. Statistical tests 
Trading volume 
Method  p-value 
Two-Sample T tests   
Pooled  <0.0001 
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Satterthwaite  <0.0001 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U tests  <0.0001 
Dollar trading volume 
Method  p-value 
Two-Sample T tests   
Pooled  <0.0001 
Satterthwaite  <0.0001 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U tests  <0.0001 
 
Table 2. 2 Order quoting summary statistics 
Table presents order quoting summary statistics for 53 S&P 500 stocks affected by the May 6, 2010 flash crash. 
The sample period covers 1:30 PM to 4 PM May 6, 2010. The time series on May 6, 2010 is divided into three: 
before the flash crash (from 1:30 PM to 2:32 PM), the flash crash period (from 2:32 PM to 3:08 PM), and after 
the flash crash (from 3.08 PM to 4 PM). 
 
  
Total number of 
shares at the bid side 
(000,000s) 
Average shares/minute at 
the bid side (000,000s) 




2:32 PM – 3:08 PM 93.3 2.5 
at the bid 
side 
3:08 PM – 4 PM 130.0 2.5 
 All 391.7 7.7 
 
  
Total number of 
shares/minute at the 
ask side (000,000s) 
Average shares/minute at 
the ask side (000,000s) 




2:32 PM – 3:08 PM 85.7 2.3 
at the ask 
side 
3:08 PM – 4 PM 123.9 2.4 
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 All 377.8 7.4 
 
Panel A of Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics of trading activities of the selected 
stocks. I observe a marked increase in average per minute transactions and trading volume 
during the flash crash, followed by a fall after the flash crash. This volatility is consistent with 
the modelled effects of the flash crash as presented in the framework. Prior to the flash crash, 
the average per minute trading volume is about 1 million. This increases by 161% during the 
flash crash and afterward falls by approximately 14%. Furthermore, the average per minute 
number of transactions and dollar trading volume during the flash crash are about three times 
higher than before the flash crash. After attaining the highest levels, average transaction and 
dollar trading volumes per minute fall by about 13%. I compute statistical tests to show the 
differences in trading volume and dollar trading volume between the period of the flash crash 
and surrounding periods. In Table 2.1’s Panel B, I present the p-values of different statistical 
approaches, testing for the null that there is no difference between the trading activity during 
the flash crash and non-flash crash periods. For robustness, I construct two-sample t-tests and 
pairwise Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U tests. Both methods show that the difference between 
these two periods is statistically significant. Given that, in the market microstructure literature, 
changes in trade sizes are thought to reflect the changing composition of the traders/participants 
in a market, one may assume that the fraction of traders that submit aggressive orders increases 
during flash crash. 
Table 2.2 presents the order submission summary statistics for my sample of stocks. 
Although average per minute trading volume increases sharply during the flash crash, the 
average volume of shares submitted in bid and ask orders over the same frequency decline 
during the flash crash. Firstly, this is consistent with what I would expect in t1, following 
liquidity consumption in t0. Secondly, when the ratio of shares in orders to trading volumes is 
calculated, I find that the ratio is 5.3 before the flash crash, indicating that approximately one 
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in five submitted shares in the orders submitted is executed prior to the flash crash. The ratio 
quickly falls to 1.8 during the flash crash and increases 2.1 afterwards. Thus, the rate of order 
execution quickens during the flash crash as the search for liquidity intensifies. The estimate 
of 1.8 share in order to trade ratio shows that more than half of shares in orders submitted 
during the flash crash are executed. This result further supports my argument that traders 
become more aggressive during the flash crash or, at the very least, the proportion of aggressive 
traders in the market increases during the flash crash. 
 
2.4  Empirical analyses, results and discussions 
My aim in this section is to formally test hypotheses arising from my three central 
framework arguments. The first argument suggests that excessive aggressiveness in trading is 
culpable in the inducement of flash crashes; this implies a significantly increased volume of 
aggressive sell and buy orders in the period leading up to and during the flash crash. More 
specifically, my framework predicts that, firstly, there should be an excessive sell 
aggressiveness in the first half of the flash crash and this aggressiveness will create a downward 
pressure on prices. Then, the buy side should subsequently become more aggressive, which 
will inevitably create an upward pressure on prices. Secondly, my framework predicts that 
aggressive orders contribute to the severity of flash crashes if there is excessive aggressiveness 
in the market in the build-up to extreme price movements. Thirdly, the framework suggests 
that aggressive orders are more profitable during extreme price movements such as flash 
crashes. The implication here is that the fraction and number of aggressive orders in the lead 
up to and during flash crashes should be higher than the fraction and number of aggressive 




2.4.1 The evolution of order aggressiveness 
In order to proceed with the test of the arguments/hypotheses above, I need to identify 
an appropriate indicator or proxy for aggressive orders. This is required to be able to compute 
interval-based fractions and volume of aggressive orders in the market. For consistency with 
the existing literature, I employ an established approach as developed by Biais et al. (1995) to 
categorise limit orders according to their aggressiveness for my empirical analysis. The 
acceptance of this classification scheme in the market microstructure literature is underscored 
by its relatively wide use (see as examples Degryse et al., 2005; Griffiths et al., 2000; 
Hagströmer et al., 2014). The Biais et al. (1995) order classification algorithm involves 
dividing buy and sell orders into six groups by their level of aggressiveness; Category 1 orders 
are the most aggressive orders, while Category 6 orders are the least aggressive. A Category 1 
buy order has a bid price higher than the best ask price and a quantity larger than the quantity 
available at the best ask price at its time of submission. These kinds of buy orders would 
normally walk across the order book. A Category 2 buy order has a bid price equal to the best 
ask price but has a target quantity exceeding the prevailing depth at the best ask price. Category 
3 buy orders also have bid prices equal to the best ask prices, however their target quantities 
do not exceed the prevailing depth at the best ask price. The bid price of Category 4 buy orders 
is higher than the best bid price but less than the best ask price. The quantity of this order is not 
necessary for categorisation purposes. Categories 5 and 6 buy orders are the least aggressive. 
Like the Category 4 buy order, there are no quantity requirements for categorising Category 5 
buy orders, however the bid prices of these orders are equal to the best bid prices. All buy 
orders not otherwise categorised above are classified as Category 6 orders; specifically, the 
prices of these orders are less than the best bid prices. Based on their classification, Category 
4, 5 and 6 orders are not usually immediately executed, and are therefore considered passive.  
The categorisation for the sell orders mirror those of the buy orders. The ask prices of 
the Category 1 sell orders are less than the best prevailing bid price and their sizes exceed the 
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depths at the current best bid prices. The ask prices of the Category 2 and 3 sell orders equal to 
the best bid price. Furthermore, the target quantities of Category 2 orders are higher than the 
quantities available at the best bid prices, whereas the quantity of Category 3 sell orders are 
not. Consistent with the categorisation of buy orders, the prices of Category 4 sell orders lie 
within the best bid-ask spread, i.e. less than prevailing best ask prices. The prices of Category 
5 sell orders equal the best ask price, while the remaining orders are classified as Category 6 
sell orders. The prices of this latter group of sell orders are higher than the prevailing best ask 
prices. 
 Degryse et al. (2005) show that the most aggressive order types (Categories 1 and 2) 
execute immediately and cause price movements. Although Category 3 orders are less 
aggressive than the first two classes of orders, they still usually result in prompt transactions, 
therefore these three types of orders (Categories 1, 2 and 3) can be considered as aggressive 
orders (see Degryse et al., 2005; Foucault, 1999). Thus, I focus on the first three types of orders. 
Specifically, I compute the sum of fractions of the aggressive order categories for the May 6, 
2010 flash crash, as well as for the normal periods surrounding the flash crash. I then compare 
the volumes within a statistical framework to determine whether the fraction of aggressive 
orders during the flash crash is higher than the fraction of the same types of orders during 
normal periods. 
Figure 2.1 presents the evolution of order aggressiveness during the day of the flash 
crash. I use 1-minute time intervals to construct both panels of the panels in the figure. In Panel 
A, I employ the standard errors of the cross-sectional means to construct 99% confidence bands 
for the order aggressiveness estimates in Panel A, to show the upper and lower bounds of the 




Figure 2. 1 Intraday evolution of the fraction of aggressive orders 
Panels A and B depict the minute-by-minute evolution of the fraction of aggressive orders for 53 S&P 500 stocks affected by the May 6 2010 flash crash; Panel B presents the 
fraction of aggressive orders when disaggregated into buys and sells, as well as the fraction of all aggressive orders, while Panel presents only the fraction of all aggressive 
orders. 99% confidence bands are constructed for Panel A using the means of the minute-by-minute fractions of aggressive orders across the stocks in the sample. The sample 
period covers 1:30 PM to 4 PM May 6, 2010. The shaded area indicates the flash crash period. 
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As evident in Panel A, the fraction of aggressive orders almost tripled during the flash 
crash from about 8% at 1:30 PM to 21.36% at 2:43 PM. The proportion of aggressive orders 
during the flash crash is, on average, higher than the surrounding time intervals. This finding 
suggests that aggressive trading activity is more prominent during the flash crash than in the 
surrounding periods. This result is consistent with the view that since aggressive orders might 
be more profitable during periods of extreme price movements, traders tend to show more 
aggressive behaviour during such periods. Furthermore, in Figure 2.1, I observe that the first 
of the two peaks of aggressive trading occurs just prior to the onset of the flash crash at about 
2:23 PM, when the fraction of aggressive orders attains about 20.71% of the total order volume. 
This appears to underscore my intuition regarding the contribution of pre-flash crash order 
aggressiveness to the flash crash. I discuss the results of my formal test of this assertion in the 
next section.  
Panel B makes the important distinction between buy and sell aggressive orders. 
Consistent with the framework’s predictions, the sell side is more aggressive from 2:17 PM to 
2:45 PM and then the buy side becomes more aggressive until 2:58 PM. This is not unexpected 
since SEC (2010) show that prices reached their lowest levels at 2:45 PM and the start to 
increase thereafter. This shows that the predictions of my framework are consistent with the 
empirical evidence and the arguments I make are valid in the case of the flash crash I examine. 






Figure 2. 2 Intraday evolution of aggressive order imbalance I 
The figure presents the minute-by-minute evolution of aggressive order imbalance (difference between the fractions of aggressive sell and buy orders) for 53 S&P 500 stocks 
affected by the May 6 2010 flash crash. The sample period covers 1:30 PM to 4 PM May 6, 2010. The shaded are indicates the flash crash period. The shaded area indicates 

































































































































































































































































Consistent with the results of Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2 shows that, as predicted by my 
framework, there is a significant increase of aggressive sell orders until the stocks’ price 
attained their lowest levels during the flash crash (at 2:45 PM) and thereafter the number of 
aggressive sell orders are outstripped by the number of aggressive buy orders until the prices 
reverted back to their pre-crash levels. Furthermore, Figure 2.2 shows that I observe a peak in 
aggressive order imbalance (the difference between aggressive sell and buy orders) at 2:17 PM; 
this implies that as predicted by my framework, aggressive orders’ build-up ahead of the flash 
crash is a contributory factor to flash crashes. 
However, it is important to note that, based on my predictions, a high fraction of 
aggressive orders during some specific days alone is not enough to influence extreme price 
movements such as a flash crash; flash crashes are more likely induced by a large amount of 
aggressive orders. Therefore, I also need to examine the number of aggressive orders during 




Figure 2. 3 Intraday evolution of aggressive orders 
The figure presents the minute-by-minute evolution of the numbers of total, sell and buy aggressive orders for 53 S&P 500 stocks affected by the May 6, 2010 flash crash. The 




























































































































































































































Figure 2.3 presents the evolution of the number of aggressive orders on May 6, 2010. 
As evident in the figure, there is a noteworthy rise in the number of aggressive orders as I 
approach the epicentre of the crash. The number of aggressive orders increases by about 6 times 
from the number at 2:00 PM (10,586/minute) to 62,760/minute at 2:43 PM, then falls 
precipitously to about 24,000/minute thereafter. Consistent with the data on the fraction of 
aggressive orders, I also observe a peak in the number of aggressive orders prior to the onset 
of the flash crash, at 2:22 PM (45,050/minute). This implies that, consistent with the predictions 
of my framework, excessive aggressiveness is likely to occur prior to flash crashes. 
Furthermore, as evident in Figure 2.2, I observe an excessive level of sell order aggressiveness 
from 2:17 PM to 2:45 PM and an excessive buy order aggressiveness thereafter. A review of 
the balance between aggressive sell and buy orders is useful in clarifying the changing of order 
dominance between the two order types. Thus, I compute aggressive order imbalance by the 




Figure 2. 4 Intraday evolution of aggressive order imbalance II 
The figure presents the minute-by-minute evolution of aggressive order imbalance (difference between the number of aggressive sell and buy orders) for 53 S&P 500 stocks 
affected by the May 6 2010 flash crash. The sample period covers 1:30 PM to 4 PM May 6, 2010. The shaded area indicates the flash crash period. The shaded area indicates 
























































































































































































































































Similar to the picture painted in Figure 2.2, Figure 2.4 shows that the predictions of my 
framework are completely in line with the evolution of the number of buy and sell orders during 
a real flash crash. I observe a surge in sell order aggressiveness prior to and during the first half 
of the flash crash until the price levels of instruments reached their minimum levels. Thereafter, 
the number of aggressive buy orders start to increase relative to the number of aggressive sell 
orders until the prices regain their pre-crash levels. The implications of the findings presented 
in Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.4 are significant, since the total number of aggressive orders could 
be high for a number of reasons; however, a flash crash is unlikely to ensue if there are no 
significant differences in the fractions and numbers of aggressive buy and sell orders. 
Thus far, the univariate empirical results presented have been generally consistent with 
the predictions of my framework concerning the relationship between order aggressiveness and 
flash crashes. Firstly, there is a significantly increased level of sell order aggressiveness prior 
to and during the first half of the flash crash and then, buy order aggressiveness gradually 
outstrips sell order aggressiveness. Secondly, there is excessive order aggressiveness prior to 
the flash crash. Thirdly, the number and the fraction of aggressive orders attain their highest 
levels during the flash crash and is in line with my argument that these types of orders might 
be more profitable during extreme price movements. Although the initial results suggest that 
my hypothesis on the predictive power of aggressive orders for flash crashes has merit, it is 
imperative that these results are formally tested within a multivariate framework. 
 
2.4.2  Multivariate Analysis 
Next, I formally investigate the relationship between aggressive orders and flash 
crashes within a multivariate framework. Specifically, I estimate the following regression 













                             (2.8) 
where FCit is a binary dependent variable and time, t, equals one-second.
10 I employ two cases 
of the Model (4.8). Firstly, I use the standard logit model; in this step, my aim is to test whether 
the build-up of aggressive orders ahead of the flash crash is linked to its onset. In the logit 
model, FCit equals one for the pre-flash crash period (2:17 PM to 2:32 PM).  Secondly, I 
employ the multinomial logit mode, which allows me to concurrently examine the relationship 
between both the pre-flash crash and flash crash periods on the one hand and contemporaneous 
order aggressiveness on the other. Thus, in the multinomial estimation of Model (8), FCit equals 
one for the pre-flash period (2:17 PM – 2:32 PM), two for the flash crash period (2:32:01 PM 
– 3:08 PM) and zero otherwise. NAO is the number of aggressive orders obtained by using the 
order classification scheme described above. I estimate the above regression for sell (NASO) 
and buy (NABO) aggressive orders separately in order to capture the marginal impact of each 
type of order. Estimating the depth of the impact of each order type is important since according 
to the literature and my framework, aggressive sell orders should play a more important role in 
flash crashes (see SEC, 2010). As already noted, the first three categories of orders are 
earmarked as aggressive orders. This is the most important variable in my study, and according 
to my arguments, I expect to see a positive relationship between the number of aggressive 
orders and the pre-flash crash (FCit=1) period (see also Griffiths et al., 2000; Mcinish et al., 
2014; Wuyts, 2011). 
Apart from the key variable, I employ some control variables in order to strengthen the 
consistency of my results. lnV is the natural logarithm of the number of shares traded for 
one/five second interval. This proxy is used to control for the effect of trading volume. The 
                                                          
10 For robustness, I also employ five-second interval analysis and obtain qualitatively similar results. For 





VPIN metric is introduced as a real-time indicator of order flow toxicity. VPIN is a modified 
version of the Easley et al. (1996) and Easley et al. (1997) probability of an informed trade 
(PIN) metric and is proposed by Easley et al. (2011) as a measure of the probability of an 
informed trade in a high frequency environment. Easley et al. (2011) and Easley et al. (2012) 
highlight the role of order flow toxicity in the May 6, 2010 flash crash.11 Easley et al. (2011; 
2012) argue that VPIN can be used to predict flash crashes. By contrast, Andersen and 
Bondarenko (2014) show that VPIN is a poor predictor for flash crashes after controlling for 
volume. Therefore, including VPIN as a control variable in Model (8) offers another 
opportunity to examine the flash crash predictability potentials of VPIN. In addition to VPIN, 
OIB is also employed to control for the order flow toxicity. Note that multicollinearity is not 
an issue here, since the correlation coefficient between VPIN and OIB is very low, at 0.054 (see 
Table 2.3). SEC (2010), Kirilenko et al. (2017), and Easley et al. (2011), show that a large 
order imbalance was one of the contributing factors to the May 6, 2010 the flash crash, hence 
the inclusion of order imbalance as an explanatory variable is completely in line with the 
literature. OIB is calculated as the absolute value of the difference between the number of buy 
and sell trades, divided by the total number of trades (see Chordia et al., 2008). In order to 
obtain OIB, trades must first be classified into buys and sells. Generally, three types of trade 
classification schemes are used to classify trades; these are the tick rule, the Lee and Ready 
(1991) algorithm, and Easley et al. (2011; 2012) bulk volume classification (BVC) method.  In 
this study, I employ the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm for order classification.12 Chakrabarty 
et al. (2015), in their comparative analysis of the aforementioned trade classification methods, 
                                                          
11 Computing VPIN requires determining the number of buckets to be employed for volume classification and a 
buy/sell trade classification method. I use 200 buckets for volume classification, because  Wu et al. (2013), who 
examine 16,000 various parameter combinations for evaluating the effectiveness of VPIN, concludes that 200 
buckets yield optimal results. Buy and sell volumes are computed using the BVC approach proposed by Easley et 
al. (2011). 
12 For robustness, I also compute OIB using the other two methods and employ them in Model (8), the inferences 




conclude that the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm method is a more accurate trade 
classification method than competing methods.  
VLT is the one/five-second standard deviation of mid-price returns; this variable is 
introduced to control for trading volatility.13 Prior contributions report extreme price volatility 
during the May 6, 2010 flash crash day (see as examples Easley et al., 2011; 2012; Kirilenko 
et al., 2017; SEC, 2010). Furthermore, an increase in the volatility of an instrument’s price will 
increase its market risk, leading to a larger price impact as well as extreme price movements. 
BAS is the one/five second spread between the best ask and best bid prices, and is a proxy for 
liquidity. BAS tends to be narrow when liquidity is high; hence, under liquidity constraints, i.e. 
when BAS is wide, I therefore expect a larger price impact (see Borkovec et al., 2010). MF 
corresponds to market fragmentation. Madhavan (2012) and Golub et al. (2012) show that 
market fragmentation is one of the factors that contribute to flash crashes, and Menkveld and 
Yueshen (2017) underscore and further explain the results of Madhavan (2012). In this study, 
the inverse of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is used for capturing how fragmented each stock 
is across various venues for each corresponding interval.14 
Table 2. 3 Correlation matrix of explanatory variables 
The table presents the correlation matrix for the explanatory variables employed in the flash crash models. NAO 
is the number of aggressive orders, NASO is the number of aggressive sell orders, NABO is the number of 
aggressive buy orders, VPIN is the Volume-Synchronized Probability of Informed Trading, VLT is the standard 
deviation of the mid-price returns, OIB is the order imbalance, BAS is a bid-ask spread, MF represents market 
fragmentation, and lnV is the natural logarithm of the number of shares. The sample includes 53 S&P 500 stocks 
affected by the May 6, 2010 flash crash. The sample period covers 1:30 PM to 4 PM May 6, 2010. 
 
 NAO NASO NABO VPIN VLT OIB BAS MF lnV 
NAO 1         
NASO 0.91 1        
NABO 0.90 0.92 1       
                                                          
13 I employ mid-price returns in order to reduce bid-ask bounce (see Avramov et al., 2006).  






ts is volume share of venue k on day t. The value of the index 




VPIN 0.014 0.013 0.014 1      
VLT 0.093 0.094 0.093 0.146 1     
OIB 0.385 0.383 0.384 0.054 0.139 1    
BAS -0.013 -0.012 -0.014 0.10 0.27 0.03 1   
MF 0.273 0.274 0.273 0.12 0.20 0.13 0.05 1  
lnV 0.394 0.395 0.394 0.08 0.30 0.27 0.05 0.58 1 
Table 2.3 presents the correlation matrix of the explanatory variables; the low 
correlation coefficient estimates suggest that multicollinearity is not an issue with the 
regression model. 
The results for both the logit and multinomial logit models’ estimations are presented 
in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 respectively.  
Table 2. 4 Standard logit model for one second frequency 








++++= lnln  
The table reports logit regressions’ coefficient estimates using one second frequencies. Results for standard logit 
model estimations are presented for the number of aggressive orders, aggressive sell orders and aggressive buy 
orders in the second, third and fourth columns respectively. FCit equals zero from 1:30 PM to 2:17 PM, and from 
2:32 PM to 4:00 PM, while it takes the value of one from 2:17 PM to 2:32 PM. NAO, NASO and NABO are the 
number of aggressive orders, number of aggressive sell orders and number of aggressive buy orders, respectively, 
lnV is the natural logarithm of the number of shares, VPIN is the Volume-Synchronized Probability of Informed 
Trading, VLT is the standard deviation of the mid-price returns, OIB is the order imbalance, BAS is the prevailing 
bid-ask spread and MF represents market fragmentation. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. The sample 
includes 53 S&P 500 stocks affected by the May 6, 2010 flash crash. The sample period covers 1:30 PM to 4 PM 
May 6, 2010. *** and ** correspond to statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
 
Variables NAO NASO NABO 
 4.98 x 10-3*** 
(2.18 x 10-4) 
1.66 x 10-2*** 
(7.27 x 10-4) 
7.12 x 10-3*** 
(3.12 x 10-4) 
lnV -1.23 x 10-2*** 
(2.37 x 10-3) 
-1.23 x 10-2*** 
(2.37 x 10-3) 
-1.23 x 10-2*** 
(2.37 x 10-3) 
VPIN -1.2531*** 
(2.43 x 10-2) 
-1.2531*** 
(2.43 x 10-2) 
-1.2530*** 







OIB -3 x 10-5*** 
(5.1 x 10-6) 
-3.11 x 10-5*** 
(5.1 x 10-6) 
-3 x 10-5*** 
(5.1 x 10-6) 
BAS -1.34*** 
(6.48 x 10-2) 
-1.3432*** 
(6.48 x 10-2) 
-1.3431*** 
(6.48 x 10-2) 




(5.26 x 10-3) (5.26 x 10-3) (5.26 x 10-3) 
Mc Fadden’s R2 0.025 0.0292 0.0251 
 
The results presented in Table 2.4 show that, as predicted by my framework, aggressive 
orders are positively linked with the pre-flash crash period. The result holds for a combination 
of buy and sell aggressive orders as well as for each type of aggressive orders separately. The 
positive and statistically significant coefficients suggest that order aggressiveness in the lead 
up to the flash crash is linked to the onset of the crash. An essential point to note is that the 
relationship between aggressive orders and the pre-flash crash period is statistically significant 
even after controlling for volume, liquidity, order flow toxicity and volatility. This finding is 
important given recent findings by Andersen and Bondarenko (2014), showing that a popular 
metric for order flow toxicity, the VPIN metric, developed by Easley et al. (2011; 2012), is a 
poor predictor for flash crashes once trading activity is controlled for. The practical implication 
of this result is that traders seeking to avoid the adverse effects of a flash crash must act quickly 
to do so. However, their actions could be inevitably endogenous, leading to a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, as their actions could exacerbate what might already be proving to be a challenging 
and increasingly illiquid trading environment. As already noted, according to the existing 
literature and the predictions of my approach, I expect that sell orders to play a more important 
role in the flash crash (SEC, 2010) and therefore, estimation separate regressions for aggressive 
sell and buy orders may provide more insightful results. This expectation is confirmed by the 
magnitude of the coefficient estimates and explanatory power for both the buy and sell 
aggressive orders estimations. Firstly, the coefficient estimate for aggressive sell orders is 2.3 
times higher than the coefficient for the number of aggressive buy orders. Secondly, according 
to the McFadden’s R2, the model with the sell order has a higher explanatory power.  
The estimated coefficients for all the other explanatory variables, except MF (market 




aggressive orders variables (NAO, NASO and NABO) are the only positive and statistically 
significant variables. As already noted, my model allows us to test the flash crash predictability 
potential of VPIN after controlling for trading activity, liquidity and volatility. My findings 
show that VPIN is negatively correlated with the pre-flash period; increases in the value of the 
VPIN metric does not provide a signal about extreme volatility. This is in some ways an 
unsurprising result, since Andersen and Bondarenko (2014) also show that VPIN is negatively 
correlated with future short-term volatility after controlling for trading activity. The 
explanatory power of the standard logit model reported for the NAO, NASO and NABO 
regressions using McFadden’s R2, are 2.5%, 2.9% and 2.51% respectively. This is also 
unsurprising because of the following two reasons. Firstly, I employ one-second frequency for 
the estimations.15 Secondly, although McFadden’s R2 is a similar measure of the goodness of 
fit to the classic R2, the value of McFadden’s R2 tend to be remarkably lower than the value of 





                                                          
15 McFadden’s R2 rises to about 4.5% when I estimate the regression at five-second frequencies; the results are 




Table 2. 5 Multinomial logit model for one second frequency 










The table reports multinomial logit regressions’ coefficient estimates using one second frequencies; Results for multinomial logit model estimations for the number of aggressive 
orders, the number of aggressive sell orders and the number of aggressive buy orders are presented in the second, third and fourth columns respectively. FCit equals zero from 
1:30 PM to 2:17 PM, and from 3:08 PM to 4:00 PM, while it takes the value of one from 2:17 PM to 2:32 PM (pre-flash crash period) and takes the value of two from 2:32 PM 
to 3:08 PM (the flash crash period). NAO, NASO and NABO are the number of aggressive orders, the number of aggressive sell orders and the number of aggressive buy orders, 
respectively, lnV is the natural logarithm of the number of shares, VPIN is the Volume-Synchronized Probability of Informed Trading, VLT is the standard deviation of the mid-
price returns, OIB is the order imbalance, BAS is the prevailing bid-ask spread and MF represents market fragmentation. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. The 
sample includes 53 S&P 500 stocks affected by the May 6, 2010 flash crash. The sample period covers 1:30 PM to 4 PM May 6, 2010. *** and ** correspond to statistical 
significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
 
 NAO NASO NABO 
Variables FC = 1 FC = 2 FC = 1 FC = 2 FC = 1 FC = 2 
 6.30 x 10-3*** 
(2.33 x 10-4) 
3.81 x 10-3*** 
(1.79 x 10-4) 
2.09 x 10-2*** 
(7.74 x 10-3) 
1.27 x 10-2*** 
(5.95 x 10-4) 
9.0 x 10-3*** 
(3.32 x 10-3) 
5.45 x 10-3*** 
(2.55 x 10-4) 
lnV -2.75 x 10-2*** 
(2.43 x 10-3) 
4.71 x 10-2*** 
(1.77 x 10-3) 
-2.75 x 10-2*** 
(2.43 x 10-3) 
4.71 x 10-2*** 
(1.77 x 10-3) 
-2.74 x 10-2*** 
(2.43 x 10-3) 
4.71 x 10-2*** 
(1.77 x 10-3) 
VPIN -4.25 x 10-1*** 
(2.53 x 10-2) 
2.88*** 
(1.72 x 10-2) 
-4.25 x 10-1*** 
(2.53 x 10-2) 
2.88*** 
(1.72 x 10-2) 
-4.25 x 10-1*** 
(2.53 x 10-2) 
2.88*** 
(1.72 x 10-2) 












OIB -2.00 x 10-5*** 
(5.27 x 10-6) 
2.4 x 10-5*** 
(2.74 x 10-6) 
-2.10 x 10-5*** 
(5.27 x 10-6) 
2.4 x 10-5*** 
(2.74 x 10-6) 
-2.10 x 10-5*** 
(5.27 x 10-6) 
2.4 x 10-5*** 
(2.74 x 10-6) 
BAS -5.2 x 10-1*** 
(6.94 x 10-2) 
2.05*** 
(3.08 x 10-2) 
-5.2 x 10-1*** 
(6.94 x 10-2) 
2.05*** 
(3.08 x 10-2) 
-5.2 x 10-1*** 
(6.94 x 10-2) 
2.05*** 
(3.08 x 10-2) 
MF 4.18 x 10-2*** 
(5.36 x 10-3) 
1.71 x 10-1*** 
(4.24 x 10-3) 
4.18 x 10-2*** 
(5.36 x 10-3) 
1.71 x 10-1*** 
(4.24 x 10-3) 
4.18 x 10-2*** 
(5.36 x 10-3) 
1.71 x 10-1*** 
(4.24 x 10-3) 




Table 2.5 presents the results for the multinominal logit model estimation. I employ this 
model to test the consistency of the standard logit model and in order to examine the 
relationship between contemporaneous order aggressiveness on the one hand and the pre-flash 
crash and the flash crash period on the other. This approach expectedly leads to a higher model 
explanatory power for the multinominal logit model estimation (McFadden’s R2 of 6.9% and 
6.6% for the number of aggressive sell and buy orders, respectively) when compared with the 
standard logit model estimation reported in Table 2.4. Firstly, the findings in Table 2.5 are 
generally consistent with the results I present in Table 2.4; all the aggressive orders variables 
are positively and significantly related with the pre-flash crash period, which suggests a link 
between the number of aggressive orders and the onset of the flash crash. Furthermore, 
consistent with the findings from Table 2.4, the number of aggressive sell orders play a more 
important role in the flash crash. The only difference in the results is that while market 
fragmentation (MF) is not statistically significant in the standard logit model, it is significantly 
and positively correlated with the pre-flash period in the multinominal logit model. This 
implies that prior market fragmentation is related to flash crashes (see also Madhavan, 2012; 
Menkveld and Yueshen, 2017). The second set of results in Table 2.5, based on the flash crash 
period itself, are also interesting. The results show that the NAO, NASO and NABO are 
positively and significantly correlated with the flash crash period even after controlling for 
volume, liquidity and volatility. The positive and statistically significant estimates of the 
aggressive orders variables appear to confirm that increases in aggressive orders make flash 
crashes more likely to ensue. Specifically, the results suggest that the probability of flash 
crashes at time t rises as the number of aggressive orders increases at the same time. The 
evidence is in line with my approach that order aggressiveness plays an important role in flash 




The regression results above, documenting the relationship between order 
aggressiveness and flash crashes, are consistent with the previous literature since they show 
that aggressive orders have a larger price impact than non-aggressive orders and that aggressive 
trading behaviour contributes to flash crashes (see as examples Griffiths et al., 2000; Mcinish 
et al., 2014; Wuyts, 2011).  
The estimated coefficient estimates for all the other explanatory variables in Table 2.5 
are also consistent with the existing literature on flash crashes. For example, the market toxicity 
metric, VPIN, has a statistically significant and positive relationship with the flash crash period. 
Taken together with the metric’s documented relationship with the pre-flash crash period, the 
implication here is that while VPIN, may be a poor predictor of flash crashes when trading 
activity is controlled for (see also Andersen and Bondarenko, 2014), it nevertheless is 
positively correlated with flash crashes themselves. This suggests that market toxicity has a 
direct relationship with the flash crash; this evidence is in line with findings of Easley et al. 
(2011; 2012) that market toxicity plays an important role in the flash crash. Volatility exhibits 
a statistically significant and positive relationship with the flash crash. The positive coefficient 
is consistent with the stream of the market microstructure literature that states that an increase 
in the volatility of stock prices causes a larger price impact, since extreme price movements 
and flash crashes are characterized by extreme price volatility (see as examples Easley et al., 
2011; Kirilenko et al., 2017; SEC, 2010). One plausible explanation of this positive relationship 
is that an increase in the volatility of stock prices increases the market risk, which in turn leads 
to larger spreads and extreme price movements.  
The literature identifies order imbalance as one of the instigators of the May 6, 2010 
flash crash (see as examples Easley et al., 2011; Kirilenko et al., 2017; SEC, 2010). 
Furthermore, Sun and Ibikunle (2016) find that order imbalance has information content and 




high frequency trading environment. Thus, the positive relationship between OIB and the flash 
crash reported in Table 2.5 is unsurprising and is in line with the literature. The bid-ask spread, 
BAS, is also positively and statistically significantly related with the May 6, 2010 flash crash. 
This result is again unsurprising because existing literature finds that orders have a larger price 
impact when the bid-ask spread is wide (see Aitken and Frino, 1996) and, as already 
enumerated, liquidity constraints contribute to extreme price movements in the market. 
Furthermore, Borkovec et al. (2010), SEC (2010), and Menkveld and Yueshen (2017) find that 
the spread during the May 6, 2010 flash crash was uncharacteristically wide. Market 
fragmentation, MF, exhibits a statistically significant and positive relationship with the flash 
crash as well; this result can be justified that market fragmentation is important in explaining 
the anatomy of the flash crash. This result underscores the results of Madhavan (2012), Golub 
et al. (2012), and Menkveld and Yueshen (2017) that show that the flash crash is linked directly 
to market structure. When liquidity is fragmented across several venues, immediate access to 
counterparties becomes slightly more challenging given that orders may now need to be routed 
through several other channels in order for them to be filled. 
I caution that evidence presented in Table 2.5 should be interpreted carefully. I do not 
claim to have found a causality between order aggressiveness and the flash crash. In addition, 
I do not claim that order aggressiveness was the main factor leading to the crash. However, my 
analysis shows that similar to other suggested factors, like order imbalance, order flow toxicity, 
market fragmentation, order aggressiveness has additional explanatory power for the flash 
crash.  
 
2.4.3  Directional returns during the flash crash 
I now turn my attention to the third mainline argument derived from my framework, 




increase in the volume of aggressive orders during the flash crash, I interpret this to be in 
response to their profitability during such periods. However, I also note that such increases 
may relate to the unwinding of untenable positions that arise as a result of extreme swings in 
instruments’ valuations during a flash crash. In order to examine the veracity of my argument 
regarding the profitability of aggressive orders, I follow the approach proposed by Ederington 
and Lee (1995) to compute hypothetical returns attributable to an informed trader active during 
the flash crash and its surrounding periods  (see also Caminschi and Heaney, 2014; Frino et al., 
2017).  
I estimate simple returns for each stock and sign the returns using a directional 
parameter (𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑡,𝑠), based on the assumption that the informed trader holds private information 
regarding the trajectory of the stocks’ prices she trades. I define the directional return for each 
one-minute interval as 
𝐷𝑅𝑡,𝑠 =  𝑅𝑡,𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑡,𝑠                                              (2.9) 
where, 𝑅𝑡,𝑠 represents simple return for stock s and time t. In order to define the directional 
parameter (𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑡,𝑠), firstly I compute the returns of each stock for the flash crash period (from 
14:32 PM to 15:08 PM) (𝑅𝑓𝑐,𝑠). The direction factor, 𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑡,𝑠 = 1 if 𝑅𝑓𝑐,𝑠 > 0, 𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑡,𝑠 = −1 
if 𝑅𝑓𝑐,𝑠 < 0, and 𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑡,𝑠 = 0 if 𝑅𝑓𝑐,𝑠 = 0.  𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑡,𝑠 = 1 (−1) indicates that the trader takes a long 
(short) position at time t for stock, s. I compute the average directional return, 𝐴𝐷𝑅𝑡, as the 
average of adjusted returns for all stocks for each one-minute interval. The cumulative average 





Figure 2. 5 Directional returns 
Panels A and B are minute-by-minute plots of average direction-adjusted returns and cumulative average direction-adjusted returns measures (in basis points) respectively for 
53 S&P 500 stocks affected by the May 6 2010 flash crash. The sample period covers 1:30 PM to 4 PM May 6, 2010. The shaded area indicates the flash crash period. 





















































































































































































































Table 2. 6 Average direction-adjusted returns 
Table presents the average adjusted returns (AAR) in 10-minute batches for S&P 500 stocks. All return measures 
are reported in bps (1 bps = 0.01%). The t-value is the statistic of a one-sample t-test testing the null of the mean 
being equal to zero. The sample includes 53 S&P 500 stocks affected by the May 6, 2010 flash crash. The sample 
period covers 1:30 PM to 4 PM May 6, 2010. *** and ** correspond to statistical significance at the 0.01 and 
0.05 levels, respectively. 
 
From (Time) To (Time) AAR Sign t-value 
1:30 PM 1:40 PM -0.90  -0.13 
1:41 PM 1:50 PM 0.56  0.08 
1:51 PM 2:00 PM -0.58  -0.08 
2:01 PM 2:10 PM -1.97  -0.30 
2:11 PM 2:20 PM -1.25  -0.19 
2:21 PM 2:30 PM -0.45  -0.06 
2:31 PM 2:40 PM 6.95  1.06 
2:41 PM 2:50 PM 97.59 *** 14.91 
2:51 PM 3:00 PM 36.19 *** 5.53 
3:01 PM 3:10 PM 11.27 * 1.85 
3:11 PM 3:20 PM -4.85  -0.75 
3:21 PM 3:30 PM 2.01  0.31 
3:31 PM 3:40 PM -0.80  -0.12 
3:41 PM 3:50 PM 4.07  0.62 
3:51 PM 4:00 PM -1.36  -0.21 
 
Figure 2.5 reports the hypothetical returns attainable through aggressive (directional) 
trading in 53 selected S&P 500 stocks around the May 6, 2010 flash crash. Panel A shows the 
simple returns adjusted for direction of price movement over the flash crash period averaged 
across all 53 stocks, while Panel B shows the cumulative average direction-adjusted returns for 
the same stocks. As presented in Panel A, there are positive and significant directional returns 
during the flash crash. Remarkably, as predicted by my framework, the positive directional 
return is gained during the second half of the flash crash and only ends at the end of the flash 
crash at about 3:08 PM. The cumulative directional returns in Panel B shows the clear and 
continuous trend in adjusted returns during the flash crash period. This and the stabilisation of 
the cumulative returns following the conclusion of the flash crash support my arguments about 
the profitability of aggressive orders during periods of extreme price movements like flash 
crashes. The overall cumulative returns accruable to an informed trader during the flash crash 




Table 2.6 reports the average direction-adjusted returns in 10-minute batches. 
Consistent with the insights from Figure 2.5, there is a positive and statistically significant 
adjusted returns, which commences in the second half of the flash crash and continues until the 
end of the flash crash. All estimated directional returns outside of the flash crash period are not 
statistically significant.   
Overall, the directional returns analysis yields consistent results with the predictions of 
my framework, implying that aggressive orders are significantly more profitable during 
extreme price movements like flash crashes. 
 
2.5  Conclusion 
In this chapter, I develop a new framework for understanding the role of aggressive 
orders in flash crashes by extending the approach of Menkveld (2013). I then use ultra-high 
frequency data from 53 S&P 500 stocks affected by the May 6, 2010 flash crash to test the 
arguments motivated by the framework. The selection of the May 6, 2010 flash crash for my 
investigation is motivated by its recognition as the most significant flash crash in recent 
financial markets history. My main framework predictions/arguments are as follows. Firstly, 
there should be a significant increase in sell order aggressiveness prior to and during the first 
half of flash crashes, i.e. until instruments’ price levels hit their lowest values and then the 
balance of order aggressiveness should shift to the buy side in the second half of the flash crash, 
i.e., until the prices re-attain their pre-crash levels. Secondly, my framework predicts that the 
build-up of order aggressiveness, which could be observed prior to extreme price volatility 
events, is inextricably linked to flash crashes. Thirdly, aggressive orders are more profitable 
during extreme price movements and thus traders tend to submit orders that are more 




In the formal test of the relationship between the number of aggressive orders and the 
pre-flash crash period, the empirical results are consistent with the predictions of my 
framework. Firstly, I find a significant increase in sell order aggressiveness prior to and during 
the first half of the May 6 2010 flash crash, thereafter the balance of order aggressiveness 
swings to the buy side, with traders submitting more aggressive buy orders relative to 
aggressive sell orders. The sell side is more aggressive until prices plummet to their lowest 
levels and then, the buy side becomes more aggressive in the run-up to prices regaining their 
pre-crash levels. Secondly, I find that the number of aggressive orders in the run up to the flash 
crash is positively and significantly related to the pre-flash crash period; thus, the build-up of 
order aggressiveness may contribute to the onset of flash crashes. Thirdly, the fraction and the 
number of aggressive orders during the flash crash are higher than the fraction and the number 
of orders during the surrounding periods due to the significantly larger (than other periods) 
profits accruable to informed investors during the flash crash. I estimate that for the stocks in 
my sample, an informed investor during the flash crash could achieve a return on his portfolio 
in excess of 1,482 bps, a return far larger than accruable during surrounding periods. This 
finding supports my argument that aggressive orders are more profitable markets are volatile 
and hence, traders tend to submit orders that are more aggressive during such periods.  
While my findings show the contribution of aggressive orders to flash crashes, it is 
essential to note two points. First point is related to potential bias in the study. Explicitly, I 
investigate the role of aggressive orders in extreme price movements by focusing on stocks that 
impacted by the flash crash. While this method is consistent with the literature (see Easley et 
al., 2011), using only the flash crash affected stocks may lead to sample selection bias. Second, 
my findings should not be misconstrued as an endorsement of policies aimed at limiting 
aggressive orders or aggressive trading behaviours in financial markets. While I acknowledge 
that aggressive traders can induce extreme price movements, aggressive trading in itself could 




3. A state space modelling of the information content of trading 
volume 
3.1  Introduction 
Trading in financial markets is driven either by information or by the search for 
liquidity (see Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988). Liquidity traders do not trade on the basis of any 
specific information; their trading strategies are therefore not directly related to future payoffs. 
The trading strategies of informed traders, on the other hand, are based on private information 
and are directly related to future payoffs. The activities of these two fundamental types of 
traders have been extensively analysed in seminal papers in the larger financial markets 
literature, and more so in market microstructure papers. For example, Kyle (1985) predicts that 
the volatility of asset prices partially reflects inside information (informed trading) and is 
independent of liquidity-driven trading effects, while Glosten and Milgrom (1985) predict that 
the breadth of the bid-ask spread is primarily driven by informed trading, which incorporates 
adverse selection costs into the spread.16  
 More recently however, Kaniel and Liu (2006) have extended Glosten and Milgrom's 
(1985) model to show that informed traders with long-lived information are more likely to use 
limit orders than market orders. Therefore, informed traders’ trading strategies, depending on 
the longevity of their information sets, may be negatively related with adverse selection. Using 
a comprehensive sample of trades from Schedule 13D filings by activist investors, Collin-
Dufresne and Fos (2015) show that, consistent with Kaniel and Liu (2006), informed traders 
with long-lived information typically use limit orders, which leads to a negative correlation 
between adverse selection and informed trading (see also Collin-Dufresne and Fos, 2016). 
                                                          
16 Consistent with Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Easley and O'Hara (1987) also suggest that stock illiquidity should 





 This chapter builds on the above predictions and findings by developing a general state 
space-based methodology for decomposing trading volume into unobservable liquidity-driven 
and information-driven components. According to Hendershott and Menkveld (2014), state 
space modelling is a natural tool for modelling an observed variable as the sum of two 
unobserved variables. While the application of state space modelling for decomposing price, 
owing to its efficiency, is very common in the finance literature (see as examples, Brogaard et 
al., 2014b; Hendershott and Menkveld, 2014; Menkveld et al., 2007), the approach has thus far 
not been directly applied to trading volume.17 This is surprising given the preponderance of the 
literature on the strength of the relationship between price and trading volume (see as examples, 
Clark, 1973; Cornell, 1981; Epps and Epps, 1976; Harris, 1986; 1987; Karpoff, 1987).  
 The heavily evidenced relationship shown in the literature is linked to the joint 
dependence of price and volume on an underlying or set of underlying variable(s); this is the 
‘mixture of distribution hypothesis’ (MDH) (see Clark, 1973; Harris, 1986). Harris (1986) 
argues that the underlying variable is the rate of flow of information. Hence, as new information 
arrives, traders act on it by revising their positions and consequently increase trading volume. 
Harris (1987), using data from NYSE, provides an empirical basis for the MDH. This implies 
that the theoretical basis for the application of state space modelling to price (i.e. that price 
reflects both information and non-information components) holds for volume.18 However, it is 
important to note that while the information component of price is its permanent component, 
the information component of volume is transitory. This is simply because although new 
information implies a new permanent level of price it will only affect trading volume 
temporarily, since once prices reflect this information, informed traders will no longer hold an 
                                                          
17 McCarthy and Najand (1993) apply state space modelling to the analysis of price and volume dependence in 
currency futures. 
18 A second explanation for the existence of the price-volume relationship is based on the sequential information 
models proposed by Copeland (1976), Jennings et al. (1981) and Smirlock and Starks (1984). The models suggest 




informational advantage and will therefore cease their trading based on the exploited 
information (see also Fama, 1970; Chordia et al., 2002; Suominen, 2001).  
 As discussed by Hendershott and Menkveld (2014), the state space approach holds 
significant economic value over other methods that could be appropriated for variable 
decomposition, such as autoregressive models (see as an example, Hasbrouck, 1991). Firstly, 
the estimation of the model using maximum likelihood is asymptotically unbiased and efficient. 
Secondly, maximum efficiency in dealing with missing values is achieved due to the use of the 
Kalman filter, which accounts for level changes across periods with missing observations, 
employed in the maximum likelihood estimation. This is a critical argument in the use of state 
space modelling in decomposing asset prices and trading volume in a high frequency trading 
environment such as the one I examine, since standard estimation approaches do not deal with 
missing observations. For example, estimating a vector autoregression implies truncation of 
the lag structure. Although standard approaches to decomposing trading volume may work well 
in a low-frequency environment, information in today’s markets travel at such ultra-high 
speeds that those standard approaches could potentially discard any additional information that 
could be obtained from high frequency data. Thirdly, following estimation the Kalman 
smoother, which is essentially a backward recursion after a forward recursion with the Kalman 
filter, facilitates a decomposition of any realised change in the series such that the estimated 
permanent or transitory component at any interval is estimated using all past, present, and 
future observations in the series. Thus, the purpose of filtering is to ensure that estimates are 
updated with the introduction of every additional observation (see also Durbin and Koopman, 
2012).  
 In line with the expectation that asset price (and by extension, volume) is driven by 
informed trading and can therefore be decomposed into permanent and transitory components 
(see Brogaard et al., 2014b; Menkveld et al., 2007), I demonstrate that (observable) trading 




component), and the second is a stationary series (the transitory component). I argue that the 
unobserved permanent component of trading volume is mainly driven by liquidity traders, 
whereas the unobserved transitory component is primarily driven by informed traders. The 
permanent component in the state space model is a nonstationary series and follows a random 
walk. Consistent with the literature (see as an example, Kyle, 1985), liquidity/uninformed 
traders trade randomly (i.e. the general reference to noise trading in the market microstructure 
literature), and thus I model the trading volume of liquidity traders as a random walk. 
Consequently, the non-random walk component of trading volume is modelled as trading 
volume due to informed trading activity. 
 In a test of the validity of the proposed state space-based volume decomposition 
approach, I use the estimated permanent and transitory components of trading volume to 
examine the impact of liquidity and informed trading activities on market quality metrics, such 
as volatility, liquidity, and toxicity. This part of my analysis serves as a joint test of the 
empirical relevance of the state space model and the impact of informed and liquidity trading 
on market quality. The relevance of my state space approach is underscored when my empirical 
findings are in line with the model predictions in the existing relevant theoretical market 
microstructure literature. I thereafter examine the predictive power of the estimated 
information-driven/transitory component of trading volume on short-horizon returns. This 
analysis furthers my aim of demonstrating the relevance of the state space approach to 
decomposing trading volume into informed and liquidity components. It is also a direct test of 
the efficiency of the price discovery process (see Chordia et al., 2005; 2008). Similar to the 
order imbalance metrics employed in Chordia et al. (2008), the transitory component, which 
also signals private information, is expected to be a predictor of short-horizon returns.  
 All the results obtained are generally consistent with my expectations. Based on my 
state space-estimated information and liquidity-driven components of trading volume, I find 




are not driven by liquidity trading activity; however, it is impacted by informed trading activity. 
I also find that informed trading activity reduces price volatility and market toxicity and 
enhances liquidity. The results are robust to alternative estimation frequencies, approaches and 
proxies for volatility and liquidity. This finding is in line with the theoretical model developed 
by Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2016), 19  which predicts that the price volatility-informed trading 
relationship is influenced by two effects. On the one hand, informed trading reveals 
information, and this decreases uncertainty in financial markets, which reduces price volatility. 
On the other hand, aggressive trading behaviour on the part of informed traders could increase 
volatility. Thus, the net impact of informed trading on stock price volatility depends on which 
effect dominates. Under normal trading conditions, the former effect would naturally dominate. 
The results are also consistent with the empirical findings of Avramov et al. (2006) and Collin-
Dufresne and Fos (2015), who find that price volatility and adverse selection are negatively 
correlated with informed trading. The negative relationships of informed trading with order 
flow toxicity and illiquidity are linked to informed traders’ use of limit orders rather than 
(aggressive) market orders.  
 Furthermore, I find that the transitory component, as estimated using my state space 
approach, is a significant predictor of one-second stock returns. This implies that although 
financial markets are efficient in the long-term, there are short-term inefficiencies in markets 
because investors need time to absorb new information (see Chordia et al., 2008). However, I 
find that the horizon for short-term stock returns predictability has decreased substantially since 
the five-minute window reported by Chordia et al. (2008). The predictability of short-horizon 
returns now only holds on a per second basis, and no longer at the minutes-long threshold 
reported in earlier studies. I show that high frequency trading is the driver of this sharp 
reduction in the length of short-term return predictability.  
                                                          
19 The rational expectation model developed by Wang (1993), via a different mechanism, also predicts a negative 




 Several streams of the literature relate to this study. One delineates traders into 
liquidity- and information-motivated traders (see as an example, Avramov et al., 2006), and 
another examines the role of the different types of traders on price volatility and 
liquidity/toxicity (see as examples, Daigler and Wiley, 1999; Van Ness et al., 2016). This 
chapter differs from both of these streams of the literature in at least three respects. Firstly, the 
approach of decomposing trading volume using state space modelling is fundamentally 
different to those employed in existing studies and holds noteworthy economic 
value/significance over other decomposition methods. Secondly, I examine the role of 
informed trading activity in the evolution of specific market quality metrics, including for a 
new market quality metric, market toxicity. Finally, and critically, I present new evidence on 
the speed of price adjustment in the presence of HFT-driven informed order flow.  
 
3.2  Trading volume and the state space model 
3.2.1  The application of state space modelling to trading volume 
State space models are a natural tool for modelling an observed variable as the sum of 
two unobserved variables. The asymptotic unbiasedness and efficiency of their estimation, i.e. 
maximum likelihood via the Kalman filter (see Brogaard et al., 2014b; Hendershott and 
Menkveld, 2014), make them best suited to analysing high frequency time series.  
 In my setting, the state space model decomposes trading volume into two parts: the 
permanent component of trading volume, which is driven by liquidity trading, and the 
transitory component of trading volume, which is driven by information-motivated trading. 
Thus, liquidity-motivated trading is expected to constitute the permanent part of trading 
volume, while informed order flow is expected to make up the transitory part. In other words, 
uninformed/liquidity order flow is necessary for trading, while informed order flow is not as 
critical. These expectations are consistent with the predictions of the models of Glosten and 




 Firstly, the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model predicts a partial market breakdown if 
there is an excessive level of informed traders in the market relative to liquidity traders. This 
is simply because when there is a dearth of liquidity traders in the market, market makers will 
aim to protect themselves against being adversely selected by widening the spread. Wider 
spreads make order execution more difficult and trading less likely. As suggested by Glosten 
and Milgrom (1985), this prediction is congruous with the well-known lemons problems 
proposed by Akerlof (1970). It simply implies that trading relies on the permanent presence of 
liquidity traders in the market. The permanent character of liquidity order flow is underscored 
by the well-known ‘no trade’ theorems. While trading may not be informationally efficient in 
the absence of informed trades, they can still occur because of the dispersion of beliefs inherent 
in uninformed order flow. This is not the case when liquidity-seeking order flow is unavailable 
in the market. Specifically, high levels of informed orders relative to liquidity orders implies 
that orders will cluster on one side of the order book, leading to no trade scenarios (see 
Brunnermeier, 2001), since there is no dispersion of belief in informed order flow. This is why 
Morris (1994) argues that no trade problems can be solved by adding liquidity traders to the 
market. Therefore, the permanent component of trading volume, as modelled using state space 
modelling, can be characterised as the liquidity component of trading volume. In addition, 
generally, the theoretical literature models liquidity traders as random traders (see as an 
example, Kyle, 1985). In line with this, in the state space representation, the permanent 
component is modelled as a (nonstationary) random walk. 
 Secondly, Suominen (2001) shows that after trading reveals the private information 
held by informed traders, liquidity traders will inevitably revise their pricing and thus become 
more cautious. This may result in a reduction in informed trading in the market. Furthermore, 
according to the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), any new information is simultaneously 
absorbed by traders, and hence can only cause transitory (short-term) changes in trading 




impacts liquidity temporarily in financial markets. Thus any changes in the information-driven 
component of trading volume, while having a durable impact on price (see Menkveld et al., 
2007), should only affect trading volume temporarily. Consistent with this, in the state space 
representation, the stationary and transitory component of trading volume as modelled using 
state space modelling is adopted as a proxy for informed trading activity. 
 The above arguments provide a firm basis for my modelling approach. Additionally, it 
is useful to draw comparisons between my state space modelling approach and a related 
methodological stream of the financial economics literature. When investigating trading 
behaviour in financial markets, modelling may focus on the duration between transactions as a 
means of capturing trading intentions, such that the time stamp may be used as an explanatory 
variable in the mean function of durations. In addition, a cubic spline may be used to smooth 
out huge variations in the duration effects. Such a model is often regarded as a state space 
counterpart of the autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) model of Engle and Russell 
(1998) (see also Durbin and Koopman, 2012).20 The ACD is suitable for analysing trading data 
with transactions at irregular intervals, and the model is extensively used in the market 
microstructure literature to test hypotheses about duration and transaction clustering. In my 
state space representation, the permanent characteristics of the nonstationary series imply 
constant duration, whereas the transitory structure of the stationary series requires non-constant 
duration between transactions. Since the permanent and transitory components of trading 
volume are motivated by liquidity and information trades respectively, there should be constant 
(non-constant) duration in liquidity (informed) trading activity. For example, as transactions 
duration decreases, I would expect an increase in the speed of price adjustment to new 
information (see Dufour and Engle, 2000). Specifically, if indeed my state space representation 
is empirically relevant, then I would expect that non-constant duration or duration clustering is 
                                                          




driven by informed trading. The empirical findings in the literature (see as examples, Dufour 
and Engle, 2000; Engle, 2000; Russell and Engle, 2005; Zhang et al., 2001) are in line with 
this expectation, and therefore provide an additional set of arguments that further underscore 
the empirical relevance of my state space approach.  However, ultimately, the ACD is an 
autoregressive model and consequently is less efficient for decomposing an observed variable 
into unobserved components than the state space modelling approach using maximum 
likelihood estimation via the Kalman filter (see Brogaard et al., 2014b; Durbin and Koopman, 
2012; Hendershott and Menkveld, 2014).  
 
3.2.2  The state space equation 
I model trading volume as the sum of a non-stationary permanent (liquidity-driven) 
component and a stationary transitory (information-driven) component.21 In its simplest form, 
the structure of the state space model for trading volume, a multiple of I stock prices, T intraday 
periods, and D intervals can be expressed as: 
                                            𝑣𝑖,𝑡,𝜏 = 𝑚𝑖,𝑡,𝜏 + 𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝜏                                                     (3.1)                   
and 
                                                    𝑚𝑖,𝑡,𝜏 = 𝑚𝑖,𝑡,𝜏−1 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡,𝜏                                                    (3.2)                                            
where 
                                                   𝑣𝑖,𝑡,𝜏 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡,𝜏),                                                       (3.3) 
      
for i = 1,…,I and 𝜏 = 1,…,T and t = 1,…,D; both 𝜏 and t index event and calendar times 
respectively (see Menkveld, 2013). 𝑇𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡,𝜏 is the volume traded in stock i at interval t 
                                                          
21 In addition to modelling the natural logarithm of trading volume as an observable variable in the state space 
representation, for robustness, I also employ level trading volume, percentage changes in trading volume and first 
difference of trading volume. My inferences are unchanged irrespective of the approach I employ; indeed all the 




and period 𝜏, 𝑚𝑖,𝑡,𝜏 is a non-stationary permanent component of the volume traded in stock i at 
interval t and period 𝜏, 𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝜏 is a stationary transitory component of the volume traded in stock 
i at interval t and period 𝜏, and 𝑢𝑖,𝑡,𝜏 is an idiosyncratic disturbance error in stock i at interval t 
and period 𝜏. 𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝜏 and 𝑢𝑖,𝑡,𝜏 are assumed to be mutually uncorrelated and normally distributed. 
The structure of the model shows that only changes in 𝑢𝑖,𝑡,𝜏 affect trading volume permanently; 
𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝜏 is temporary because its effects are ephemeral. By using maximum likelihood (likelihood 
is constructed using the Kalman filter),22 I can easily estimate 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑢  and 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑠, where t equals to 
one of one second, minute or hour. Specifically, I first partition my sample into one second, 
minute and hour intervals, then estimate 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑢   and  𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑠 for these intervals by using trading 
volume at different periods (𝜏) during the intervals. This implies that, as in Menkveld et al. 
(2007), my permanent and transitory components (𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑢  and  𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑠 ), as estimated using the state 
space model, are time variant (see Table 4 in Menkveld et al., 2007: 220). I impose the time 
variant structure, because I subsequently use the estimated components in multivariate 
predictive regressions. Brogaard et al. (2014b) also compute time variant permanent and 
transitory components of an observable variable (price).   
 According to the structure of my state space model, the permanent component of 
trading volume is due to the activity of the fraction of the market populated by liquidity traders, 
while the other fraction of the market populated by informed traders reflects the transitory 
component of trading volume. It implies that my estimated coefficients (𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑢  and 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑠), 
modelled as variances of permanent and transitory trading volume respectively, can be used as 
                                                          
22 The Kalman filter evaluates the conditional mean and variances of the state vector  𝒎𝒕 given past observations 
𝑉𝑡−1 = {𝒗𝟏, . . , 𝒗𝒕−𝟏}: 𝒂𝒕|𝒕−𝟏 = E(𝒎𝒕|𝑉𝑡−1), 𝑷𝒕|𝒕−𝟏 = var(𝒎𝒕|𝑉𝑡−1),      𝑡 = 1, . . , 𝑁.                            
In order to initialize the Kalman filter, I also have 𝒂𝟏|𝟎 =  𝒂 and 𝑷𝟏|𝟎 =  𝑷, where 𝒎𝟏 ~ 𝑁(𝒂, 𝑷). This 
initialization works only if 𝒎𝒕 is a stationary process. However, as in my case, often 𝒎𝒕 is not a stationary process. 
Hence, “diffuse initialization” is done and estimated by numerically maximizing the log-likelihood. This is 
evaluated by the Kalman filter due to prediction error decompositions. It can be shown that when the model is 
correctly specified the standardized prediction errors are normally and independently distributed with a unit 




proxies for the two fractions of trading volume, i.e. 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑢  is a proxy for liquidity-motivated 
traders and 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑠 is a proxy for information-motivated traders. Since informed trading occurs 
only occasionally relative to uninformed trading, which is more regular, I would expect 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑠 to 
be higher than 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑢 .   
 Although a one-second interval is a suitable frequency to investigate high-frequency 
trading activity, it is a very short interval for trade-based measures such as trading volume; 
hence, I employ one-minute and one-hour interval analysis for robustness. Furthermore, any 
interval that has fewer than three transactions is excluded from the sample.  
 The value of my volume decomposition approach is inextricably linked to the relevance 
of the estimated transitory and permanent components as proxies for informed and uninformed 
trading respectively. Therefore, in order to test their empirical relevance, I employ a series of 
predictive multivariate regressions, which are discussed in the next section. Specifically, I test 
whether the estimated components of trading volume’s impact on market quality proxies are 
consistent with the predicted and established patterns in the literature. The hypotheses related 
to these tests are developed in Section 3.2.3.  
 
3.2.3   The empirical relevance of state space decomposition of trading volume: theory 
and hypotheses 
This section develops three hypotheses for testing the relevance of my state space 
modelling approach. 
 
3.2.3.1 Hypothesis I: state space model-estimated components of trading volume and 
volatility 
Kyle (1985) presents a theoretical model for deriving equilibrium security prices when 




continuous auction system, reflecting information being incorporated into prices at a constant 
rate. Price volatility in part depends on the informed trader’s information as incorporated into 
prices, and is “unaffected by the level of noise trading” (see Kyle, 1985: 1319).23 Degryse et 
al. (2013) extend Kyle's (1985) model by adding a large liquidity trader to the framework. They 
show that when a market maker perceives order flow as uninformed, she does not revise prices, 
such that the liquidity trader benefits from a lower price impact. This prediction also suggests 
an insignificant level of uninformed trading-price volatility relationship. Crucially, this 
relationship relies on a risk neutrality assumption. 
 Hellwig (1980) takes a more apt approach by assuming that price reflects information 
derived from the auctioning activity of risk averse agents. This assumption yields a prediction 
of a positive relationship between liquidity trading and volatility (see also Collin-Dufresne and 
Fos, 2016; Daigler and Wiley, 1999). Considered together with the well-documented positive 
relationship between aggregate trading volume and stock price volatility (see as examples, 
Karpoff, 1987; Lamoureux and Lastrapes, 1990; Lee and Rui, 2002; Park, 2010), the 
implication of the above prediction is that, in a framework controlling for aggregate trading 
volume, the positive relationship between volatility and liquidity trading activity dissipates. 
This is because, as argued by Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2016) and Daigler and Wiley (1999), 
the positive relationship between trading volume and volatility is driven by liquidity trading. 
Furthermore, Hellwig (1980) shows that informed trading activity decreases volatility in 
financial markets (see also Avramov et al., 2006; Wang, 1993), implying a negative 
relationship between volatility and informed trading activity. 
 I would therefore expect that the negative relationship between informed trading and 
volatility will endure in a framework controlling for trading volume. Conversely, there should 
be no expectation of a statistically significant relationship between liquidity trading and 
                                                          
23 Kalotychou and Staikouras (2009), reviewing several market microstructure models, argue that, consistent with 




volatility once volume is controlled for, since liquidity trading is the main driver of the trading 
volume-volatility relationship. I exploit these predicted relationships in a test of the validity of 
my state space modelling approach. Specifically, I test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis I. The state space model-estimated transitory component of trading volume reduces 
volatility 
 
3.2.3.2 Hypothesis II: state space model-estimated components of trading volume, 
liquidity and market toxicity 
In the market microstructure literature, the bid-ask spread holds economic significance 
for the market maker (see as an example, Branch and Freed, 1977). Huang and Stoll (1997) 
show that the bid-ask spread incorporates three costs: the order processing cost, inventory 
holding cost, and the adverse selection cost. Huang and Stoll (1997) and Bollen et al. (2004) 
argue that order processing and inventory holding costs respectively are not related to the type 
of traders active in the market, since a market maker incurs those costs irrespective of who they 
trade with. However, the adverse selection cost is trader type-dependent. Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985) and Easley and O'Hara (1987) predict that the adverse selection cost is due to market 
makers facing adverse selection risk when they trade with informed traders. This means that 
the bid-ask spread is driven by informed trading activity. Order flow is considered toxic when 
market makers are adversely selected by informed traders in a high frequency environment (see 
Easley et al., 2011). Hence, market toxicity is seen as the high frequency equivalent of adverse 
selection risk. I would therefore expect market toxicity to rise in line with increases in the 
adverse selection cost and the widening of the bid ask spread. The widening of the bid-ask 
spread implies a reduction in liquidity.  
 While an increase in informed trading activity could lead to increased adverse selection 
risk for the market maker and induce a widening of the spread, this effect is often eclipsed by 




activity. This is because informed trading mainly occurs in tandem with uninformed trading. 
According to Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), increases in uninformed/liquidity trading volume 
go hand in hand with induced informed trading volume, such that liquidity-seeking trading 
activity provides an opportunity for informed traders to camouflage their trades. This implies 
that informed traders would normally trade only when their trades could be disguised, and 
uninformed trading activity offers the opportunity for disguising informed trades. This is 
logical since if informed orders are identified ahead of execution, they would no longer be 
beneficial for informed traders and therefore could no longer be considered informed.  
 Kyle (1985) also states that an increase in noise trading induces a higher level of 
informed trading (see also Ibikunle, 2018). Ibikunle (2018) specifically provides empirical 
evidence that informed traders increase their trading activity in the presence of higher trading 
volumes, which is shown to be dominated by uninformed trading activity. Increased trading 
activity has the effect of enhancing liquidity and therefore inducing a narrowing of the bid-ask 
spread (see Barclay and Hendershott, 2003; Biais et al., 1999 for further empirical evidence). 
Hence, I would expect a positive relationship between market liquidity and informed trading 
activity. This expectation is consistent with Kyle (1981; 1984; 1985; 1989) showing that 
informed trading activity is positively related to market liquidity (see also Collin-Dufresne and 
Fos, 2015). Improvements in liquidity implies a narrowing of the bid-ask spread and by 
extension a reduction in market toxicity.  
Furthermore, according to Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2016), informed traders with long-
lived information mainly use limit orders. This helps them avoid detection and leads to a 
negative correlation between adverse selection and informed trading. Consequently, I test the 
following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis II. The state space model-estimated transitory component of trading volume 





3.2.3.3 Hypothesis III: state space model-estimated transitory component of trading 
volume and short-horizon returns 
According to Fama (1970), financial markets are largely informationally efficient over 
a daily horizon. Chordia et al. (2002; 2008) however argue that there are inefficiencies in 
markets at shorter horizons because traders need time to act on new information. Motivated by 
this, Chordia et al. (2002; 2008) examine the predictability of short-term returns from lagged 
order imbalance and find that, indeed, markets are inefficient over short periods. Chordia et al. 
(2002; 2008) use order imbalance in their own regressions investigating the predictability of 
short-horizon returns for two reasons. Firstly, order imbalance signals private information, 
which should result in a permanent price impact (this is also alluded to by Kyle, 1985). 
Secondly, large order imbalances exacerbate the inventory problem faced by the market maker, 
leading to quote revisions and changes in the bid-ask spread. Similarly, I argue that my 
transitory component of trading volume signals private information, and thus I expect the 
component to be a significant predictor of short-horizon stock returns and, by extension, an 
inverse predictor of market efficiency (see Chordia et al., 2008; Chung and Hrazdil, 2010).  
 The informative element of both Chordia et al.’s (2002; 2008) order imbalance measure 
and my own state space-based transitory component of trading volume24 measure make them 
suitable predictors in the short-horizon return predictive regressions. Consequently, my third 
hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis III. The state space model-estimated transitory component of trading volume is a 
significant predictor of short-horizon returns. 
 
                                                          
24 In addition, the idea that returns depend on trading volume (or its components) is consistent with the literature. 
The relationship between return and lagged trading volume is predicted by the sequential information arrival 
model developed by Copeland (1976) and Jennings et al. (1981). This model assumes that initially, new 
information is observed only by a trader, leading to her revising her beliefs and beginning to trade advantageously 
with the information. This informed trading activity generates a new equilibrium price, and therefore returns (price 
changes). Specifically, sequential information flow models argue that contemporaneous absolute stock returns can 




3.3 Data and measures 
3.3.1 Data 
I use two sets of data in this study. The first consists of ultra-high frequency tick-by-
tick data for the most active 100 S&P 500 stocks, as sourced from the Thomson Reuters Tick 
History (TRTH) database; trading activity is measured by dollar trading volume. It includes 
data for the trading days between October 2016 and September 2017. In the data, each message 
is recorded with a time stamp to the nearest millisecond. The following variables are included 
in the dataset: Reuters Identification Code (RIC), date, timestamp, price, volume, bid price, ask 
price, bid volume, and ask volume. I apply Lee and Ready’s (1991) algorithm to classify trades 
as buyer- or seller-initiated.25 The final dataset after cleaning26 contains about 216.37 million 
trades, out of which 106.89 million (109.48 million) are buyer- (seller-) initiated. The total 
value of all trades captured in the analysis equals US$3.28 trillion. 
 The second dataset is used to execute additional out of sample tests of the validity of 
my state space modelling approach. It is a proprietary dataset obtained from NASDAQ, and 
contains transactions for 120 randomly selected NASDAQ and NYSE-listed stocks trading 
during all the trading days in 2009. The data is complementary to the first dataset I employ 
because it disaggregates transactions into those executed based on orders submitted by HFTs 
and non-HFTs. This is the same dataset described in detail by Brogaard et al. (2014b). The 
dataset contains the following information on each transaction included in the sample: date, 
time (in milliseconds), transaction size (shares), price, buy-sell indicator, and liquidity nature 
of the two sides to each trade (HH, HN, NH and NN). HH indicates a trade based on an HFT 
demanding liquidity and an HFT supplying the required liquidity. HN implies that an HFT 
demands liquidity and a non-HFT supplies liquidity, while NH is the opposite. NN refers to 
                                                          
25 Chakrabarty et al. (2015) compare the different trades classification methods and conclude that Lee and Ready’s 
(1991) is the most accurate method. 
26 I follow Chordia et al. (2001) and Ibikunle (2015) in applying a standard set of exclusion criteria to the data, 




trades where both counterparties are non-HFTs. I identify the sum of HH, HN and NH as HFT 
volume. Based on this classification, HFTs are counterparties in about 71.30% of all trades in 
the sample. The NASDAQ-provided dataset is only used in Section 3.5 of this chapter, where 
further justification for its use is outlined.  
 
3.3.2 Measures and descriptive statistics 
In order to conduct a joint test of the empirical relevance of my state space modelling 
approach and the impact of liquidity and informed trading on price volatility, liquidity, and 
market toxicity, I estimate a set of predictive regressions. Thus, apart from the state space-
estimated permanent and transitory components of trading volume, my volatility, liquidity, and 
market toxicity measures are the main variables of interest. Below I elaborate on how these 
and other relevant variables are computed. 
 
3.3.2.1 Volatility measures 
Consistent with the literature, I use the absolute value of price changes, |∆𝑝𝑖,𝑡|, as the 
main proxy for stock price volatility (see Karpoff, 1987). ∆𝑝𝑖,𝑡 is the difference in price change 
between the last transaction prices, p, for stock i at intervals t and t-1. 
 For robustness, I also proxy volatility using the standard deviation of stock returns 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
𝑅  
(see Barclay and Hendershott, 2003; 2008; Lamoureux and Lastrapes, 1990; Malceniece et al., 
2018), where R is the midpoint-to-midpoint return with each midpoint computed using the best 
bid and ask quotes corresponding to each transaction in stock i during interval t; R is thus 
defined in event/transaction time. The standard deviation of these returns within each interval 
t is my volatility measure. This midpoint-based approach is used in order to reduce the 
incidence of bid-ask bounce, which transaction prices are susceptible to (see Avramov et al., 




transaction prices do not yield materially different results. Interval t corresponds to one of one 
second, minute or hour for both volatility proxies. 
 
3.3.2.2 Liquidity measures 
For robustness, I employ three spread measures as proxies for liquidity; the spread 
metrics are the effective spread (𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡), quoted spread (𝑄𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡), and relative spread 
(𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡). The 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is obtained by dividing the difference between interval t’s best 
ask and bid prices by the midpoint of both prices for stock i, while the 𝑄𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is simply 
the difference between interval t’s best ask and bid prices for stock i. The 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is twice 
the absolute value of the difference between the last transaction price for stock i in interval t 
and the midpoint of the prevailing bid and ask prices when the transaction occurs for stock i. 
Interval t corresponds to one of one second, minute or hour for all liquidity proxies. 
 
3.3.2.3 Market toxicity 
I use the nominal order imbalance metric employed by Chordia et al. (2008) as a proxy 
for the level of order flow toxicity in the market; in this chapter, I call the measure 𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡. This 
is because existing order toxicity measures, such as the volume synchronised probability of 
informed trading (VPIN - see Easley et al., 2012), essentially capture the essence of order 
imbalance in the market and thus are highly correlated with 𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡. 𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is computed as the 
absolute value of the number of buyer-initiated trades minus the number of seller-initiated 
trades divided by the total number of trades for stock i during interval t, where t corresponds 
to one of one-minute or one-hour. I employ only minute and hour intervals because it is 
challenging to obtain enough trading volume for the lower volume stocks to compute unbiased 





3.3.2.4 Volume measures 
In my state space model, trading volume is the observable variable, which is then 
decomposed into unobservable proxies of liquidity trading activity (𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑢) and informed trading 
activity (𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑠) in stock i at time t. Thus, the proxies could be mechanically correlated with 
trading activity and volume. In order to ascertain that observed effects of the proxies are not 
due to aggregate trading volume, I need to include at least one proxy for trading volume/activity 
in my secondary models. This is particularly important in my framework since Andersen and 
Bondarenko (2014) show that the relationship between VPIN, also estimated from trading 
volume, and future short-term volatility is trivial after controlling for mechanic correlation 
between VPIN and trading volume. Controlling for trading volume/activity in my secondary 
models addresses the Andersen and Bondarenko (2014) criticism. I employ the natural 
logarithm of trading volume for stock i at time t (𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡) as a proxy for trading volume. A second 
trading activity-related proxy is also included in my models: 𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡. 𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is the absolute value 
of the difference between buyer- and seller-initiated trades for stock i during interval t. 
According to Chordia et al. (2002), the metric adequately proxies trading activity because it 
strongly influences prices and liquidity.  
Table 3. 1 Definitions of variables and descriptive statistics 
The table defines the variables calculated for each stock-interval, i, t, and reports the descriptive statistics. All 
variables, except 𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡, are computed at a one-second frequency (t equals one-second). 𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is computed at a one-
minute frequency. The sample contains the most active 100 S&P 500 stocks traded between October 1, 2016 
through to September 30, 2017 on NYSE and NASDAQ. 
 
Variable Description Mean Median Stand. 
Deviatio
n 
𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 Effective spread for stock i at interval t. 
Computed as twice the absolute value of 
the difference between the last execution 
price and the midpoint of the prevailing 
bid and ask prices at interval t.  




𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 Relative spread for stock i at interval t. 
Computed as the difference between the 
best ask and bid prices divided by the 
midpoint of both prices during interval t. 
0.0003 0.0002 0.0009 
𝑄𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 Quoted spread for stock i at interval t. 
Computed as the difference between the 
best ask and bid prices during interval t. 
0.0186 0.0100 0.0564 
𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 Absolute difference between buyer- and 
seller-initiated trades for stock i during 
interval t. 
1584.05 424.00 35771 
|∆𝑝𝑖,𝑡| Absolute value of price change for stock 
i during interval t. Computed as the 
absolute value of the differences 
between last prices at intervals t and t-1. 
0.0091 0.0090 0.0670 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 Midpoint-to-midpoint return for stock i 
during interval t. Computed as the 
difference between the midpoints 
corresponding to the last transactions at 
intervals t and t-1 divided by the 
midpoint corresponding to the last 
transaction at interval t-1 
-0.412x10-6 0.00 0.0013 
𝜎𝑖,𝑡
𝑅  Standard deviation of midpoint-to-
midpoint returns for stock i during 
interval t; each midpoint during the 
interval t corresponds to a transaction 
occurring during the interval. 
0.92x10-4 0.59x10-4 0.0009 
𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡 Market toxicity for stock i for interval t. 
Computed as the absolute value of the 
difference between the numbers of buy 
and sell trades divided by the sum of the 
numbers of buy and sell trades occurring 
during interval t. 
0.5406 0.5037 0.3419 
 
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics for volatility, liquidity, market toxicity and volume 
metrics. Midpoint return estimates for stock i at time t, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡s, are also presented. All measures 
except that of market toxicity (𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡) are based on one-second computations; 𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is based on 
one-minute calculations. Consistent with recent evidence (see as an example, Malceniece et 
al., 2018), the spread measures are tight, with the average 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡, 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡, and 




are weakly negative over my sample period. However, volatility is generally low irrespective 
of which proxy I focus on. The mean and median for |∆𝑝𝑖,𝑡| are about 0.0092 and 0.009 
respectively, while 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
𝑅  is lower still at 0.00009. 
 
3.4 Analysis of state space decomposition of trading volume 
3.4.1 State space decomposition of trading volume: estimates 
Table 3.2 presents the cross-sectional mean estimated values of the permanent 
(liquidity-driven) and transitory (information-driven) components of trading volume as 
decomposed using the state space model. 
Table 3. 2 State Space Estimates 
The table contains mean cross-sectional estimates of transitory (information-driven) and permanent (liquidity-
driven) components of trading volume for the most active 100 S&P 500 stocks trading between October 1, 2016 
and September 30, 2017. Stocks are divided into quartiles according to their level of trading activity; trading 
activity is based on trading volume. Quartile 1 contains the least active companies, while Quartile 4 contains the 
most active stocks. The estimates are based on the following state space model for decomposing trading volume 
into its transitory and permanent components: 
𝑣𝑖,𝑡,𝜏 =  𝑚𝑖,𝑡,𝜏 + 𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝜏 ; 𝑚𝑖,𝑡,𝜏 =  𝑚𝑖,𝑡,𝜏−1 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡,𝜏 
where 𝑣𝑖,𝑡,𝜏 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡,𝜏), i = 1,…,I (stocks), t = 1,…,D (intervals),  𝜏 = 1,…,T (periods), 𝑇𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡,𝜏 
corresponds to the trading volume of stock i at interval t and period 𝜏, 𝑚𝑖,𝑡,𝜏 is a non-stationary permanent 
component of stock i at interval t and period 𝜏, 𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝜏 is a stationary transitory component for stock i at interval t 
and period 𝜏 and 𝑢𝑖,𝑡,𝜏 is an idiosyncratic disturbance error for stock i at interval t and period 𝜏. 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑠 and 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑢 are the 
respective estimates of the transitory and permanent components of trading volume for stock i and interval t, 
estimated by maximum likelihood (constructed using the Kalman filter). Estimations are presented for one-
second, one-minute, and one-hour frequencies (t equals one-second, one-minute and one-hour). 
 
Stock quartiles 
Variable Least active 2 3 Most active 
One-second frequency (t equals one-second) 
𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑠 1.02 1.24 1.37 1.51 
𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑢   0.46 0.49 0.53 0.78 
One-minute frequency (t equals one-minute) 
𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑠 1.21 1.36 1.63 1.88 
𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑢   0.49 0.55 0.72 0.85 





2𝑠 1.34 1.65 1.77 1.96 
𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑢   0.51 0.59 0.76 0.97 
 
The results are presented for the mean estimates based on one-second, one-minute, and 
one-hour estimations. For improved insight, I divide my sample into quartiles according to 
their level of trading activity; trading activity is measured by dollar trading volume. The stocks 
in Quartile 1 are the least active stocks, while Quartile 4 stocks are the most active. As expected, 
the mean 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑠 is consistently higher than the mean 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑢  across all quartiles, irrespective of the 
estimation frequency of the state space model. This is consistent with the structure of my state 
space modelling approach. Informed trades are modelled as transitory, occurring only when 
traders have an informational advantage in the market, while uninformed trades are a 
permanent fixture in markets. This implies a higher variance for informed trades, hence I would 
expect higher estimates for 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑠 relative to 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑢 .   
 Informed traders are, strategically, more active when trading volume and liquidity 
trading are high, because higher trading volumes provide better “camouflage” for informed 
trades (see Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988). The estimates presented in Table 3.2 are consistent 
with this widely held view in the market microstructure literature. The mean variance of 
liquidity-motivated trades in Quartile 4 is higher than the mean variance of liquidity trades in 
all of the other quartiles, and is lowest in Quartile 1. This suggests that informed traders should 
be most active in Quartile 4 and least active in Quartile 1. The transitory component estimates 
in Table 3.2 are completely in line with this expectation. The mean transitory component in 
Quartile 4 are 1.51, 1.88 and 1.96 for the one-second, one-minute and one-hour estimations 
respectively. These estimates are 48%, 55.37% and 46.27% larger than the one-second, one-
minute, and one-hour frequencies mean estimated values for Quartile 1 stocks at 1.02, 1.21, 




 Inferring from the Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) models, when 
uninformed traders are scarce in the market, the price discovery process becomes impaired or 
even breaks down. This is because the prospect of compensation for gathering information is 
reduced in markets where uninformed traders are few, and this leads to fewer than optimal 
potential informed traders being incentivised to acquire information. The absence of informed 
traders in the markets impairs the price discovery process, since their trades convey information 
to the market. Thus, both liquidity and informed traders are critical to the price discovery 
process. An approach that allows me to directly estimate the proportion of trading volume that 
can be attributed to both types of traders is therefore valuable in several contexts, not least in 
market reporting activities, investment management, and policy/regulations development. For 
example, firm managers’ responses to the so-called speeding ticket (Price and Volume Query) 
often issued by some exchanges, such as the Australian Securities Exchange, focus mainly on 
explaining the evolution of trading volume. 
 
3.4.2 State space decomposition of trading volume: analysis of empirical relevance 
3.4.2.1 Hypothesis I: state space model-estimated components of trading volume and 
volatility 
I estimate the multivariate predictive model presented in Equation (3.4) in order to 
examine the relationship between the state space estimated proxies of liquidity (𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑢) and 
informed ( 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑠) trading activities on the one hand and volatility on the other. This is a direct 
test of Hypothesis I in Section 3.2.3.1. 
  |∆𝑝𝑖,𝑡| = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠 + 𝛽5𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑢 + 𝑖,𝑡   (3.4),                                                                                                                                
where all variables are as defined in Section 3.3.2. Equation (3.4) is estimated at one-second, 
one-minute, and one-hour intervals. 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠  and 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑢 , the proxies for informed and 




may therefore be of potential concern, since I include two proxies of trading activity (𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 
and 𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1) in the model. However, as shown in Table 3.3, this is not the case. Note that my 
state space representation models informed and uninformed trading volume as variances of 
transitory and permanent trading volume. I employ these variance measures as proxies of 
informed and uninformed trading volume in Equation (3.4), and subsequent models. Therefore, 
collinearity is not expected in the regression framework. Consistent with this view, the 
correlation coefficient estimates presented in Table 3.3 show that there are no multicollinearity 







Table 3. 3 Correlation matrix for variables 
The table plots the correlation matrix of the variables employed in this study’s models. One-second frequency (t equals one-second) is used to compute all variables.  
𝑄𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is the quoted spread for stock i for interval t and is computed as the difference between the best ask and bid prices for interval t. 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is the relative spread for 
stock i and interval t and is computed as the difference between the best ask and bid prices divided by the midpoint of both prices for interval t. 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is the effective spread 
for stock i for interval t and computed as twice the absolute value of the difference between the last execution price and the midpoint of the prevailing bid and ask prices for interval 
t, 𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is the natural logarithm of trading volume for stock i for interval t, while 𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is the absolute difference between buyer- and seller-initiated traders for stock i for interval 
t. 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑠 is the state space model-estimated transitory component of trading volume and is the proxy for informed trading in stock i during interval t, while 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑢 is the state space model-
estimated permanent component of trading volume and is the proxy for liquidity trading in stock i during interval t. |∆𝑝𝑖,𝑡| is the absolute value of price change for stock i for 
interval t and is computed as the absolute value of the differences between the last prices at intervals t and t-1, while 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
𝑅  is the standard deviation of midpoint-to-midpoint returns 
for stock i during interval t; each midpoint corresponds to a transaction. The sample contains the most active 100 S&P 500 stocks traded between October 1, 2016 and September 
30, 2017 on NYSE and NASDAQ. 
 
 𝑄𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑠    
 
𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑢  |∆𝑝𝑖,𝑡| 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
𝑅  
 𝑄𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 1         
𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 0.79909 1        
 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 0.90722 0.72476 1       
𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡 
 
-0.04144 -0.06261 -0.01673 1      
𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 0.00133 0.01265 0.00284 0.11090 1     
𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑠   0.00000 0.00013 0.00007 0.00326 0.44342 1    
𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑢  0.00000 -0.00001 0.00005 0.00021 -0.00001 -0.00000 1   
|∆𝑝𝑖,𝑡| 0.08621 0.05052 0.06789 0.01904 0.01101 0.00004 0.00008 1  
𝜎𝑖,𝑡





As stated in Section 3.2.1, for robustness, I employ a second volatility proxy, i.e. the 
standard deviation of midpoint returns. Consistent with the literature, I include the proxy’s 
lagged value as an additional explanatory variable (see as examples, Justiniano and Primiceri, 
2008; Schwert, 1989) in Equation (3.5): 
𝜎𝑖,𝑡
𝑅 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑅 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠 + 𝛽6𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑢 + 𝑖,𝑡 
 (3.5), 
where all variables are as previously defined.  Equations (3.4) and (3.5) are estimated using 
time fixed effects with panel corrected standard errors. For robustness, I also include stock 
fixed effect and both stock and time fixed effects jointly. All of the estimation approaches yield 
qualitatively similar results.  
 Both of the volatility proxies I employ encapsulate all variation in stock prices; no 
distinction is made between permanent and temporary price changes. This approach is based 
on the extensive market microstructure literature stream investigating the impact of various 
market phenomena on market quality proxies (see as examples the recent works by Buti et al., 
2011; Comerton-Forde and Putniņš, 2015; Malceniece et al., 2018). The purpose of this 
analysis is to test the empirical relevance of my state space modelling approach by verifying 
whether the estimated components of trading volume affect market quality variables as 
predicted in the literature (see Section 3.2.3), hence my adoption of the volatility measures 
developed in the existing literature. 
 The results obtained from the estimation of Equations (3.4) and (3.5) are presented in 
Table 3.4.  
Table 3. 4 Predictive regressions of market volatility on lagged components of trading 
volume 
The predictive power of one-second/minute/hour permanent and transitory components of trading volume is 
estimated using the following models: 
|∆𝑝𝑖,𝑡| = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠 + 𝛽5𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1





𝑅 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑝
+ 𝛽2𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠 + 𝛽6𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑢 + 𝑖,𝑡 
where |∆𝑝𝑖,𝑡| is the absolute value of price change for stock i and interval t and computed as the absolute value of 
the differences between last prices at intervals t and t-1, 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 is the effective spread for stock i for interval 
t-1 and computed as twice the absolute value of the difference between the last execution price and the midpoint 
of the prevailing bid and ask prices for interval t-1. 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑅  is the standard deviation of midpoint-to-midpoint returns 
for stock i during interval t-1; each midpoint corresponds to a transaction. 𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 is the natural logarithm of 
trading volume for stock i and interval t-1, and 𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 is the absolute difference between buyer- and seller-
initiated traders for stock i and interval t-1. 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠 and 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑢  are state space model-estimated proxies (estimated 
using Kalman filter constructed maximum likelihood) for informed and uninformed trading activity respectively 
for stock i and interval t-1. The sample contains the most active 100 S&P 500 stocks traded between October 1, 
2016 and September 30, 2017 on NYSE and NASDAQ. ***, ** and * correspond to statistical significance at the 
0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Panel A 

















































Sample size (n) 29959938 8880028 204354 
Fixed effects Time Time Time 































































Sample size (n) 29959938 8880028 204354 
Fixed effects Time Time Time 
𝑅2̅̅̅̅  1.12% 3.24% 8.73% 
 
The inferences drawn from the estimates in Table 3.4 are consistent across all frequency 
estimations. The coefficient estimates show that lagged 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑠 is a significant predictor of the 
absolute value of price changes, |∆𝑝𝑖,𝑡|, and the standard deviation of stock returns, 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
𝑅 ; the 
𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑠 coefficients are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The negative coefficient estimates 
indicate that increases in information-motivated trades reduce price volatility in financial 
markets. This result is consistent with the findings of Avramov et al. (2006), who find that 
stock price volatility is negatively correlated with informed traders (see also Hellwig, 1980; 
Wang, 1993). Hypothesis I is therefore upheld.  
 In contrast, 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑢  is not a significant predictor of volatility once I control for volume. 
This is because the positive relationship between trading volume and volatility is driven by 
trading volume due to liquidity trading (see Collin-Dufresne and Fos, 2016; Daigler and Wiley, 
1999).27 The significant negative 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑠 and the insignificant 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑢  coefficient estimates imply a 
validation of my state space approach to decomposing trading volume into informed and 
liquidity-driven components. 
 I note that while the coefficient estimates are consistent for all estimation frequencies 
across both panels, the impact of 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑠 is stronger for lower frequencies. For example, in Panel 
                                                          
27 For robustness and in a test of the arguments presented by Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2016) and Daigler and 
Wiley (1999), i.e. that a positive volume-volatility relation is driven by liquidity trading, I exclude the trading 
volume proxy from a follow-up model. I find that once trading volume is not controlled for, the liquidity trading 
proxy becomes a positive and statistically significant predictor of volatility. For parsimony, I do not show this 




A (B), the effect of 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑠 on volatility proxies for the one-hour frequency estimation is 6.65 
(124.28) and 98.80 (1,249) times larger than that of the one-minute and one-second frequency 
estimations respectively. These differences are due to more information being typically 
released over longer intervals. It is plausible that the market learns more about the 
developments relevant to an instrument over an hour than over a second or a minute, or at the 
very least, comes to terms more with new information over a longer time horizon. The 
estimated coefficients for all of the other explanatory variables are consistent with the existing 
literature.  
 The explanatory powers of the one-second regressions are low, with the 𝑅2̅̅̅̅  being only 
about 0.87% for |∆𝑝𝑖,𝑡| in Panel A and 2.49% for 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
𝑅  in Panel B. This is unsurprising and is 
because I estimate the models at a one-second frequency, with very little information being 
released during the very narrow window (see Chordia et al., 2008). Consequently, the 𝑅2̅̅̅̅  
estimates are larger for the one-minute and one-hour frequencies, which are 3.24% and 8.73% 
respectively in Panel B.   
 
3.4.2.2 Hypothesis II: state space model-estimated components of trading volume, 
liquidity and market toxicity 
I next test Hypothesis II from Section 3.2.3.2. Specifically, I investigate the nature of 
the relationship between my state space model-estimated components of trading volume on the 
one hand, and liquidity and market toxicity on the other. For this purpose, I estimate the 
following multivariate predictive models: 
    𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑝 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠 + 𝛽5𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑢 + 𝑖,𝑡          (3.6),                   
     𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑝 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠 + 𝛽5𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1




where 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 corresponds to one of 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡, 𝑄𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡, and 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡. All variables 
are as previously defined. Equation (3.6) is estimated at one-second, one-minute, and one-hour 
frequencies, while Equation (3.7) is estimated at one-minute and one-hour frequencies only. 
This is because trading activity during a one-second interval is minimal and not substantial 
enough to compute 𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡 within the interval in an unbiased manner. 
Table 3. 5 Predictive regressions of market liquidity on lagged components of trading volume 
The predictive power of the state space-estimated lagged permanent and transitory components of trading volume 
is estimated using the following model: 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑅 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠 + 𝛽5𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑢 + 𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 corresponds to one of 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡, 𝑄𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡. 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is the effective spread for 
stock i at interval t and is computed as twice the absolute value of the difference between the last execution price 
and the midpoint of the prevailing bid and ask prices for interval t, 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is the relative spread for stock i at 
interval t and is obtained by dividing the difference between the best ask and bid prices by the midpoint of both 
prices for interval t, 𝑄𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  is the quoted spread for stock i for interval t and computed as the difference 
between the best ask and bid prices for interval t. 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑅  is the standard deviation of mid-price returns for stock i 
during interval t-1 and calculated as the standard deviation of midpoint-to-midpoint returns during interval t-1; 
each midpoint corresponds to a transaction. 𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 is the natural logarithm of trading volume for stock i during 
interval t-1 and 𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 is the absolute difference between buyer- and seller-initiated traders for stock i during 
interval t-1.  𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠 and 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑢  are state space model-estimated proxies (estimated using Kalman filter constructed 
maximum likelihood) for informed and uninformed trading activity respectively for stock i and interval t-1. The 
sample contains the most active 100 S&P 500 stocks traded between October 1, 2016 and September 30, 2017 on 
NYSE and NASDAQ. ***, ** and * correspond to statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A 

















































Sample size (n) 29959938 8880028 204354 
Fixed effects Time Time Time 























































Sample size (n) 29959938 8880028 204354 
Fixed effects Time Time Time 
𝑅2̅̅̅̅  1.05% 2.02% 18.36% 
 
Panel C 

















































Sample size (n) 29959938 8880028 204354 
Fixed effects Time Time Time 
𝑅2̅̅̅̅  1.77% 2.16% 16.43% 
 
Panels A, B, and C of Table 3.5 show the results for Equation (3.6), where 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡, 




statistically significant (p-value <0.01) 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠  coefficient estimates show that, consistent with 
Hypothesis II and the predictions of Kyle (1981; 1984; 1985; 1989), informed trading activity 
is positively linked to liquidity. By contrast, 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑢 ’s coefficient estimates are not statistically 
significant, suggesting that 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑢  is not a significant predictor of liquidity once I control for 
volume and order flow dynamics. This is in line with the estimates obtained in the estimation 
of Equation (3.5). The results are also consistent with the empirical findings of Collin-Dufresne 
and Fos (2015) and suggest that, as predicted by Kaniel and Liu (2006), informed traders use 
limit orders rather than market orders. The coefficients of all of the control variables are in line 
with the consistent literature. The consistency of the results with the literature emphasize the 
relevance of my state space modelling approach. Similar to the price volatility model, 𝑅2̅̅̅̅  values 
in Panels A, B, and C are generally small for the one-second and one-minute high frequency 
estimations, with estimates ranging from 1.05% to 2.76%. The low 𝑅2̅̅̅̅  values are due to the 
estimation frequencies. Hence, the one-hour frequency models have much higher levels of 
explanatory powers. In Panels A, B, and C, the 𝑅2̅̅̅̅  values are 19.49%, 18.36% and 16.43% 
respectively for the one-hour frequency estimations.  
Table 3. 6 Predictive regressions of market toxicity on lagged components of trading volume 
The predictive power of the state space-estimated lagged permanent and transitory components of trading volume 
is estimated using the following model: 
𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑅 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠 + 𝛽5𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑢 + 𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is the proxy for market toxicity for stock i and interval t and is calculated as the absolute value of the 
difference between the numbers of buy and sell trades divided by the sum of the numbers of buy and sell trades 
occurring during interval t. 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑅  is the standard deviation of mid-price returns for stock i during interval t-1 and 
calculated as the standard deviation of midpoint-to-midpoint returns during interval t-1; each midpoint 
corresponds to a transaction. 𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 is the natural logarithm of trading volume for stock i during interval t-1 and 
𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 is the absolute difference between buyer- and seller-initiated traders for stock i during interval t-1.  
𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠 and 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑢  are state space model-estimated proxies (estimated using Kalman filter constructed maximum 
likelihood) for informed and uninformed trading activity respectively for stock i and interval t-1. The sample 
contains the most active 100 S&P 500 stocks traded between October 1, 2016 and September 30, 2017 on NYSE 





Dependent Variable: 𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡 
 One-minute frequency One-hour frequency 































Sample size (n) 8880028 204354 
Fixed effects Time Time 
𝑅2̅̅̅̅  0.95% 3.99% 
 
Table 3.6 presents the estimated coefficients for the model estimated at one-minute and 
one-hour frequencies. Consistent with the results in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠  is negatively and 
statistically significantly related to 𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡 at the 0.01 level of statistical significance, however 
𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑢  is not, once volume and liquidity are controlled for. The inverse relationship between the 
𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡 and 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠  suggests that information-motivated trading volume reduces order flow 
toxicity in financial markets, even after controlling for the overall impact of trading volume 
and volatility. This is in line with the arguments that informed trading, which is dependent on 
uninformed trading activity, enhances liquidity (see Kyle, 1981; 1984; 1985; 1989). Another 
explanation for the ameliorating effect of informed trading on market toxicity is presented by 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), who show that when informed traders observe the same 
information signal (a very plausible scenario), they compete against each other to exploit the 
signal. This competition may lead to the market maker facing reduced adverse selection risk. 
When faced with reduced adverse selection risk, market makers will respond with tighter 




 Although all other control variables are significant in the one-minute frequency model 
estimation, the explanatory power of the regression is small, with the 𝑅2̅̅̅̅  being only about 
0.95%, again owing to the high frequency of the model estimation. This view is underscored 
by the larger 𝑅2̅̅̅̅  value for the one-hour frequency estimation at 3.99%. 
3.4.2.3 Hypothesis III: state space model-estimated components of trading volume and 
short-horizon returns 
As outlined in Section 3.2.3.3, my third hypothesis suggests that 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑠 is a significant 
predictor of short-horizon stock returns. In a test of this hypothesis, I estimate the following 
regression model: 
   𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑝 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠 + 𝑖,𝑡       (3.8)                
where all of the variables are as previously defined. All variables are computed over a one-
second frequency.  
Table 3. 7 Predictive regressions of short horizon stock returns on lagged transitory 
component of trading volume 
The predictive power of the state space-estimated lagged transitory component of trading volume is estimated 
using the following model: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑅 +  𝛽2𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the midpoint-to-midpoint return for stock i during interval t and is computed as the difference between 
the midpoints corresponding to the last transactions at intervals t and t-1 divided by the midpoint corresponding 
to the last transaction at interval t-1. 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑅  is the standard deviation of mid-price returns for stock i during interval 
t-1 and calculated as the standard deviation of midpoint-to-midpoint returns during interval t-1; each midpoint 
corresponds to a transaction. 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 is the effective spread for stock i and interval t-1 and computed as twice 
the absolute value of the difference between the last execution price and the midpoint of the prevailing bid and 
ask prices for interval t-1 𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 is the natural logarithm of trading volume for stock i during interval t-1 and 
𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 is the absolute difference between buyer- and seller-initiated traders for stock i during interval t-1. 𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 
is a proxy for market toxicity for stock i and interval t-1 and calculated as the absolute value of the difference 
between the numbers of buy and sell trades divided by the sum of the numbers of buy and sell trades for interval 
t-1   𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠 is a state space model-estimated proxy (estimated using Kalman filter constructed maximum likelihood) 
for informed trading activity for stock i and interval t-1. The sample contains the most active 100 S&P 500 stocks 
traded between October 1, 2016 and September 30, 2017 on NYSE and NASDAQ. ***, ** and * correspond to 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1   0.301x10
-5 
(0.82) 
Sample size (n) 29959938 8880028 
Fixed effects Time Time 
𝑅2̅̅̅̅  0.17% 0.65% 
 
Table 3.7 presents the estimated coefficients for Equation (3.8). All of the coefficients, 
except 𝛽1 (for 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑅 ), are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This result is a validation of 
my third hypothesis and thus further emphasizes the empirical relevance of my state space 
modelling approach. The statistically significant relationship between 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠  and one-second 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 implies that 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑠, as obtained using the state space model approach, signals private 
information similar to the order imbalance metrics used by Chordia et al. (2008). The 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠  
coefficient estimate is negative, suggesting that an increase in the level of informed trading 
eliminates/reduces return predictability/arbitrage (see Hellwig, 1980; Wang, 1993). The 𝑅2̅̅̅̅  is 
0.17%. The low 𝑅2̅̅̅̅  is linked to the estimation frequency of the regression model, which is one 
second in this case.  
 An estimation of the model over a lower frequency, such as the one-minute interval, 
could also prove insightful. This is because the trading volume in my sample appears to be 




al., 2014b). Thus, if HFTs are responsible for driving a substantial proportion of the informed 
trading volume, the predictability of stock return should be greatly diminished over a one-
minute interval, since a one-minute interval cannot be considered a short-horizon in an HFT-
driven market. I estimate the following regression at a one-minute frequency; the only 
difference to Equation (3.8) is the addition of 𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡, which can only be validly computed at a 
minimum frequency of about one minute: 
 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑝 +  𝛽2𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠 +
𝛽6𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑖,𝑡     (3.9) 
In this model, I expect that the coefficients for the two information signal proxies, i.e. 𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 
and 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠 , will not be statistically significant at the one-minute interval because of the superfast 
trading systems of HFTs trading in S&P 500 stocks. 
 The final column of Table 3.7 presents the estimated coefficients for Equation (3.9). As 
predicted, 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠 ’s coefficient is not statistically significant, owing to the lack of return 
predictability over a time period stretching into a minute. However, the 𝑅2̅̅̅̅  coefficient at 0.65% 
is larger than for the one-second frequency estimation in Equation (3.8). The lack of statistical 
significance for 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠 ’s coefficient  in the one-minute frequency regression model is due to the 
prevalence of HFT activity in the data I use, and the ability of HFTs to absorb and act on new 
information at a fast pace and thereby eliminate arbitrage opportunities. This leads to the 
elimination of return predictability at less than ultra-high frequencies. 𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 is an information 
signal based on the order imbalance metric used by Chordia et al. (2008); however, in contrast 
to the results presented by Chordia et al. (2008), the metric is not statistically significant here. 
This shows that while one-second stock returns are predictable from lagged metrics that signal 
private information, one-minute stock returns are not predictable in financial markets 




 A key finding here is that although 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑠 is a lag predictor of one-second stock returns, 
one-minute stock returns are not predictable using either 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑠 or the order imbalance metric 
𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡 inspired by Chordia et al. (2008). Thus, the latter part of the findings is not consistent 
with the results presented by Chordia et al. (2008), who show that even five-minute stock 
returns can be predicted from past order imbalance. The inconsistency here is linked to the data 
period employed by both studies. While Chordia et al. (2008) employ a dataset covering the 
years 1993 to 2002, when HFTs were not the main drivers of trading in financial markets, the 
analysis in this section is based on a much more recent dataset from 2016 to 2017. In Section 
3.5, I show that, based on 2009 data, 71% of NASDAQ and NYSE’s trading volume is linked 
to HFT activity. It is therefore not surprising to find that in recent years, the speed of price 
adjustment through the incorporation of new information has become much higher. 
 
3.5 High frequency trading and return predictability28 
In Section 3.4.2.3, I argue that the lack of a statistically significant relationship between 
𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2𝑠 and one-minute 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is due to HFTs driving a faster incorporation of information into prices. 
In this section, I substantiate this theory by addressing the role of HFTs in the elimination of 
return predictability. In comparison with non-HFTs, HFTs could be viewed as being informed, 
simply on the basis that they trade with either private or public information (e.g. the sudden 
arrest of a firm’s CEO for fraudulent activities) at a faster pace than non-HFTs. This is referred 
to as latency arbitrage; it involves the exploitation of a trading time disparity between fast and 
slow traders, when that trade is executed solely because of a latency advantage. Ibikunle (2018) 
argues that this speed advantage is tantamount to an information advantage when traders trade 
at different speeds, since the end result remains the same – a set of traders exploit information 
                                                          




(whether private or public) ahead of a different set of traders. Thus, exchanges with 
infrastructures that especially accommodate HFTs tend to display efficient prices ahead of 
others when instruments are traded simultaneously across those exchanges. This is the case 
with the analysis of price leadership in the London equity market conducted by Ibikunle (2018). 
Chaboud et al. (2014) and Brogaard et al. (2014b) also show that HFTs enhance informational 
efficiency by speeding up price discovery and eliminating arbitrage opportunities.  
 In order to capture the transitory nature of informed trading volumes linked to HFT 
activity, I design a test which reflects the extent of transitory informed trading in the market 
when arbitrageurs observe that instruments’ prices have deviated from their underlying values. 
I note that, while HFTs could be considered informed in comparison with non-HFTs, not all 
HFTs employ arbitrage strategies. Menkveld (2013) and Hagströmer and Nordén (2013) show 
that the majority of HFTs (about 80%) typically apply market making strategies. Furthermore, 
in a market dominated by HFTs, the speed advantage will not consistently confer appreciable 
advantages over the also fast competition. Thus, my test is designed to capture the changes in 
HFT volumes attributable to informed HFT activity.  
 For the test, I use the transactions dataset for 120 NASDAQ and NYSE stocks obtained 
from NASDAQ. The data disaggregates transactions into HFT and non-HFT transactions for 
the year 2009. Employing the dataset, I re-estimate Equations (3.8) and (3.9) with one 
additional variable, 𝐷𝐻𝐹𝑇,𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠 : 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑝 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠 + 𝛽6𝐷𝐻𝐹𝑇,𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗
𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠 + 𝑖,𝑡       (3.10) 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑝 +  𝛽2𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽7𝐷𝐻𝐹𝑇,𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1





2𝑠  is obtained by interacting a new variable, 𝐷𝐻𝐹𝑇,𝑖,𝑡−1, with the lag transitory 
component variable, 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠 . 𝐷𝐻𝐹𝑇,𝑖,𝑡−1is a dummy variable equalling one for stock i for interval 
t-1 during periods of high HFT activity. In order to determine the intervals of high HFT activity, 
I compute the proportion of HFT trades to non-HFT trades using the designations (HFT/non-
HFT) for the transactions in the NASDAQ data. A one-second or one-minute interval is 
designated as an interval of high HFT activity if the proportion of HFT trades for that interval 
is one standard deviation higher than the mean for the surrounding -60, +60 corresponding 
intervals. Intervals correspond to one-second or one-minute. No other interval is considered 
because the existing literature (see as an example, Chordia et al., 2008) shows that short horizon 
predictability is eliminated within a few minutes. The NASDAQ dataset, as pointed out by 
Brogaard et al. (2014b), does not identify all HFTs. Hence, for robustness, I employ an 
alternative measure of HFT activity in my analysis; this is the widely deployed proxy based on 
the ratio of messages to the number of transactions (see as examples, Boehmer et al., 2015; 
Malceniece et al., 2018). 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1 is a proxy for one period lag illiquidity and corresponds to 
one of either the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio or 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡. As in Equations (3.8) and (3.9), 
Equations (3.10) and (3.11) are estimated at one-second and one-minute frequencies 
respectively.  
If 𝐷𝐻𝐹𝑇,𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠 ’s coefficient is negative and statistically significant, it implies that 
a transitory rise in HFT activity is informed and reduces return predictability. This conclusion 
will be especially strengthened if 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠  is not statistically significant in Equations (3.10) and 
(3.11), since it would imply that the reduction in return predictability is primarily driven by 
transitory HFT volume. A result of this nature would be in line with one of the assumptions 
underlying my state space modelling approach, i.e. informed trading volume is transitory and 




Table 3. 8 Predictive regressions of short horizon stock returns on lagged components of 
trading volume interacted with a dummy variable for high frequency trading 
The predictive power of the state space-estimated lagged transitory component of trading volume (interacted with 
a dummy variable for high frequency trading activity) is estimated using the following model:  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑅 +  𝛽2𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐷𝐻𝐹𝑇,𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠 + 𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the midpoint-to-midpoint return for stock i during interval t and is computed as the difference between 
the midpoints corresponding to the last transactions at intervals t and t-1 divided by the midpoint corresponding 
to the last transaction at interval t-1. 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑅  is the standard deviation of mid-price returns for stock i during interval 
t-1 and calculated as the standard deviation of midpoint-to-midpoint returns during interval t-1; each midpoint 
corresponds to a transaction. 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1 is a proxy for one period lag illiquidity and corresponds to one of the 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio (𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1) or 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡. 𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 is computed as absolute return divided by 
trading volume for stock i during interval t-1. 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 is the effective spread for stock i and interval t-1 and 
computed as twice the absolute value of the difference between the last execution price and the midpoint of the 
prevailing bid and ask prices for interval t-1 𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 is the natural logarithm of trading volume for stock i during 
interval t-1 and 𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 is the absolute difference between buyer- and seller-initiated traders for stock i during 
interval t-1. 𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 is a proxy for market toxicity for stock i and interval t-1 and calculated as the absolute value 
of the difference between the numbers of buy and sell trades divided by the sum of the numbers of buy and sell 
trades for interval t-1   𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠 is a state space model-estimated proxy (estimated using Kalman filter constructed 
maximum likelihood) for informed trading activity for stock i and interval t-1. 𝐷𝐻𝐹𝑇,𝑖,𝑡−1 is a dummy variable 
equalling one during periods of high HFT activity for stock i and interval t-1. A one-second or one-minute interval 
is designated as an interval of high HFT activity if HFT trades for that interval is one standard deviation higher 
than the mean for the surrounding -60, +60 corresponding intervals. The sample contains the most active 100 S&P 
500 stocks traded between October 1, 2016 and September 30, 2017 on NYSE and NASDAQ. ***, ** and * 
correspond to statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Panel A 
Dependent Variable: 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
 One-second frequency One-minute frequency 





































𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1   -0.165x10
-2 
(-1.33) 
Sample size (n) 8291971 2069787 
Fixed effects Time Time 






Dependent Variable: 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
 One-second frequency One-minute frequency 





































𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1   0.137x10
-5 
(0.54) 
Sample size (n) 29959938 8880028 
Fixed effects Time Time 
𝑅2̅̅̅̅  0.21% 0.77% 
 
I present the results based on the two approaches to computing 𝐷𝐻𝐹𝑇 in Table 3.8; Panel 
A shows the results using the NASDAQ-defined HFT/non-HFT transactions, while Panel B 
shows the results using the ratio of messages to transactions HFT proxy. 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 corresponds to 
the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio and 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 in Panels A and B respectively. Contrary 
to the results in Table 3.7, although it remains negative, 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑠 ’s coefficients for the one-second 
frequency estimation in both panels are not statistically significant. However, when the 
transitory component variable is interacted with 𝐷𝐻𝐹𝑇,𝑖,𝑡−1, it becomes highly statistically 
significant, while retaining its negative sign. This implies that the reduction in the return 
predictably observed in the earlier analysis is driven by informed HFT activity. Consistent with 
the assumption underlying my state space modelling approach, the transitory component of 




of information into instruments’ prices and leads to the elimination of arbitrage opportunities. 
With this analysis, I ascertain that the transitory trading volume component relevant to 
eliminating return predictability in today’s financial markets is the HFT kind. 
 
3.6  Conclusion 
In this chapter, I develop a state space model for decomposing trading volume into 
liquidity-driven (permanent) and information-driven (transitory) components. I argue that the 
permanent component of trading volume is driven by liquidity-seeking order flow, while the 
transitory component is driven by information-motivated order flow. In addition to providing 
a robust set of arguments grounded in the literature to support my theses, I further develop a 
set of multivariate regression models to formally test them. Firstly, I find that the transitory 
component of trading volume obtained from my state space model has a statistically 
significantly relationship with volatility, liquidity and market toxicity, even after controlling 
for volume. There is no such relationship observed for the permanent component once volume 
is controlled for. These results are consistent with an extensive stream of theoretical and 
empirical studies on the relationship of the informed and liquidity trading activity with 
volatility, liquidity and market toxicity. The consistency therefore implies that the permanent 
and transitory components, estimated using my state space modelling approach, can be viewed 
as encapsulating the liquidity- and information-motivated trades, respectively. 
 I also demonstrate that the transitory component is a significant predictor of short-
horizon returns. This underscores the argument that the transitory component is a proxy for 
private information. However, in contrast to Chordia et al. (2008), I find that one-minute 
returns cannot be predicted using either the state space-estimated transitory component or the 
minute(s)-long order imbalance metrics employed by Chordia et al. (2008). This implies that 




faster rate than in the early 2000s period examined by earlier studies. I show that this sharp 






















4. Need for Speed? International transmission latency, 
liquidity and volatility 
 
“The rise of high-frequency traders has opened up a debate among investors, brokers and 
exchanges. Critics have long claimed that speed-driven traders unfairly hurt traditional 
investors… Supporters argue that faster traders are now a vital element of modern markets…” 
Financial Times, 15th May 2019 
  
4.1  Introduction 
The speed of trading and, ultimately, of price adjustment, is an important factor in the 
price discovery process in financial markets. That factor, today, holds a significance that 
transcends market quality implications. It is the driving force behind a recent upsurge of latency 
arbitrage in modern financial markets, as markets become increasingly dominated by ultra-
high-frequency algorithmic traders. However, speed may also be good for markets. The 
evidence of this has thus far been inconsistent. Some studies find that speed is good for liquidity 
and price discovery (see as examples Brogaard et al., 2014b; Hendershott et al., 2011; 
Hoffmann, 2014), while others suggest a positive relationship between speed and adverse 
selection cost (see as examples Biais et al., 2015; Foucault et al., 2016; Foucault et al., 2017; 
Hendershott and Moulton, 2011), implying a negative effect on market quality and liquidity in 
particular. Jovanovic and Menkveld (2016) show that better informed high-frequency traders 
(HFTs) can reduce welfare, and Kirilenko et al. (2017) argue that although HFTs did not trigger 
the flash crash, they nevertheless exacerbated it by demanding immediacy.  
While the existing literature focuses on traders’ execution speed in their examination 
of the role of speed on market quality, I focus on a new variable capturing the combination of 
microwave/fiber optic connection latency, traders’ information execution time, and exchange 




is important since speed between different exchanges is not only dependent on the 
heterogeneous technological capacity of traders, but also depends on the connection latency 
between financial markets and exchange latencies of different financial markets. This implies 
that TL holds economic significance for market quality beyond what the factors linked to trader 
execution speed hold. Furthermore, modern financial markets are characterized by high 
fragmentation. This underscores how critically inter-venue speeds must be incorporated into 
any examination of market quality implications of speed. The economic insights this 
consideration could generate are likely substantial (see also Menkveld and Zoican, 2017).  In 
addition, recent arguments by regulators and investors suggest that while higher information 
transmission speed offered by HFTs improves liquidity (and by extension, market quality), it 
nevertheless contributes to higher volatility and market risk, and hence impairs market 
quality.29 Motivated by these contrasting arguments and the incomplete picture drawn by the 
existing literature, I investigate the effects of speed on the quality of financial markets by 
applying the measure of latency, TL.  
The focus of my study is therefore closely related to the works of Shkilko and Sokolov 
(2016), Menkveld and Zoican (2017), and Baron et al. (2018). Shkilko and Sokolov (2016) 
examine liquidity when there are speed differentials among traders, and find that these 
differentials impair liquidity and volatility in financial markets. It is important to note that 
Shkilko and Sokolov's (2016) focus on the 2011-2012 period, during which microwave 
networks are only accessible to a small group of sophisticated trading firms. By contrast, I use 
more recent data allowing me to capture the latest changes in microwave technology, which 
has recently lost much of its exclusivity and is now available for a nominal fee. It implies that 
my study offers a clearer picture of the effects of speed on market quality in financial markets. 






Specifically, I directly estimate transmission latency between trading venues from transaction-
level data and empirically examine the impact of estimated latency on liquidity and volatility. 
Similar to my study, Baron et al. (2018) construct measures of latency from transaction-
level data, and examine the performance and competition among HFTs. There are two 
important differences between my study and Baron et al.’s (2018). First, Baron et al. (2018) do 
not estimate transmission latency between financial markets, which is particularly important in 
today’s highly fragmented markets. Specifically, Baron et al. (2018) estimate what they call 
Decision Latency, which is the difference between timestamps from a passive trade to a 
subsequent aggressive trade by the same firm, in the same security and at the same exchange. 
Secondly, and more importantly, their study analyzes the impact of latency on HFTs’ trading 
performance, not liquidity and volatility, in financial markets. Menkveld and Zoican (2017) 
model the HFT arms race by adding the impact of exchange speed to Budish et al.’s (2015) 
model, and find that indeed, there is a nontrivial relationship between exchange speed and 
liquidity. It is important to note that in Menkveld and Zoican’s (2017) model, exchange latency 
does not include the trader’s execution latency, and thus is assumed constant for all traders. 
Their model identifies two channels through which exchange speed affects the bid-ask spread. 
Firstly, as a result of improvements in exchange latency, high-frequency market makers 
(HFMs) can quickly update their quotes and reduce their adverse selection risk, which implies 
that HFMs narrow the competitive spread, since speed allows them to face reduced adverse 
selection risk. Secondly, high-frequency speculators may still prevail in an arms race; therefore, 
HFMs would need to set a wider spread in order to compensate for higher adverse selection 
risk.  
My study differs from Menkveld and Zoican (2017) in at least two aspects. Firstly, their 
study is a theoretical contribution. Secondly, while Menkveld and Zoican (2017) focus on the 




combined effect of trader execution latency, exchange latency, and connection latency between 
exchanges.  
My empirical approach involves first estimating the TL between the home exchange in 
Frankfurt (Xetra Stock Exchange – XSE) and a satellite exchange in London (Cboe Stock 
Exchange – CBOE), where XSE-listed stocks are cross-listed, and then examining its effect on 
liquidity and volatility of cross listed stocks  in the satellite market. I thereafter investigate the 
channels, as informed by various theoretical models, through which my latency measure 
impacts market quality metrics.   
My findings suggest that 49% (80%) of price-changing trades on CBOE occur within 
3 (5) milliseconds (ms) of similar and proportional price-changing trade on XSE. This means 
that the existing microwave and fiber optic connections affect price responses on CBOE within 
3-5ms of price changes on XSE. These estimates are consistent with the anecdotal evidence 
provided by industry practitioners active in both markets, since the latency (3-5ms) includes 
the traders’ execution latencies, exchange latencies in CBOE and XSE, and connection latency 
between XSE and CBOE. For example, Perseus, one of the microwave connection providers 
between London and Frankfurt, states that a round trip latency via microwave and fiber optics 
between London and Frankfurt is 4.6ms and 8.4ms, respectively (see Footnote 29). The 
significance of these estimates is that analysis shows that higher TL leads to lower liquidity and 
volatility (i.e. speed enhances liquidity and increases volatility). The results are robust to 
alternative proxies for liquidity and volatility and more importantly, the magnitudes of these 
effects are economically meaningful. In order to address potential endogeneity concerns, I 
present causal evidence from a quasi-experimental setting, studying the impact of two 
technological upgrades by XSE on liquidity and volatility in CBOE. I compare the liquidity 




that, consistent with the previous results, increases in speed lead to enhanced liquidity and 
higher volatility. 
The positive effect of speed on liquidity is linked to fast traders using their speed 
advantage to avoid adverse selection risk and thereby increasing liquidity. Another channel 
through which speed impacts market quality metrics is explained by the prediction of Roşu 
(2016), specifically that speed increases the aggressiveness of traders and this aggressiveness 
then leads to higher price volatility (see also Collin-Dufresne and Fos, 2016). Thus, it appears 
that while speed enhances market quality by enhancing liquidity, it impairs it by intensifying 
market volatility. This implies a trade-off between the benefits of speeds (liquidity 
improvements) and its unwanted effects (increased volatility). I therefore examine the net 
economic implication of latency on market quality, with liquidity and volatility as market 
quality characteristics. The analysis shows that while high latency can improve market quality 
by reducing volatility, its liquidity deterioration effect dominates its volatility reducing effect. 
This implies that the net effect of increasing (reducing) latency (speed) is an impairment of 
market quality.    
My contributions to the existing literature are as follows. Firstly, my study is the first 
to empirically estimate TL between the two biggest European financial centers, Frankfurt and 
London, and by so doing corroborates the information provided on connection speed by the 
microwave and fiber optic connection providers (such as McKay Brothers). This exercise is 
particularly important in Europe, where financial markets have become increasingly 
fragmented across dominant national exchanges and a dominant London-based pan-European 
trading venue, CBOE. Secondly, I provide causal evidence on the direct impact of speed on 
market quality variables, such as volatility, which is unclear in the current literature. Thirdly, I 
complement the existing empirical literature that examines the relationship between trader and 




latency, exchange latency, and connection latency (microwave or fiber connections) between 
exchanges on liquidity and volatility of financial markets. The approach I take is more realistic 
and the measure I use is more relevant when measuring the impact of speed on market quality 
in a fragmented trading space – the reality of trading in modern financial markets. Finally, 
using a framework that controls for the undesirable (increased volatility) and desirable 
(enhanced liquidity) effects of speed, I show that the dominant effect of increased speed of 
trading is positive for market quality. 
 
4.2  Institutional and technical backgrounds 
4.2.1   Transmission latency between financial markets 
In today’s trading environment, information transmission speeds between trading venues play 
an important role in facilitating price discovery in an increasingly fragmented market place. A 
decade ago, the most common way to transmit information from Frankfurt to London was via 
a fiber optic cable; at this time fiber optics offered information transmission latencies of about 
4.2ms.30 Although fiber optic technology offers fast transmission, it is not the fastest. This is 
simply because with fiber optic technology, “information” (photons) travels through cables and 
it is difficult to place cables in a straight line between trading venues. For example, Shkilko 
and Sokolov (2016) show that until 2010 the fiber optic cabling between Chicago and New 
York exceeded the straight line distance between the two cities by about 200 miles. In contrast 
to fiber optic technology, with microwave technology, “information” (microwaves) travels 
through air. Hence, microwave networks offer information transmission speeds that are 
between 30 and 50% faster than with fiber optic technology. For example, microwaves shave 
about 1.9ms off the information transmission latency between Frankfurt and London when 
                                                          





compared to fiber optics, a reduction from 4.2ms to 2.3ms.31 It is therefore not surprising that 
the past decade has seen an emergence of the operation of microwave networks between major  
financial trading locations, such as London and Frankfurt.32 Some of these networks are 
operated by specialist network providers (e.g., McKay Brothers), while others are operated 
directly by HFTs (e.g., Jump Trading).
                                                          






Figure 4. 1 A map of microwave networks connecting the British Isles to continental Europe 





Figure 4.1 shows the microwave networks between the UK and Germany, and their 
respective providers (see Laumonier, 2016). Given the notable speed advantage of microwave 
networks, HFTs are ready to pay significant amounts of money to obtain several microseconds 
of speed advantage over their competitors.33  
In this study, I estimate the information transmission latency between XSE and CBOE 
by using transaction-level data. My TL estimate is therefore composed of the following 
elements: (i) the connection latency between XSE and CBOE, (ii) the exchange latencies for 
XSE and CBOE, and (iii) the traders’ execution latencies. Explicitly, the connection latency is 
the time it takes for information to travel via microwave/fiber optic connections between XSE 
and CBOE. The exchange latencies consist of the time it takes for the exchanges to process 
incoming and outgoing instructions. According to Menkveld and Zoican (2017), the exchange 
latency is the sum of gateway-processing latency and gateway-to-matching-engine latency. 
Gateway-processing latency equals the time spent inside the gateway application, and gateway-
to-matching-engine latency is the time between an order’s departure from the gateway and 
when the matcher begins processing the order. Finally, the transaction-level data from TRTH 
that I employ provides exact exchange timestamps for executed transactions. It thus also takes 
into account the time needed to execute transactions, which includes the traders’ execution 
latencies, i.e. their signal processing and reaction times. 
 
4.2.2   Technological upgrades on XSE 
In order to address potential endogeneity concerns, I study the impact of two 
technological upgrades implemented by XSE on liquidity and volatility at CBOE. These 
technological upgrades are (1) the “New T7 Trading Technology” upgrade first offered on July 






3, 2017, and (2) the “Introduction of PS gateways” upgrade first offered on April 9, 2018.34  
The Deutsche Börse T7 Trading Technology system reduces order processing time 
significantly and should be captured by my TL measure. The PS (Partition Specific) gateways 
upgrade for all cash market instruments operates in parallel to the existing HF gateways. 
Usually, latency jitters on parallel inbound paths encourage multiplicity to reduce latency. 
However, this leads to greater system load and choking at busy times, and thus less predictable 
latencies may arise. The PS gateways upgrade introduces a single low-latency point of entry, 
which addresses this issue and consequently reduces exchange latency at XSE. This reduction 
should also be captured by TL. Since the two technological upgrades are introduced to reduce 
exchange latency at XSE, they could be employed as exogenous shocks in my quasi-natural 
experiment to examine the relationship between latency and market quality characteristics. 
 
4.3  Data and latency estimation 
My data source is the TRTH v2 (Datascope). The most important feature of the 
Datascope-sourced datasets that makes them highly suitable for my analysis is that they provide 
exact exchange timestamps in milliseconds for exchange-traded transactions and order flow. 
The main dataset employed in this study consists of ultra-high-frequency tick-by-tick data for 
the most active 100 German stocks that trade both on XSE in Frankfurt (home market) and on 
CBOE in London (satellite market). The dataset includes transaction-level data for trading days 
between March 2017 and August 2018. I select this period for two reasons. Firstly, Datascope 
does not provide exchange timestamps for European markets before June 2015. Secondly, as 
noted, to address potential endogeneity concerns, I employ a quasi-natural experiment 
approach using the two technological updates described above. The upgrade dates are July 3, 
                                                          






2017 and April 9, 2018. I then select a data coverage period spanning four months before and 
after the upgrades for the difference-in-difference (DiD) framework. The Datascope data 
contain standard transaction-level variables such as date, time (both TRTH and exchange 
timestamps), price, volume, bid price, ask price, bid volume, and ask volume.  
From the raw data I determine the prevailing best bid and ask quotes for each 
transaction, enabling me to see the status of the order book at the time of each transaction. I 
divide the sample of 100 stocks into quartiles using their level of trading activity; trading 
activity is measured by euro trading volume. 
 
4.3.1   Trading summary statistics 
Table 4.1 reports trading activity statistics for XSE and CBOE. 
Table 4. 1 Transactions’ summary statistics and statistical tests 
Panels A and B respectively present trading summary statistics for XSE and CBOE. Panel C reports the statistical 
tests of the trading summary differences between the XSE and CBOE. The statistical tests conducted are two-
sample t-tests and pairwise Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests. The sample consists of the 100 most active German 
stocks cross-listed on the XSE and CBOE. The sample period covers March 2017 to August 2018. Stocks are 
classified into quartiles using Euro trading volume. 
Panel A 

















Full sample 16,263.46 428.56 984.02 14.94 
Least active  2,388.44 74.33 335.89 7.31 
Quartile 2 4,717.94 145.04 557.78 10.92 
Quartile 3 10,556.57 213.05 933.38 14.03 
Most active 46,835.87 1,267.65 2,083.09 27.19 
 
Panel B 
 Trading activity: CBOE  
Full sample 2,739.96 64.09 356.29 6.87 
Least active  312.36 10.81 80.25 3.92 
Quartile 2 667.55 18.67 165.23 5.72 
Quartile 3 1,539.50 31.12 320.37 6.91 





 Trading activity (Full sample)  
XSE – CBOE 13,523.5*** 364.47*** 627.73*** 8.07*** 
t-test p-value < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
W-M-W test p-
value 
< 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
 
Panels A and B of Table 4.1 present market activity statistics for XSE and CBOE 
respectively, and Panel C presents the difference in full-sample trading activity between the 
two stock exchanges along with p-values obtained using different statistical approaches (two-
sample t-tests and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests). The p-values are reported for the null that 
there is no difference in trading activity between XSE and CBOE. Going by the number of 
transactions and nominal and euro-denominated trading volume, XSE appears to be more 
active than CBOE for the selected sample of stocks. This is expected since XSE is the home 
market for my selected sample of German stocks. 
 
4.3.2   Price discovery 
My latency (TL) estimation method assumes that information is transmitted from 
Frankfurt to London; an assumption supported by prior research (see as an example Grammig 
et al., 2005). Indeed, it is implausible to assume that the preponderance of firm-specific 
information about German companies originates from outside of Germany. The expectation 
that information for German stocks largely flows from Germany is also supported by the 
superior volume of transactions recorded for XSE compared to CBOE. Nevertheless, it is 
important to ascertain that XSE holds price leadership relative to CBOE for my sample of 
stocks, especially since the European markets have become increasingly fragmented over the 
past decade. This fragmentation has in some cases upended the natural expectation that superior 
trading activity confers higher levels of price discovery. For example, Ibikunle (2018) 




listed on CBOE, and finds that although LSE holds superior trading activity for the stocks, 
CBOE leads price discovery in those stocks for much of the trading day. 
Table 4. 2 Price discovery analysis 
This table presents the results for three different price discovery metrics estimating the share of price discovery 
for XSE and CBOE. IS is the information share metric as developed by Hasbrouck (1995), CS is the component 
share metric based on Gonzalo and Granger (1995), and ILS is the information leadership share as defined by 
Putniņš (2013). All estimates are computed based on price samples at the one-second frequency. The sample 
consists of the 100 most active German stocks cross-listed on XSE and CBOE. The sample period covers March 
2017 to August 2018. Stocks are classified into quartiles using Euro trading volume. 
 
 IS CS ILS 
Full sample 0.69 0.64 0.61 
Least active 0.63 0.60 0.56 
Quartile 2 0.61 0.58 0.56 
Quartile 3 0.68 0.64 0.58 
Most active 0.76 0.71 0.61 
 
Table 4.2 presents the results of the price leadership analysis between XSE and CBOE. 
For robustness, I employ three measures of price discovery computed using data price data 
sampled at the one-second frequency. The first and second measures are the information share 
metric (IS) developed by Hasbrouck (1995), and the component share metric (CS) developed 
by Gonzalo and Granger (1995).35 These methods are based on the vector error correction 
model (VECM), and usually provide similar results if the VECM residuals are not correlated. 
However, as suggested by Yan and Zivot (2010), both metrics suffer from bias if noise levels 
differ across trading venues. Therefore, I employ the information leadership share metric (ILS) 
prescribed by Putniņš (2013), which corrects for the differential treatment of noise by the IS 
and CS measures and provides a cleaner measure of information leadership. The results are 
consistent with earlier studies, in that price discovery occurs mainly on XSE for German stocks; 
IS, CS and ILS estimates are 0.69, 0.64 and 0.61 respectively for the full sample of stocks. This 
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result implies that the majority of information is incorporated on XSE first. Therefore, my 
assumption regarding the information transmission direction appears valid. Table 4.2 further 
reports that the information share of XSE is typically highest for the most active stocks. This 
result is consistent with the empirical findings of Brogaard et al. (2014b), and suggests that 
HFTs are more active in the most active stocks. 
 
4.3.3   Latency measurement 
In general, latency can be considered as the delay between a signal and a response (see 
Baron et al., 2018). Following Laughlin et al. (2014), I define the signal as a price-changing 
trade in the home market, and the response as a near-coincident same direction price-changing 
trade in the satellite market. Laughlin et al. (2014) validly employ this method for futures-ETF 
pairs in the US financial markets, and I apply it to measure latency in the case of the 100 most 
active cross-listed German stocks between XSE and CBOE. According to the law of one price, 
the price of the cross-listed stocks should be the same regardless of location. Specifically, the 
difference between cross-listed security prices in different exchanges should simultaneously 
be eliminated in a no-arbitrage scenario and if markets are informationally efficient.36 
The latency measurement approach involves first identifying the exact exchange 
timestamp for each price-changing trade on XSE. I then look for a near-coincident same 
direction price-changing trade on CBOE. In order to identify the near-coincident trade in 
CBOE I examine trades occurring within 10ms of each price-changing trade on XSE. I select 
the 10ms interval since the average information transmission latencies between Frankfurt and 
London are 2.3ms and 4.2ms for microwave and fiber optic connections, respectively.37 
                                                          
36 One may argue that no-arbitrage limits and liquidity and trading cost can prevent market participants perfectly 
arbitraging price differences away. However, this argument cannot cause any serious concerns in my framework 
for two reasons. Firstly, I are using well-traded stocks in a major economy and secondly, on average, 






Table 4. 3 Information transmission latency between XSE and CBOE 
This table presents different statistics for the information transmission latency between XSE and CBOE. Panel A reports the number of responses on CBOE to price-changing 
trades on XSE for different time bins in milliseconds (ms) for the quartiles and full sample of stocks; stocks are classified into quartiles using Euro trading volume. Panel B 
presents the mean and standard deviation of the information transmission latency between XSE and CBOE for each quartile and the full sample of stocks. Panel C shows the 
average information transmission latencies for 21 trading days before and after a technological upgrade on July 3, 2017. The statistical tests conducted are two-sample t-tests 
and pairwise Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests. The sample consists of the 100 most active German stocks cross-listed on XSE and CBOE. The sample period covers March 2017 




Full sample Least active Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Most active 
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
3 936,646 48.61 63,563 49.05 108,325 46.50 187,528 44.76 577,230 50.39 
4 286,962 14.89 19,041 14.69 36,303 15.58 63,498 15.16 168,120 14.68 
5 332,286 17.24 21,742 16.78 41,457 17.79 75,439 18.01 193,648 16.91 
6 100,435 5.21 6,496 5.01 11,959 5.13 23,531 5.62 58,449 5.10 
7 81,733 4.24 5,933 4.58 10,862 4.66 20,686 4.94 44,252 3.86 
8 75,895 3.94 5,281 4.08 9,976 4.28 19,924 4.76 40,714 3.55 
9 62,679 3.25 4,106 3.17 7,700 3.31 15,834 3.78 35,039 3.06 
10 50,364 2.61 3,415 2.64 6,389 2.74 12,517 2.99 28,043 2.45 
 
Panel B 
Full sample Quartile 1 (least active) Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 (most active) 
Mean (ms) St. Dev Mean (ms) St. Dev Mean (ms) St. Dev Mean (ms) St. Dev Mean (ms) St. Dev 
4.39 1.86 4.39 1.87 4.45 1.88 4.55 1.94 4.32 1.83 
 
Panel C 
Period  Average latency for the full sample 
Before upgrade 4.40 




Difference  0.10*** 
t-test p value < 0.001 
















Panel A in Table 4.3 reports the number of responses on CBOE to the signals on XSE 
for various latencies. I exclude the responses that fall in the 2ms interval. This is because the 
2ms interval is less than the theoretical limit of 2ms it should take light to travel in a vacuum 
between the two locations. The number of responses in this interval account for only 2% of all 
responses, hence the exclusion should not have any material impact on my analysis. Laughlin 
et al. (2014) argue that the responses at less than the speed-of-light can be considered as a proof 
of the predictive capacity of HFTs. I do not examine this argument since it is outside of the 
scope of this study. 
There are two important findings in Panel A. First, it shows that 48.61% (80.74%) of 
all responses (after excluding the [0 – 2ms] interval) fall within the 3ms (5ms) bin. These 
latencies are consistent with those provided by the microwave network and fiber optic 
connection providers, and corroborate the view that my latency measure indeed captures the 
transmission latency between the two trading venues. For example, McKay Brothers recently 
announced that their average microwave latency between the XSE (FR2) and CBOE (LD4) 
data centres is 2.3ms. Furthermore, it is generally acknowledged that the average latency via 
fiber optic connections is about 4.2ms (see Footnote 29). These announced latencies, 2.3ms 
and 4.2ms, are only transmission latencies between exchanges and do not take into account the 
exchange latencies and the traders’ order execution latencies. Therefore, I expect the actual 
trading latencies to be closer to my estimated transmission latencies. Panel A’s estimates 
suggest that traders are more likely to employ the faster microwave technology than fiber optic 
options for connecting Frankfurt and London. Secondly, on average, the most active stocks 
have quicker response times, with 50.39% (81.98%) of all responses falling in the 3ms (5ms) 
bin. This is unsurprising given that existing studies suggest that HFTs trade more in the most 
active stocks (see Brogaard et al., 2014b). Panel B in Table 4.3 presents the mean and standard 




sample is 4.39ms and, consistent with Panel A in Table 4.3, the most active stocks have the 
lowest transaction latency.   
The empirical relevance of my latency estimation is underscored by the literature 
(Baron et al., 2018; Laughlin et al., 2014), but I also directly test its precision by examining the 
latency evolution around the technology upgrade events. A downward adjustment of the 
latencies on the event dates would provide support to the accuracy of my estimation. Figure 
4.2 illustrates the impact of the “New T7 Trading Technology” upgrade on my estimated 
latency variable, TL. The figure shows a sharp decrease in latency on the day of the upgrade, 
with the average latency falling by 0.105ms to 4.297ms – a reduction of 2.4%. In addition, 
Panel C in Table 4.3 tests the statistical significance of the difference between the latencies 21 
trading days before and after the implementation of the upgrade. The estimates show that the 










                                                          
38 Although not explicitly reported, the picture is comparable for the second technological upgrade. The 





Figure 4. 2 Information transmission latency over time 
This figure plots the information transmission latency from June 2017 to July 2017. The period includes 21 trading days before and after a speed-inducing technological upgrade. 
The vertical bar indicates the technological upgrade, “New T7 Trading Technology”, which took effect on July 3, 2017. The sample consists of the 100 most active German 



































































































































































































































































































































































The fact that my estimated latency variable decreases following the implemented 
upgrade provides suggestive evidence that my latency measure is empirically relevant and 
correctly captures the delay between a signal and a response. 
 
4.4  Empirical findings and discussion 
In this section, I examine the role of latency (speed) in fragmented financial markets by 
linking TL to liquidity and volatility. 
 
4.4.1   Latency and Liquidity 
Motivated by the contrasting theories on the impact of speed on market quality 
characteristics, I begin by testing whether TL is related to liquidity. I estimate the following 
regression model using fixed effects: 
      𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝛾𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝐶𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
5
𝑘=1 + 𝑖,𝑡                                (4.1) 
where 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 either corresponds to one of quoted (𝑄𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡) or effective (𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡) 
spread for stock i and transaction t, 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑡 are stock and time fixed effects, 𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is the 
transmission latency between Frankfurt and London for stock i and transaction t, and 𝐶𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 is a 
set of k control variables which includes the standard deviation of stock returns (𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡) for 
stock i and transaction t as a proxy for volatility, the inverse of price (𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡) for stock i and 
transaction t, the natural logarithm of trading volume (𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡) for stock i and transaction t, 
market depth (𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡) for stock i and transaction t, and momentum (𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡) for stock 
i and transaction t. All of the variables are transactions-based (i.e. t represents trade time rather 
than clock time) because my measure of latency is transactions-based. 
𝑄𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is computed as the difference between ask and bid prices for stock i 




difference between the transaction price and the prevailing bid-ask spread for stock i and 
transaction t, 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is calculated as the standard deviation of returns for contemporaneous 
and previous transactions (transactions at time t and t-1) for stock i, 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡 is the inverse of 
the transaction price for stock i and transaction t, 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is the natural logarithm of trading 
volume for stock i and transaction t, 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 is the sum of prevailing bid and ask sizes for 
stock i corresponding to transaction t, and 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡 is the first lag of the stock return for 


















Table 4. 4 Summary statistics and correlation matrix for explanatory variables 
This table reports the summary statistics and correlation matrix for the main explanatory variables. Panel A presents the mean and standard deviation of the main explanatory 
variables and Panel B shows the correlation matrix. All variables are computed for the CBOE. 𝑄𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 is the quoted spread and computed as the difference between the best 
ask and bid prices, 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 is the effective spread and computed as twice the absolute difference between the transaction price and the midpoint of the prevailing bid and ask 
prices, 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎 is the absolute value of price changes and computed as the absolute value of price differences between the contemporaneous and previous transactions, 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣 
is the standard deviation of stock returns for contemporaneous and previous transactions, 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑃𝑟𝑖 is the inverse price and computed as one divided by the transaction price, 
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑉 is the natural logarithm of trading volume for each transaction, 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ proxies the market depth and is computed as the sum of the prevailing ask and bid sizes for each 
transaction, and 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚 is the first lag of stock returns for each transaction. The sample consists of the 100 most active German stocks cross-listed on XSE and CBOE. 
The sample period covers March 2017 to August 2018. Stocks are classified into quartiles using Euro trading volume. 
Panel A 
Variables Full sample Least active Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Most active 
Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev 
𝑄𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 (bps) 454.24 1274 717.19 1445 709.86 2202 610.38 1216 289.61 544.66 
𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 (bps) 427.25 1190 670.24 1387 666.489 2063 559.01 997.11 275.43 515.22 
𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎 (bps) 327.63 718.26 460.13 806.78 437.37 1145 371.46 629.75 255.59 444.52 
𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣 (bps) 13.35 275.99 20.90 140.18 15.90 315.42 30.99 348.32 8.88 271.96 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑃𝑟𝑖 (bps) 302.16 340.52 363.80 557.58 217.24 134.89 423.11 319.73 307.01 329.44 
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑉 3.88 1.30 3.53 1.26 3.57 1.19 3.93 1.23 4.06 1.32 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 424.83 724.68 267.25 647.72 233.48 304.81 351.47 802.66 535.17 812.43 
𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚 (bps) 0.61 276.35 0.45 141.76 0.87 315.81 1.393 349.91 0.46 272.12 
 
Panel B 
 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑄𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑃𝑟𝑖 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑉 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 
𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 1         
𝑄𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 0.96 1        
𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎 0.48 0.47 1       
𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣 0.02 0.02 0.02 1      
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑃𝑟𝑖 -0.16 -0.15 -0.20 0.00 1     




𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ -0.10 -0.10 -0.12 -0.00 0.41 0.40 1   
𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚 0.01 0.0 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 1  




Panels A and B in Table 4.4 report the mean and standard deviation estimates for all 
variables, and the correlation between the variables employed in the fixed effects model, 
respectively. As evident in Panel A, spread and volatility proxies are lower for the most active 
stocks. The narrower spreads on the most active stocks suggest that higher trading volume 
encourages traders to provide liquidity, i.e. HFTs are more active in the most active stocks (see 
also Brogaard et al., 2014b). Furthermore, the smaller absolute value of price changes and 
standard deviation of stock returns on the most active stocks are consistent with Kyle’s (1985) 
model, in that informed traders participate more in the most active stocks, and this reduces 
price volatility (see Wang, 1993 for the relationship between informed trading and volatility). 
The low correlation coefficient estimates between the variables (except for the quoted and 
effective spreads, which is to be expected) suggest that I do not face multicollinearity issues in 
the regression models. It is important to note that all variables, except 𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡, are computed 
for CBOE. This is because, as discussed in Section 4.3.2, information is propagated from 
Frankfurt to London, hence the effects of latency can only be captured for the satellite market.  
I estimate Equation (4.1) for the full sample of stocks and stock trading activity 
quartiles. I estimate the equation for stock quartiles because Jovanovic and Menkveld (2016) 
show that the relationship between exchange latency and financial markets may depend on the 






Table 4. 5 Latency and liquidity 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following regression model: 




where 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 corresponds to one of quoted (𝑄𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡) or effective (𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡) spread for stock i and transaction t, 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑡 are stock and time fixed effects, 𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 
is the transmission latency between Frankfurt and London for stock i and transaction t. 𝐶𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 is a set of k control variables, which includes the standard deviation of stock returns 
(𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡) for stock i and transaction t as a proxy for volatility, the inverse of price (𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡) for stock i and transaction t, the natural logarithm of trading volume (𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡) 
for stock i and transaction t, market depth (𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡) for stock i and transaction t, and momentum (𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡) for stock i and transaction t. 𝑄𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is computed as the 
difference between ask and bid prices for stock i corresponding to transaction t, 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is measured as twice the absolute value of the difference between the transaction 
price and the prevailing bid-ask spread for stock i and transaction t, 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is calculated as the standard deviation of returns for contemporaneous and previous transactions 
(transactions at time t and t-1) for stock i, 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡 is the inverse of the transaction price for stock i and transaction t, 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is the natural logarithm of trading volume for 
stock i at time t, 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 is the sum of prevailing bid and ask sizes for stock i corresponding to transaction t and 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡 is the first lag of the stock return for stock i at 
the time of transaction t (momentum for time t is the stock return at time t-1). The sample consists of the 100 most active German stocks that are cross-listed in XSE and CBOE. 
All variables, except latency, are computed for the CBOE. Stocks are classified into quartiles using Euro trading volume. The sample period covers March 2017 to August 
2018. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 
0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
Panel A 
Dependent variable: 𝑸𝒔𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊,𝒕 






































































Stock fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝑹𝟐̅̅̅̅  41.6% 24.8% 20.9% 48.5% 25.9% 
 
Panel B 
Dependent variable: 𝑬𝒔𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊,𝒕 



































































Stock fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






The results obtained from the estimation of Equation (4.1) are presented in Table 4.5. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The coefficient estimates 
show that there is a positive relationship between information transmission latency and both 
quoted and effective spreads. The results hold for all the stock quartiles as well as for the overall 
sample. This implies that the increases (decreases) in transmission latency (speed) are 
associated with deteriorations in liquidity. Specifically, the quoted and effective spreads widen 
by 10 and 7bps respectively for each one unit increase (decrease) in latency (speed). Both 
estimates are statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  The magnitude of the association is also 
economically meaningful. For example, the results show that a 1ms decrease in latency is 
expected to reduce quoted (effective) spread by about 10/454 = 2.2% (7/427 = 1.6%). It simply 
implies that using microwave latency over fibre optic cables (the difference between these two 
transmission methods is about 1.9ms) for trading information transmission can potentially 
reduce quoted (effective) spread by 4.2% (3%). This is a substantial change in economic terms, 
especially, considering the staggering number of such trades that could be placed over the 
course of one day.  
This result suggests that displayed liquidity (quoted spread) improves and trading cost 
(effective spread) decreases as a result of an acceleration in speed between the home and 
satellite markets. The results presented in Panels A and B of Table 4.5 are generally consistent, 
but there is a notable point of departure. While Panel A’s estimates show that the effect of 
latency on spreads is larger in magnitude for the most active stocks compared to the least active 
stocks, Panel B’s estimates show otherwise. Thus, Panel A’s results suggest that the positive 
link between speed and liquidity improvements is mainly driven by the most active stocks, 
while Panel B’s results suggest that the least active stocks are the main drivers of this 
relationship. This inconsistency may be linked to differences of intuition behind the 




of trading cost if trades are executed at the quoted prices, while the effective spread is a better 
measure of trading cost when trades are executed inside the quoted spread (see Petersen and 
Fialkowski, 1994). Petersen and Fialkowski (1994) further show that the inaccuracy of the 
quoted spread when trades are executed inside the spread is notably stronger for the most active 
stocks. Thus, I caution that the evidence presented in Panel A, suggesting that the relationship 
between liquidity and speed is mainly driven by the most active stocks, should be interpreted 
carefully. 𝑅2̅̅̅̅ s for the full sample for the quoted and effective spread regressions are 42% and 
41% respectively, which is very high for estimations at transactions (sub-minute) frequency.  
This result is consistent with the predictions of Hoffmann (2014) and Jovanovic and 
Menkveld (2016), and the results of the empirical studies of Hendershott et al. (2011) and 
Menkveld (2013). In general, the theoretical literature suggests two opposite impacts of latency 
on liquidity. On the one hand, high-frequency market makers may exploit higher speeds in 
updating their quotes faster and, hence, face a substantially reduced level of  adverse selection 
risk (see as an example Hoffmann, 2014). On the other hand, speculative high-frequency 
traders can use higher speed to pick off limit orders of market makers, and thus, increase 
adverse selection risk (see as an example Biais et al., 2015). My results indicate that, as shown 
by Menkveld (2013), high-frequency traders generally tend to deploy market making strategies 
rather than speculative strategies. Being faster allows them to avoid being adversely selected 
and to manage their inventory more efficiently. This ability to reduce adverse selection risk 
implies a narrowing of the spread and an improvement in liquidity. In addition to the 
consistency with the liquidity literature stream, my results are also in line with the findings 
from the price discovery stream. Specifically, my results imply that high-frequency traders 
benefit from higher speed to eliminate price distortions quicker, and the improvement in 
efficient price discovery attracts more traders, thereby further increasing liquidity (see also 





4.4.2   Latency and volatility 
Next, I estimate the following regression model using fixed effects in order to test the 
impact of latency on stock price volatility: 
                    𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝛾𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝐶𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
5
𝑘=1 + 𝑖,𝑡                               (4.2) 
where 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 corresponds to either the absolute value of price changes (𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑡) or 
the standard deviation of stock returns (𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡) (see Karpoff, 1987). 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑡 is computed 
as the absolute value of transaction price differences between transaction t and t-1. 𝐶𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 is a 
set of k control variables, which includes 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡, 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡, 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡, and 
𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡. All of these variables are as previously defined. The only difference between 
Equations (4.2) and (4.1) is that instead of volatility, I use a liquidity proxy as one of the control 














Table 4. 6 Latency and volatility 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following regression model: 




where 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 corresponds to either absolute value of price change (𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑡) or the standard deviation of stock returns (𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡), 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑡 are stock and time fixed 
effects, 𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is the information transmission latency between Frankfurt and London and 𝐶𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 is a set of k control variables, which includes the effective spread (𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡) 
for stock i and transaction t as a proxy for liquidity, the inverse of price (𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡) for stock i at time t, the natural logarithm of trading volume (𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡) for stock i and 
transaction t, market depth (𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡) for stock i and transaction t, and momentum (𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡) for stock i and transaction t. 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑡 is computed as the absolute value 
of transaction price differences between the time of transaction t and transaction t-1, 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡  is calculated as the standard deviation of returns for contemporaneous and 
previous transactions (transactions t and t-1) for stock i, 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is measured as twice the absolute value of the difference between the transaction price and the prevailing 
bid-ask spread for stock i and transaction t, 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡  is the inverse of the price for stock i and transaction t, 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is the natural logarithm of trading volume for stock i and 
transaction t, 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 is the sum of prevailing bid and ask sizes for stock i corresponding to transaction t, and 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡 is the first lag of the stock return for stock i and 
transaction  t (momentum for transaction t is the stock return for transaction t-1).The sample consists of the 100 most active German stocks that are cross-listed in XSE and 
CBOE. All variables, except latency, are computed for the CBOE.  Stocks are classified into quartiles using Euro trading volume. The sample period covers March 2017 to 
August 2018. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance 
at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively.  
Panel A 
Dependent variable: 𝑨𝒃𝒔𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒊,𝒕 




































































Stock fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝑹𝟐̅̅̅̅  41.8% 34.5% 28.6% 49.4% 30.1% 
 
Panel B 
Dependent variable: 𝑺𝒕𝒅𝒅𝒆𝒗𝒊,𝒕 



































































Stock fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 







I present the results for the full sample and quartile estimations of Equation (4.2) in 
Table 4.6. Panels A and B show the results for the two stock price volatility proxies. Standard 
errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The estimates suggest a negative 
(positive) relationship between latency (speed) and volatility for both proxies. Specifically, the 
absolute value of price change and the standard deviation of stock returns decrease by 0.7 and 
0.2bps respectively per unit increase (decrease) in latency (speed). 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 are 
statistically significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels respectively. Economically what this means 
is that a decrease in latency from 4.2ms (fibre optic cable) to 2.3ms (microwave connection) is 
expected to increase standard deviation of stock returns by 1.9 * 0.2/13.32 = 2.8%. The 
estimates imply that an increase (decrease) in the latency (speed) of order transmission 
decreases volatility in stock prices. This may not necessarily be a negative effect on market 
quality if increased speed simply means that new information arrives at the market more often. 
If this is the case, I would expect to see more rapid changes in prices as investors revise their 
beliefs about the value of their holdings (see Madhavan et al., 1997). It is important to note that 
for the absolute value of price changes, the negative (positive) relation between latency (speed) 
and volatility holds for all quartiles (except Quartile 3) and the overall sample; however, the 
results for the standard deviation of stock returns suggest that this negative relation is mainly 
driven by the most active stocks, which indicates cross-sectional differences in the impact of 
latency on volatility. 𝑅2̅̅̅̅ s for the full sample results are 42% and 18% respectively, again 
indicating that my model has a high explanatory power when the frequency of the estimation 
is considered.  
The positive correlation between speed and volatility is consistent with the theory of 
Roşu (2016) and the empirical studies of Boehmer et al. (2015) and Shkilko and Sokolov 
(2016). Firstly, Roşu’s (2016) model predicts that low latency will improve liquidity. As the 




more aggressively. Consequently, increments in aggressiveness in financial markets will 
increase stock price volatility (see also Collin-Dufresne and Fos, 2016). My finding is in line 
with this insight and shows that lower (higher) latency (speed) leads to higher volatility. All 
the estimated coefficients for the control variables are consistent with the literature. 
 
4.4.3   Difference-in-difference estimation of the relationship between speed and market 
liquidity and volatility 
In order to address potential endogeneity, specifically that an unobserved variable 
correlated with information latency might be driving liquidity/volatility or that there exists 
some reverse causality between market quality variables (i.e. liquidity and volatility in my set-
up), I use a quasi-experimental setting studying two technological upgrades that improved 
latency on XSE. Specifically, I attempt to causally link the observed changes in liquidity and 
volatility to latency by employing a DiD framework. 
On July 3, 2017 and April 9, 2018, XSE implemented upgrades to increase the 
exchange’s speed (see Section 4.2.2 for details on the two upgrades). I compare the changes in 
the liquidity and volatility of stocks affected by the technological upgrades with those that are 
unaffected by estimating the following regression model: 
               𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑑 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑑 +  𝛾1𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑑 + 𝛾2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛾3𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑑 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 +
                                                                                                                     ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝐶𝑘,𝑖,𝑑
8
𝑘=1 + 𝑖,𝑑          (4.3)                                      
where i denotes stocks and d denotes days. 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑑 are stock and time fixed effects. The 
dependent variable 𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑑 corresponds to one of the liquidity and volatility proxies: quoted 
(𝑄𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑) and effective (𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑) spreads for liquidity, and absolute value of price 
changes (𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑑) and standard deviation of stock returns (𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑑) for volatility. 




each transaction, 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 is a daily average, each intraday value is computed as twice the 
absolute value of the difference between a transaction’s price and the prevailing bid-ask spread, 
𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑑 measures the absolute difference between the last prices for stock i for days d and 
d-1, and 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑑 is the standard deviation of transaction prices’ returns. Consistent with 
Equations (4.1) and (4.2), all variables are computed for CBOE.  
𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑑 is a dummy taking the value 0 for the pre-upgrade period and 1 for the post-
upgrade period. I employ a 4-month horizon to assess the impact; 𝑑 comprises [-120; +120] 
days. It is important to note that my results are robust to different horizons: 1-, 2-, or 3-month 
periods before and after the upgrade. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 is a dummy taking the value 1 for stocks 
that are affected by the upgrade and zero for stocks that are not. Specifically, my treatment 
group is the 100 stocks that are cross-listed on both XSE and CBOE. Hence, any XSE exchange 
latency upgrade will impact the TL of these stocks. My control group comprises of 100 stocks 
that are only listed on CBOE and not on XSE; thus, upgrades should not have any impact on 
them. In this framework, my treatment and control groups belong to different countries. 
However, this should not have a material impact on my results for at least two reasons. Firstly, 
the results are based on variations at frequencies less than one second; at these frequencies, 
microstructure effects are unlikely to be driven by regulatory regimes in the case of stocks 
trading in quite similar market structures. Secondly, all of the stocks in both groups are 
domiciled and traded within the jurisdiction of the European Securities Market Authority 
(ESMA), and are therefore covered by largely similar regulatory regimes. The approach of 
including stocks from different countries within the same DiD framework is consistent with 
the literature (see as an example Malceniece et al., 2018). Furthermore, in order to ensure that 
I compare like-for-like as much as possible, I employ the approach developed by Boulton and 
Braga-Alves (2010) to match each of the treatment stocks to a corresponding control stock; the 




𝐶𝑘,𝑖,𝑑 is a set of k control variables, which includes 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑑, 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑑, 
𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑑 (in the liquidity models), 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 (in the volatility models), 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑑, 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑖,𝑑, 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑑, 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑑, and 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑑. 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑑 is the first lag of daily return 
(𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑑 is the return of stock i on day d-1), 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑑 is the inverse of last transaction 
price, 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑑 is the natural logarithm of trading volume, 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑖,𝑑 is a trend variable starting 
at zero at the beginning of the sample period and increasing by one every trading day d, 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑑 is computed as the sum of ask and bid sizes, 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑑 is the number of 
transactions and 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑑 is a dummy taking the value 1 for days with macroeconomic 
announcements, and zero otherwise. 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑑 and 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 are as previously defined. 𝛾1 
captures any common effects that might have impacted all stocks following the upgrade, 𝛾2 
captures any pre-existing differences between the treatment and control groups. 𝛾3, the key 
coefficient, captures the interaction of 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑑 and 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 and thus estimates any 
incremental effect of the upgrades on the treatment group. The model is estimated with firm 
and time fixed effects, and standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
Similar to Equations (4.1) and (4.2), I estimate the model for the full sample and quartiles. The 






                                                          
39 I find that there is no material difference in the coefficients of interest between the two specifications. For 




Table 4. 7 Difference-in-difference estimation of the effects of latency on liquidity 
This table examines the relationship between liquidity and latency by exploiting two technological upgrades on July 3, 2017 and April 9, 2018. Specifically, the table reports 
coefficient estimates from the following regression model, with observations sampled at the daily frequency: 




where 𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑑 corresponds to one of two liquidity proxies: quoted (𝑄𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑) and effective (𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑) spreads. 𝑄𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 is the average of the differences between the ask 
and bid prices corresponding to each transaction, 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 is a daily average, each intraday value is computed as twice the absolute value of the difference between a 
transaction’s price and the prevailing bid-ask spread. 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑑 is a dummy taking the value zero for the pre-upgrade period and one for the post-upgrade period, and 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 
is a dummy taking the value 1 for stocks impacted by the upgrade and zero for stocks not affected by the upgrade. The treatment group consists of the 100 stocks cross-listed 
on XSE and CBOE and the control group includes the 100 stocks listed on CBOE, but not cross-listed on XSE. 𝐶𝑘,𝑖,𝑑 is a set of k control variables, which includes 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑑, 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑑, 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑑, 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑑, 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑖,𝑑, 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑑, 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑑 and 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑑. 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑑is the first lag of daily return for stock i on day d (𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑑 is the 
return of stock i on day d-1), 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑑is the inverse of last transaction price for stock i on day d, 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑑 is the standard deviation of transaction prices for stock i during day 
d, 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑑 is the natural logarithm of trading volume for stock i on day d, 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑖,𝑑 is a trend variable for each stock i starting at zero at the beginning of the sample period and 
increasing by one every trading day d, 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑑is computed as the sum of ask and bid sizes for stock i on day d, 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑑 is the number of transactions for stock i on 
day d and 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑑 is a dummy for stock i and takes the value one for days ds with macroeconomic announcements and zero otherwise. Stocks are classified into quartiles 
using Euro trading volume. Firm and time fixed effects are employed, and standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. The sample period covers [-4; +4 months] intervals around each upgrade. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels 
respectively. 
Panel A 
Dependent variable: 𝑸𝒔𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊,𝒅 





















































































































Stock fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝑅2̅̅̅̅  36.3% 35.8% 17.7% 38.6% 48.8% 
 
Panel B 
Dependent variable: 𝑬𝒔𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊,𝒅 





























































































































Stock fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 











Table 4.7 reports the estimation results for when 𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑑 in Equation (4.3) corresponds to 
either the quoted or effective spreads.  
The interaction coefficients (𝛾3) suggest that the technological upgrades are linked with 
decreases of about 4.5bps and 10bps in quoted and effective spreads respectively for the treated 
group of stocks, when compared to the control group. Both estimates are statistically significant 
at the 0.01 level. In order to put the economic significance of this result into some perspective, 
recall that the average latency reduction from the two upgrades, based on our analysis (see 
Panel C in Table 4.3 and Footnote 38), is about 2% or 0.08ms (2% * 4.39). Thus, a 2% (0.08ms) 
reduction in latency is estimated to decrease quoted (effective) spread by 4.5/454 = 1% (10/427 
= 2.3%). This implies that, following the upgrade, liquidity increases and trading costs decrease 
more for my treatment group relative to the control group, and it further shows that the latency 
improvements are, over and above other controlled effects, driving stock market liquidity. 
Importantly, the fact that stocks that were expected to benefit from the technological upgrades 
see a significant improvement in liquidity allows me to establish a causal relationship between 
speed and liquidity, while ruling out endogeneity concerns. Therefore, the results are consistent 
with the earlier fixed effect models. The findings of the DiD frameworks are also consistent 
with the predictions of Hoffmann (2014) and Jovanovic and Menkveld (2016), and with the 
empirical findings of Menkveld (2013) and Hendershott et al. (2011), and suggest that speed 
is generally used by high-frequency market makers as a means of reducing adverse selection 
risk, thus leading to their provision of a higher level of liquidity. Similar to the earlier estimated 
fixed effects model for liquidity, while the positive relationship between speed improvements 
and quoted spread is driven by the most active stocks, the positive relationship between speed 
improvements and effective spread is driven by the least active stocks. The estimated 




quoted and effective spread models are 36% and 30%, respectively. These are substantial 






Table 4. 8 Difference-in-difference estimation of the effects of latency on volatility 
This table examines the relationship between volatility and latency around two technological upgrades on July 3, 2017 and April 9, 2018. Specifically, the table reports 
coefficient estimates from the following regression model using daily frequencies: 




where 𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑑 corresponds to one of two volatility proxies: absolute value of price changes (𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑑) and standard deviation of stock returns (𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑑). 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑑 is the 
absolute difference between the last prices for stock i for days d and d-1, 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑑 is the standard deviation of transaction prices for stock i during day d. 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑑 is a dummy 
taking the value zero for the pre-upgrade period and one for the post-upgrade period, and 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 is a dummy taking the value one for stocks that are impacted by the 
upgrade and zero for stocks that are not. The treatment group consists of the 100 stocks cross-listed on XSE and CBOE and the control group includes the 100 stocks listed on 
CBOE, but not cross-listed on XSE. 𝐶𝑘,𝑖,𝑑 is a set of k control variables, which includes 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑑, 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑑, 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑, 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑑, 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑖,𝑑, 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑑, 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑑 
and 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑑. 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑑is the first lag of daily return for stock i on day d (𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑑 is the return of stock i on day d-1), 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑑is the inverse of last transaction 
price for stock i on day d. 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 is a daily average, each intraday value is computed as twice the absolute value of the difference between a transaction’s price and the 
prevailing bid-ask spread. 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑑 is the natural logarithm of trading volume for stock i on day d, 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑖,𝑑 is a trend variable for each stock i starting at zero at the beginning 
of the sample period and incrementing by one every trading day d, 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑑is computed as the sum of ask and bid sized for stock i on day d, 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑑 is the number of 
transactions for stock i on day d, and 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑑 is a dummy for stock i taking the value one for days d with macroeconomic announcements and zero otherwise. Stocks are 
classified into quartiles using Euro trading volume. Firm and time fixed effects are employed, and standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. t-statistics 
are reported in parenthesis. The sample period covers [-4; +4] intervals around each upgrade. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 
levels respectively. 
Panel A 
Dependent variable: 𝑨𝒃𝒔𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒊,𝒅 














































































































Stock fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝑹𝟐̅̅̅̅  25.9% 8.3% 10.6% 7.7% 46.9% 
 
Panel B 
Dependent variable: 𝑺𝒕𝒅𝒅𝒆𝒗𝒊,𝒅  



























































































































Stock fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 











Table 4.8 reports the estimation results for the volatility measures, i.e. the absolute 
value of price change and the standard deviation of intraday stock returns for stock i on day d. 
The interaction coefficients (𝛾3) suggest that the technological upgrades are linked with 
increases in volatility. Both the absolute value of price change and the standard deviation of 
stock returns (volatility proxies) increase by 2.550 and 0.028 bps respectively for the treatment 
group of stocks in comparison to the control group; the changes are statistically significant at 
0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. The economic significance of these estimates is put into some 
perspective when we recall that the difference between the latencies of microwave and fibre 
optic cable is about 23 times higher than this reduction (1.9/0.08). Again, the results allow me 
to confirm the causal link between speed and volatility. Generally, the findings presented in 
Table 4.8 further support my earlier results and are consistent with the empirical findings of 
Shkilko and Sokolov (2016) and Boehmer et al. (2015). As already noted, the positive 
relationship between speed and volatility is related to increased aggressiveness in financial 
markets (for a more detailed discussion, see also Collin-Dufresne and Fos, 2016; Roşu, 2016). 
The 𝑅2̅̅̅̅  for the absolute value of price change and standard deviation of stock return models 
are 26% and 30%, respectively. 
  
4.4.4   How does latency impact liquidity and volatility? 
In this section’s analysis, I focus on the two channels literature identifies as potential 
avenues through which speed impacts liquidity. The first is that speed aids adverse selection 
risk avoidance by liquidity providers; I call this the adverse selection avoidance channel (see 
as examples Hoffmann, 2014; Jovanovic and Menkveld, 2016). The second relates to speed 
helping faster traders to pick-off the limit orders of slower traders and hence end up decreasing 
liquidity (see as examples Foucault et al., 2016; Foucault et al., 2017); I call the channel the 




The results suggest that fast traders generally use their speed advantage to avoid adverse 
selection rather than to pick-off limit orders of liquidity providers (see also Hagströmer and 
Nordén, 2013; Menkveld, 2013), or at least the effect of the former action dominates the effect 
of the latter action. In this section, I explore this issue further. If my argument about the adverse 
selection avoidance channel is valid, then latency improvements should be accompanied by 
smaller price impacts (see also Shkilko and Sokolov, 2016). This argument links to the stream 
of the market microstructure literature focusing on the links between price impact and liquidity. 
The argument is also anchored on the theoretical approach described in Menkveld (2013). 
Specifically, HFTs using their speed advantage to avoid adverse selection tend to follow market 
making strategies, basically working off a model based on their profits coming from the bid-
ask spread. Adverse selection risk thus poses a risk to their strategy. It follows that if becoming 
quicker helps them to further decrease the risk of adverse selection, they would be more willing 
to provide more liquidity, which decreases a trade’s price impact. 
I follow Baron et al. (2018) in designing a test of the adverse selection avoidance 
channel. I use a fixed effects framework similar to Equations (4.1) and (4.2), the difference 
being that I now employ the price impact of each transaction as my new dependent variable. 
Price impact is computed as in Shkilko and Sokolov (2016); 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 2𝑞𝑡(𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑡+1 −
𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑡), where 𝑞𝑡 is the direction of the trade,
40 and 𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑡 and 𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑡+1 are the prevailing 
midquotes for transactions t and t+1 respectively. Specifically, I run the following model: 
                     𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝛾𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝐶𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
6
𝑘=1 + 𝑖,𝑡                              (4.4) 
                                                          




Table 4. 9 Price Impact and Latency: testing adverse selection channel 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following regression model: 




where 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡 corresponds to the price impact for stock i and transaction t, 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑡 are stock and time fixed effects, 𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is information transmission latency between 
Frankfurt and London. 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 2𝑞𝑡(𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑡+1 − 𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑡), where 𝑞𝑡 is the direction of trade, 𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑡 and 𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑡+1 are the mid-quotes for transaction t and t+1. 𝐶𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 is a set of k 
control variables, which includes the standard deviation of stock returns (𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡) for stock i and transaction t as a proxy for volatility, the effective spread (𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡) for 
stock i and transaction t as a proxy for liquidity, the inverse of price (𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡) for stock i and transaction t, the natural logarithm of trading volume (𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡) for stock i and 
transaction t, market depth (𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡) for stock i and transaction t, and momentum (𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡) for stock i and transaction t. 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is calculated as the standard deviation 
of returns for contemporaneous and previous transactions (transactions at time t and t-1) for stock i, 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is measured as twice the absolute value of the difference between 
the transaction price and the prevailing bid-ask spread for stock i at time t, 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡 is the inverse of the transaction price for stock i at time t, 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is the natural logarithm 
of trading volume for stock i and transaction t, 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 is the sum of prevailing bid and ask sizes for stock i corresponding to transaction t and 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡 is the first lag of 
the stock return for stock i and transaction t (momentum for transaction t is the stock return transaction t-1). The sample consists of the 100 most active German stocks cross-
listed on XSE and CBOE. All variables, except latency, are computed for the CBOE. Stocks are classified into quartiles using Euro trading volume. The sample period covers 
March 2017 to August 2018. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** correspond to 
statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively.  
 
Dependent variable: 𝑷𝑹𝑰𝑴𝑷𝒊,𝒕 






































































Stock fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 















where 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑡 are stock and time fixed effects respectively, and 𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡is the TL between 
XSE and CBOE for transaction t and stock i. 𝐶𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 is a set of previously defined k control 
variables, which includes 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡, 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡, 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡, 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡, and 
𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡.  
The results obtained from the estimation of Equation (4.4) are presented in Table 4.9. 
The standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The estimated latency 
coefficient in Table 4.9 is positive and statistically significant at the 0.05 level. This implies 
that, consistent with the previous sets of results, the price impact increases (decreases) by 10bps 
per unit increase in latency (speed). The magnitude of the effect is also economically 
meaningful; a 1ms decrease in latency is expected to decrease price impact by 4% (10/254). 
The results are therefore in line with the adverse selection avoidance channel argument, and 
suggest that speed incentivizes liquidity providers to trade more as it helps them to avoid being 
adversely selected (see also Hoffmann, 2014; Jovanovic and Menkveld, 2016). The result does 
not hold for the least active stocks, which might be explained by the concentration of HFTs in 
the most active stocks. The 𝑅2̅̅̅̅  for the full sample is 14%.  
As previously demonstrated, volatility also increases with speed. Therefore, I next 
investigate the channel(s) through which speed impacts volatility. A potential channel is 
described in the theoretical model presented by Roşu (2016). Specifically, the model shows 
that as market liquid improves (which, as shown above, is a consequence of speed), fast traders 
face a lower price impact, and therefore trade even more aggressively. Consequently, 
increments in aggressiveness in financial markets will increase stock price volatility (see also 
Collin-Dufresne and Fos, 2016 for the relationship between aggressiveness and volatility). I 
call this channel the aggressiveness channel. A series of estimations already show that speed 
decreases price impact and increases liquidity (see Tables 4.5, 4.7 and 4.9 for details) and form 




second part of the test of the aggressiveness channel argument, i.e. the role of latency on 
aggressiveness, I estimate the logit regression model in Equation (4.5). If my intuition is valid, 
then latency (speed) should decrease (increase) aggressiveness since Roşu (2016) predicts that 
speed can increase volatility through its impact on aggressiveness.  
   𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝛾𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝐶𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
6
𝑘=1 + 𝑖,𝑡                         (4.5)                             
where 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is a binary dependent variable for stock i and transaction t. 
Specifically, 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 equals one for the aggressive trades and zero otherwise. In 
order to classify trades according to their aggressiveness, I employ the modified version of the 
approach proposed by Barber et al. (2009) and Kelley and Tetlock (2013). I start by 
determining the direction of each transaction in the spirit of Lee and Ready (1991). Then, I 
compare the transaction price with the prevailing best bid (ask) price for sell (buy) transactions. 
If the transaction price is below (above) or equal to the prevailing best bid (ask) price, I classify 
this sell (buy) transaction as an aggressive trade. 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑡 are stock and time fixed effects, 
𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡is the TL between XSE and CBOE. 𝐶𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 is a set of previously defined k control 












Table 4. 10 Trade Aggressiveness and Latency: testing aggressiveness channel 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following logit regression model: 




where 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is a binary dependent variable for stock i and transaction t. Specifically, 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 equals one for aggressive trades and zero otherwise. In 
order to delineate trades as aggressive or non-aggressive, I first classify trades on the basis of trade direction (buy or sell) using Lee and Ready’s (1991) algorithm. I then 
compare the transaction prices with the prevailing best bid (ask) price for sell (buy) transactions. If a transaction price is below (above) or equal to the prevailing best bid (ask) 
price I classify the sell (buy) transaction as an aggressive trade. 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑡 are stock and time  fixed effects, 𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is the key variable in the model and the information 
transmission latency between Frankfurt and London. 𝐶𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 is a set of k control variables, which includes the standard deviation of stock returns (𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡) for stock i and 
transaction t as a proxy for volatility, the effective spread (𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡) for stock i and transaction t as a proxy for liquidity, the inverse of price (𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡) for stock i and 
transaction t, the natural logarithm of trading volume (𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡) for stock i and transaction t, market depth (𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡) for stock i and transaction t, and momentum (𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡) 
for stock i and transaction t. 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is calculated as the standard deviation of returns for contemporaneous and previous transactions (transactions t and t-1) for stock i, 
𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is measured as twice the absolute value of the difference between the transaction price and the prevailing bid-ask spread for stock i and transaction t, 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡 is 
the inverse of the transaction price for stock i and transaction t, 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is the natural logarithm of trading volume for stock i and transaction t, 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 is the sum of prevailing 
bid and ask sizes for stock i corresponding to transaction t and 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡 is the first lag of the stock return for stock i and transaction t (momentum for transaction t is the 
stock return for transaction t-1). The sample consists of 100 most active German stocks that cross-listed in XSE and CBOE. All variables, except latency, are computed for the 
CBOE. Stocks are classified into quartiles using Euro trading volume. Marginal effects are reported in brackets and they are computed as the mean of marginal effects across 
stocks. The sample period covers March 2017 to August 2018. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
*, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively.  
 
Dependent variable: 𝑨𝒈𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊,𝒕 












































































































Stock fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 











Table 4.10 reports the estimation results for the logit model. The results are qualitatively 
similar for the overall sample and quartiles. I also report marginal effects in parentheses, which 
show an increase in the probability of aggressive trades if the explanatory variable increases 
by one standard deviation, conditional on all other explanatory variables being at their 
unconditional means. My results show that the 𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant at 0.01 level, which implies that indeed increments (decrements) in 
latency (speed) decrease the probability of aggressive trades. Based on the marginal effects, 
traders are 0.3% less (more) likely to aggressively trade subsequent to increasing latency 
(speed). Overall, I conclude that trader improvements in the speed of order execution ultimately 
drives increased trading aggressiveness, a conclusion consistent with the aggressiveness 
channel hypothesis and Roşu (2016). The McFadden R2 for the full sample is 27%, a substantial 
explanatory level for an estimation based on an intraday estimation frequency. 
 
4.5  Economic implications: the trade-off between higher (lower 
liquidity/volatility) and lower (higher liquidity/volatility) latency 
In Section 4.4, I find that, as argued by various regulators and investors,41 lower 
(transmission) latency between financial markets leads to better liquidity and higher volatility.  
In the market microstructure literature, liquidity and volatility are considered to be two 
important market quality metrics (see as examples, Hendershott et al., 2011; Malceniece et al., 
2018). Specifically, higher liquidity is perceived as good whereas higher volatility might be 
perceived as less beneficial. Thus, my main empirical finding, i.e. lower latency improves 
liquidity and increases volatility, is unable to show whether speed is beneficial or harmful for 
financial markets overall; more explicitly, my analysis does not allow me to show the (net) 






economic implication of latency. Nevertheless, my analysis suggests that there is a trade-off, 
or at least an inflection point at which the liquidity enhancing benefits of speed are offset by 
its volatility increasing effects. Therefore, in this section, I examine the relative impact of 
liquidity, volatility, and latency on expected return by interacting liquidity/volatility with 
latency. This approach allows me to attempt an estimation of the economic implication of 
latency, and to investigate the trade-off between higher (lower liquidity/volatility) and lower 
latency (higher liquidity/volatility). Specifically, I investigate the impacts of volatility and 
liquidity on expected return during regular trading periods and higher latency periods, and then 
compare them. I employ expected return as a key speed-impacting variable for two reasons. 
Firstly, to an investor, expected return serves as an indicator of profits relative to risk; hence it 
holds significant economic implications. Secondly, making valid a comparison between high 
and low latency in this study requires that I employ a variable impacted by both liquidity and 
volatility. The literature shows that, indeed, expected return is a direct measure satisfying this 
criterion. For example, Holmström and Jean (2001) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005) propose 
asset pricing models in which expected return is positively correlated with liquidity risk, and 
Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) empirically test this relationship and find that indeed, expected 
stock returns are positively related to fluctuations in aggregate liquidity. Poterba and Summers 
(1986) explain the theoretical (positive) relationship between expected return and volatility, 
and French et al. (1987) empirically show the positive relationship between expected return 
and volatility (see also Pindyck, 1984). In addition to the well-established literature about the 
relationship between liquidity/volatility and expected return, Malceniece et al. (2018) and 
Brogaard et al. (2014b) show the potential relationship between latency and the cost of 
capital/market efficiency, i.e. the efficiency of capital allocation. The overwhelming view in 




Developing a framework estimating the marginal impacts of latency-interacted liquidity and 
volatility proxies is thus a valid approach. My framework includes the following specification: 
        𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑡 +  𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 ∗
                                               𝐷𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦,𝑖,𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝐶𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
3
𝑘=1 + 𝑖,𝑡 (4.6)                                                
where 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the expected return for stock i at interval t and computed as the mean of returns 
for the previous 60 transaction intervals. 𝐷𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦,𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy equalling one during periods 
of high (low) latency (speed); a transaction interval is designated as a high (low) latency (speed) 
transaction interval if the latency for that interval is one standard deviation higher than the 
mean for surrounding -60, +60 corresponding transaction intervals.42 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑡 are stock and 
time fixed effects, and 𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is the TL between XSE and CBOE. 𝐶𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 is a set of previously 
defined k control variables, which includes 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡, 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡.  
I run two variants of Equation (4.6). In the first specification, I run the model with only 
two explanatory variables, 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡. In this analysis, my main aim is to show 
if expected return is impacted by both volatility and liquidity, as suggested by the literature 
(see Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Poterba and Summers, 1986). This analysis is particularly 
important since my motivation for using expected return as a main variable is based on the 
suggestion in the literature of a relationship between liquidity/volatility and expected return. In 
the second specification, I run the complete model as specified in Equation (4.6). As noted, I 
aim to examine the relative impact of liquidity and volatility on expected return, and therefore 
in the second specification, I standardize all variables to compare the size of coefficients on a 
comparable scale.43  
                                                          
42 For robustness, I designate the transaction interval as an interval of high (low) latency (speed) transaction 
interval if latency for that interval is two standard deviation higher than the mean for the surrounding -60, +60 
corresponding transaction intervals. The results obtained are qualitatively similar to the reported results. 
43 For robustness, I compute standardize coefficients based on un-standardized variables within the regression 




Table 4. 11 Expected return and trade-off between higher (lower liquidity/volatility) and lower latency (higher liquidity/volatility) 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of two specifications of the following regression model: 
           𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑡 +  𝛾1𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾3𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 ∗   𝐷𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦,𝑖,𝑡 +   𝛾4𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾5𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝐶𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
3
𝑘=1 + 𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the expected return for stock i and transaction t, 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑡 are stock and time  fixed effects, 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is the standard deviation of returns for stock i and transaction 
t, 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is effective spread for stock i and transaction t, 𝐷𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦,𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy equalling one during periods of high (low) latency (speed) for stock i, 𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is the 
information transmission latency between Frankfurt and London, and 𝐶𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 is a set of k control variables, which includes the market depth (𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡) for stock i and transaction, 
the inverse of price (𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡) for stock i and transaction t, and the natural logarithm of trading volume (𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡) for stock i and transaction t. 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is computed as the mean of 
the previous 60 transaction intervals (t) returns for stock i, 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is calculated as the standard deviation of returns for the contemporaneous and previous transactions 
(transactions t and t-1) for stock i, 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is measured as twice the absolute value of the difference between the transaction price and the prevailing bid-ask spread for stock 
i and transaction t, 𝐷𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦,𝑖,𝑡 is designated as an interval of high (low) latency (speed) interval (t) if latency for that interval is one standard deviation higher than the mean for 
the surrounding -60, +60 corresponding transaction intervals for stock i, 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 is the sum of prevailing bid and ask sizes for stock i corresponding to transaction t, 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡 
is the inverse of the price for stock i and transaction t, and 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is the natural logarithm of trading volume for stock i and transaction t. In Panel A reports a parsimous model 
estimation, while Panel B reports results for the full model estimation. The sample consists of the 100 most active German stocks that cross-listed on XSE and CBOE. All 
variables, except 𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡, are computed for the CBOE. The sample period covers March 2017 to August 2018. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
Panel A 







Stock fixed effects Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes 
𝑅2̅̅̅̅  22.8% 
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Stock fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Table 4.11 reports the estimation results for Equation (4.6). Panel A reports the 
coefficient estimations with two explanatory variables, i.e. proxies for volatility (𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡) 
and liquidity (𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡). The results show that both 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 are 
individually positively and significantly related with expected return. This result is consistent 
with predictions of the theoretical models developed by Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and 
Poterba and Summers (1986). The estimates show that volatility and liquidity risk are indeed 
priced, and therefore higher volatility and lower liquidity leads to higher expected return (see 
French et al., 1987; Pástor and Stambaugh, 2003 for empirical consistency).  Panel B shows 
the estimation results for the complete form of Equation (4.6). The coefficient of 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is 
positive and statistically significant; 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is associated with a 0.065 standard deviation 
increment in expected return. It implies that volatility is priced and consistent with results 
reported in Panel A; higher volatility is linked to higher expected return. Although the 
coefficient for the volatility proxy is statistically significant, 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡,  the liquidity proxy, 
is not statistically significant, which is inconsistent with the results reported in Panel A; I 
believe this linked to the addition of the latency interacted 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 in the specification.
44 
Notwithstanding, the main focus for this estimation are the interaction variables’ coefficients. 
I observe that when 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 are interacted with the latency dummy 
(𝐷𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦,𝑖,𝑡), both variables become highly statistically significant. 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦,𝑖,𝑡 is 
negatively related with expected return, which implies that, while on average volatility leads 
to higher expected return (see the coefficient estimates of 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡, 0.065), increased latency 
has an ameliorating effect on volatility, leading to reduced compensation since the risk 
presented by volatility reduces. 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦,𝑖,𝑡 is positively related with expected 
                                                          
44 To support this argument, i.e. insignificance of  𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 in Panel B is sourced by adding the interaction 
coefficient, I run the model without 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦,𝑖,𝑡 and find that indeed 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is statistically 
significant in this case. This shows that the positive relationship between illiquidity and expected return presented 
in Panel A, is eliminated because of the added interacted variable. For parsimony, I do not show this result, 




return which shows that illiquidity leads to higher expected return when latency is high. This 
is in line with the expectation that the widening of the spread implies an increase in adverse 
selection, which needs to be priced. Furthermore, the fact that once the interaction 
variable 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦,𝑖,𝑡 is added to the model the significance of 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡’s 
coefficient disappears, while 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦,𝑖,𝑡’s coefficient becomes statistically 
significant, implies that latency is a pivotal determinant of the relationship between liquidity 
and expected return. It thus appears that when liquidity is impaired, I would expect to see a 
higher level of adverse selection risk, which leads to investors demanding higher returns as 
compensation for the adverse selection-induced larger spread they are forced to trade with. The 
results reported in Panel B have several important implications. Firstly, transmission latency – 
the combination of traders’ execution latency, exchange latency, and connection latency – is 
one of the most important determinants of the relationship between volatility/liquidity and 
expected return. Therefore, it plays a vital role in today’s financial markets and the economy. 
This insight is consistent with recent empirical findings in the literature, for example, the 
literature on the potential relationship between HFT and the cost of capital (see as an example, 
Malceniece et al., 2018), and the economic importance of market fragmentation in the 
efficiency of modern financial markets (see as an example, O'Hara and Ye, 2011). Secondly, 
the magnitude (absolute value) of 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡’s coefficient at 0.065 is about 48 times higher than 
the magnitude of 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡’s coefficient at 0.0014. This implies that the risk presented by 
volatility is the more important driver of expected return; this result is further underscored by 
the lack of statistical significance of 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡’s coefficient in Panel B. However, when both 
proxies are interacted with 𝐷𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦,𝑖,𝑡, the magnitude of the impact of interacted liquidity on 
expected return, 0.00420, is slightly higher than the magnitude (absolute value) of the impact 
of interacted volatility on expected return, 0.00419, demonstrating the unmistakable effect of 




being as high as the risk of trading in markets where price volatility is driven by increased 
speed, perhaps even seeing the former risk as being higher than the latter. The implication of 
this finding is that the net effect of low latency is the enhancement of market quality. While 
latency influences the effects of both liquidity and volatility on expected return, the effect is 
more defining and stronger for liquidity.  This finding is consistent with that of Aït- Sahalia 
and Saglam (2013), who show that the speed advantage of HFTs improves the welfare of all 
traders, i.e. both HFTs and low frequency traders, in financial markets, and hence the benefits 
of high speed trumps its risks.  The 𝑅2̅̅̅̅  for the full sample is 42%, which shows that my model 
explains a substantial part of the variation in expected return at the intraday level. For 
comparison, return predictability models typically explain single percentage digits (see as 
examples, Chordia et al., 2008; Rzayev and Ibikunle, 2019). 
 
4.6  Conclusion 
In this study, I examine the role of latency on market quality by focusing on liquidity 
and volatility proxies; my findings are four-fold.  
By estimating latency between Frankfurt and London from transaction-level data, I 
provide empirical evidence that prices in London respond to price changes in Frankfurt within 
3-5ms. This result is consistent with the latencies claimed by the providers of microwave and 
fiber optic connections between London and Frankfurt, and thus demonstrates the empirical 
relevance of my information transmission latency estimation method.  
Secondly, I report that decreases in the information transmission latency between the 
home and satellite markets increases liquidity and volatility in the satellite market; the results 
are robust to alternative liquidity and volatility proxies and more importantly, economically 
meaningful. In order to address potential endogeneity concerns I employ a difference-in-




liquidity and volatility in the satellite market, by examining cross-listed stocks. I find that, 
indeed, liquidity and price volatility in the satellite market increases significantly more for 
stocks directly impacted by the technological innovations in the home market. This allows me 
to establish a causal relationship between speed on the one hand and liquidity and volatility on 
the other, thus ruling out endogeneity concerns. 
Thirdly, I examine the potential channels through which latency impacts liquidity and 
volatility. I provide empirical evidence consistent with the predictions of theoretical market 
microstructure models, suggesting that fast traders use their speed to avoid adverse selection 
risk/cost, a component of the bid-ask spread. This ability to avoid adverse selection risk leads 
to a narrowing of the spread/increased liquidity, which in turn reduces the price impact of 
trades. Faced with lower adverse selection risk, fast traders are more likely to trade even more 
readily, leading to increased aggressive trading and higher price volatility. 
The positive effect of speed on market quality through the enhancement of liquidity and 
its adverse effect on market quality through its increasing of volatility implies a trade-off 
between speed’s positive and negative effects. Therefore, I investigate the relative impact of 
liquidity, volatility, and latency on expected return; the latter is driven by the other three. I 
show that latency is an important determinant for the relationship between volatility/liquidity 
and expected return, and more importantly, while high latency can improve market quality by 
reducing volatility, its liquidity deterioration effect dominates its volatility reduction effect. 









5.1 Summary of findings 
5.1.1 Order aggressiveness and flash crashes 
In Chapter 2, I investigate the contribution of aggressive orders to flash crashes by 
developing a new framework; the framework is the extension of the theoretical approach 
described in Menkveld (2013). This chapter contributes to the literature on flash crashes by 
drawing the link between order aggressiveness and flash crashes, making no assumptions 
regarding liquidity constraints in the market, and explaining the economic motivation of 
aggressive trading during flash crashes. The framework is a three-stage trading strategy. At the 
first stage, a hypothetical trader submits an (excessive) aggressive sell order, leading to stock 
prices going down. Thereafter, the trader submits an aggressive buy limit order and thereby, 
generates increasing pressure on prices. During the last stage, the trader sells his/her securities 
and leaves the market. I show that through the adoption of the noted trading strategy, the 
hypothetical aggressive trader can obtain higher profit under a few necessary conditions, i.e. 
when the trader can avoid being adversely selected. The theoretical framework raises three 
arguments: (1) contemporaneous aggressive orders contribute to flash crashes, (2) the build-up 
of order aggressiveness is inextricably linked to flash crashes, and (3) aggressive orders are 
more profitable during flash crashes. Thereafter, I use ultra-high frequency data from 53 S&P 
500 stocks, affected by the May 6 2010 flash crash, to test the arguments motivated by the 
framework.  
This chapter reveals three major findings motivated by the predictions of the 
framework. First, I show that there is an excessive order aggressiveness at the sell side prior to 
and during the first half of the May 6 2010 flash crash, and thereafter, the buy side became 
more aggressive. Second, I find that the build-up of order aggressiveness may contribute to the 




significantly related to the flash crash. Third, I find that traders behave more aggressively 
during flash crashes, and the economic motivation of this excess aggressiveness is the 
profitability of aggressive orders during these periods. Specifically, I estimate that for the 
stocks in my sample, an informed investor during the flash crash could achieve an additional 
1,482 bps return on his portfolio. 
 
5.1.2  A state space modelling of the information content of trading volume 
In Chapter 3, I propose the state space modelling approach to decompose high 
frequency trading volume into informed and uninformed parts. This chapter contributes to the 
literature on the information content of the trading volume, by proposing a more efficient way 
to decompose the trading volume into liquidity- and information-driven components and by 
examining the role of informed trading in market toxicity, and eliminating arbitrage 
opportunities. 
This chapter acknowledges three major findings. First, the state space approach is an 
empirically relevant and more efficient method to decompose high frequency trading volume 
into its components, i.e. uninformed and informed components. Second, I find that informed 
trading reduces volatility, illiquidity and toxicity in financial markets. Third, my findings 
suggest that informed HFTs eliminate arbitrage opportunities and reduce the return 
predictability window. 
This chapter has important implications for financial markets. Specifically, by using 
this approach, stock exchanges may further understand the evolution of high frequency trading 
volume/information in financial markets, as it allows for the direct estimation of both 





5.1.3 Need for Speed? International transmission latency, liquidity and volatility 
In Chapter 4, I examine the role of latency on market quality by developing a new proxy 
for latency, i.e. information transmission latency (TL), in fragmented financial markets. This 
chapter contributes to the literature on the HFT by being the first to empirically estimate TL 
between the two biggest European financial centres, Frankfurt and London, and analysing the 
combined role of the traders’ execution latency, exchange latency and connection latency 
(microwave or fibre connections) between exchanges on the liquidity and volatility of financial 
markets. This implies that the latency measure I use, TL, is more relevant when measuring the 
impact of speed on market quality in a fragmented trading space; thus, it has further economic 
insights. Furthermore, the study proposes a new method to investigate the net economic impact 
of high speed on financial markets.  
This chapter reveals four major findings. First, my findings suggest that the constructed 
latency metric is empirically relevant, and the information transmission latency between the 
two biggest European financial markets, Frankfurt and London, is 3–5ms. Second, I show that 
higher transmission speed leads to higher liquidity and volatility and that these relationships 
are causal. For this, I employ a difference-in-difference analysis to show the causality. Third, 
I provide empirical evidence that the channels – adverse selection avoidance and 
aggressiveness – proposed by various theoretical models can explain the study’s finding of the 
relationship between speed and market quality. Finally, I show that transmission latency 
between financial markets is an important determinant of the relationship between 
volatility/liquidity and the expected returns, and more importantly, liquidity deterioration 
impact of high latency dominates its volatility reducing effect. It thus implies that the net effect 
of high transmission speed is the enhancement of market quality. 
 





Six main financial markets microstructure issues (flash crashes, trading volume, 
liquidity, volatility, price efficiency and high-frequency trading) are investigated in this thesis. 
My studies deliver the view that the evolution of market structure is not necessarily 
beneficial/harmful for financial markets. Although the studies in this thesis investigate research 
questions in detail, nevertheless there are some limitations in it mainly because of data 
availability.  
Chapter 2 provides an important insights into the links between aggressive orders and 
flash crashes. In this study the aggressive orders and the profit related to these orders are 
estimated from order-level data. While the empirical methods to estimate the number of 
aggressive orders and profits of aggressive traders are well-established and widely accepted in 
the literature, the data employed in this thesis does not have the identifier of traders and thus, 
does not allow me to directly compute the number of aggressive orders and profit of aggressive 
traders for HFTs. Future research can more accurately investigate the predictions of the 
framework described in Chapter 2 employing the data with traders’ identifier. Furthermore, as 
noted in Chapter 2, while my sample selection criteria is motivated by the literature, it may 
lead to sample selection bias. 
Chapter 3 proposes new model, state-space modelling approach, to decompose trading 
volume into liquidity- and information-driven components. I did not include the impact of 
liquidity shocks to the model because of two reasons. Firstly, I aimed to keep model as tractable 
as possible. Secondly, examining the liquidity shocks is outside of the scope of this study. 
Future research can further decompose liquidity-motivated trading volume into general 
liquidity and liquidity shocks components.  
Another limitation can be found in Chapter 4. In this chapter I estimate the information 
transmission speed between Frankfurt and London by using TRTH data. TRTH provides 




not able to estimate the latency beyond millisecond basis. It is clear that some information can 
be lost in the method described in this chapter as a result. The use of microseconds rather than 
milliseconds is therefore ideal for limiting bias. More empirical studies can estimate more 
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APPENDIX 2.B. List of the sample stocks 
ISIN CODE RIC Security name 
US0378331005 AAPL.OQ Apple Inc. 
US03073E1055 ABC.N AmerisourceBergen Corp. 
IE00B4BNMY34 ACN.N Accenture plc 
US0530151036 ADP.OQ Automatic Data Processing Inc. 
US0236081024 AEE.N Ameren Corp. 
US0015471081 AKS.N AK Steel Holding Corp. 
US0200021014 ALL.N Allstate Corp. 
US0231351067 AMZN.OQ Amazon.com Inc. 
US0325111070 APC.N Anadarko Petroleum Corp. 
US1101221083 BMY.N Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. 
US0846707026 BRKb.N Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 
US2058871029 CAG.N ConAgra Brands Inc. 
US1491231015 CAT.N Caterpillar Inc. 
US1651671075 CHK.N Chesapeake Energy Corp. 
US1567001060 CTL.N CenturyLink Inc. 
US1667641005 CVX.N Chevron Corp. 
US2635341090 DD.N E I du Pont de Nemours and Co. 
US2479162081 DNR.N Denbury Resources 
US2605431038 DOW.N Dow Chemical Co. 
US2786421030 EBAY.OQ eBay Inc. 
US2686481027 EMC.N EMC Corp. 
US30219G1085 ESRX.OQ Express Scripts Holding Co. 
US2971781057 ESS.N Essex Property Trust Inc. 
US3453708600 F.N Ford Motor Co. 
US3696041033 GE.N General Electric Co. 
US38259P7069 GOOG.OQ Alphabet Inc. (Google Inc. Class C) 
US4370761029 HD.N Home Depot Inc. 
US4282361033 HPQ.N Hewlett-Packard Inc. 
US4592001014 IBM.N International Business Machines Corp. 
US4581401001 INTC.OQ Intel Corp. 
US9255501051 JDSU.OQ JDS Uniphase Corp. 
US4781601046 JNJ.N Johnson & Johnson 
US1912161007 KO.N The Coca Cola Co. 
US5260571048 LEN.N Lennar Corp. 
US58155Q1031 MCK.N McKesson Corp. 
IE00BTN1Y115 MDT.N Medtronic Plc. 
US88579Y1010 MMM.N 3M Co. 
US02209S1033 MO.N Altria Group Inc. 
US5949181045 MSFT.OQ Microsoft Corp. 
US68389X1054 ORCL.OQ Oracle Corp. 
US7134481081 PEP.N PepsiCo Inc. 
US7170811035 PFE.N Pfizer Inc. 
US7427181091 PG.N Procter & Gamble Co. 
US7181721090 PM.N Philip Morris International Inc. 
US7132911022 POM.N Pepco Holdings Inc. 




US8835561023 TMO.N Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. 
US8825081040 TXN.N Texas Instruments Inc. 
US91324P1021 UNH.N United Health Group Inc. 
US9497461015 WFC.N Wells Fargo & Co. 
US9311421039 WMT.N Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 
US30231G1022 XOM.N Exxon Mobil Corp. 
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